FKIE_CVE-2026-90229
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:20| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/nvme/host/apple.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "97cb6867c9f6de75905b361abfeba136a3d3d120",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5bd2927aceba181b84286e00aa2f56e117e699c3",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5f6f4777b7a8676251139dbfbcdec3cb578f0e40",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5bd2927aceba181b84286e00aa2f56e117e699c3",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bf51e306e3dcffd1a63ef09a7a39d28f3578dd2d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5bd2927aceba181b84286e00aa2f56e117e699c3",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "215d1682f0bae495f3f9cf692b358116b7a18602",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5bd2927aceba181b84286e00aa2f56e117e699c3",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c11685ee4eedc70f738b117a4a8c0fbe84cd79b3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5bd2927aceba181b84286e00aa2f56e117e699c3",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "87d5b9864c8118d26f54de4b66d2bddf2c659272",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5bd2927aceba181b84286e00aa2f56e117e699c3",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/nvme/host/apple.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.191",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.157",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.110",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.52",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme-apple: Destroy the admin queue on removal\n\nThe admin queue is allocated with blk_mq_alloc_queue() but never\ndestroyed. nvme_free_ctrl() only drops the last reference and\nblk_mq_exit_queue() and blk_sync_queue() never run: the hctx is never\nmoved to q-\u003eunused_hctx_list and the timeout timer and work stay armed on\na queue that is about to be freed which will eventually oops inside\nblk_mq_timeout_work().\n\nThis can only be triggered when the controller fails to come up and is\nthen immediately torn down again which is why no one ever ran into this\nbefore.\n\nLet\u0027s just copy what the pcie driver does: unquiesce and destroy the admin\nqueue before nvme_uninit_ctrl().\n\nWith this the following WARN followed by a panic no longer happens:\n\n WARNING: block/blk-mq.c:4390 at blk_mq_release+0x194/0x238, CPU#4: kworker/u34:4/119\n CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 119 Comm: kworker/u34:4 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc1-dirty #248 PREEMPT\n Hardware name: Apple Mac mini (M1, 2020) (DT)\n Workqueue: nvme-wq apple_nvme_remove_dead_ctrl_work\n pstate: 61400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : blk_mq_release+0x194/0x238\n lr : blk_mq_release+0x58/0x238\n sp : ffffc000833a3b50\n x29: ffffc000833a3b50 x28: ffff80001d0450f8 x27: ffff800020c95200\n x26: 0000000000000088 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: ffff800020f36805\n x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffc00081a86878 x21: ffff800020be9c60\n x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800022501698 x18: 000000000000000a\n x17: 7365757165722066 x16: 666f7265776f7020 x15: 0000000000000000\n x14: 0000000000000028 x13: 0000000000004def x12: 0000000000000003\n x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffc000805b4fc8\n x8 : ffffc00081915820 x7 : ffffc00081c4f3c8 x6 : 0000000000000001\n x5 : 0000000000000004 x4 : ffff800022498d80 x3 : ffffc000833a3b14\n x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff800022501698\n Call trace:\n blk_mq_release+0x194/0x238 (P)\n blk_put_queue+0x8c/0xf0\n nvme_free_ctrl+0x4c/0x260\n device_release+0x44/0x128\n kobject_put+0xa0/0x120\n put_device+0x1c/0x40\n nvme_uninit_ctrl+0x48/0x60\n apple_nvme_remove+0x54/0xb0\n platform_remove+0x28/0x40\n device_remove+0x54/0x98\n device_release_driver_internal+\n device_release_driver+0x20/0x38\n apple_nvme_remove_dead_ctrl_wor\n process_one_work+0x1f4/0x770\n worker_thread+0x1b8/0x360\n kthread+0x140/0x160\n ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20\n irq event stamp: 448\n hardirqs last enabled at (447):in_unlock_irqrestore+0x74/0x80\n hardirqs last disabled at (448): [\u003cffffc000811cf5c0\u003e] el1_brk64+0x20/0x60\n softirqs last enabled at (0): [ess+0xb28/0x2698\n softirqs last disabled at (0): [\u003c0000000000000000\u003e] 0x0\n ---[ end trace 0000000000000000\n Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000\n Mem abort info:\n ESR = 0x0000000096000005\n EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL),\n SET = 0, FnV = 0\n EA = 0, S1PTW = 0\n FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault\n Data abort info:\n ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000\n CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagA\n GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0\n [0000000000000000] user address\n Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] SMP\n CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 54 Comm: kwor 7.2.0-rc1-dirty #248PREEMPT\n Tainted: [W]=WARN\n Hardware name: Apple Mac mini (M1, 2020) (DT)\n Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_timeou\n pstate: 01400005 (nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO +DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n pc : percpu_ref_tryget_many.cons\n lr : percpu_ref_tryget_many.constprop.0+0xc0/0x168\n sp : ffffc000829cbce0\n x29: ffffc000829cbce0 x28: ffff800020be9f48 x27: ffff800013e503c0\n x26: 0000000000000108 x25: 000009c05\n x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffffc000819f5000 x21: ffff800020be9f48\n x20: ffff8001deda4808 x19: ffff8000a\n x17: 00000000580e1fac x16: ffffc00082bbbb7c x15: 0000000000000000\n x14: 0000000000000028 x13: 000000001\n x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : ffffc000829cbc20\n x8 : \n---truncated---"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90229",
"lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:20:46.957",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "HIGH",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.4,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.4,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:18.650",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/215d1682f0bae495f3f9cf692b358116b7a18602"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f6f4777b7a8676251139dbfbcdec3cb578f0e40"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87d5b9864c8118d26f54de4b66d2bddf2c659272"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97cb6867c9f6de75905b361abfeba136a3d3d120"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf51e306e3dcffd1a63ef09a7a39d28f3578dd2d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c11685ee4eedc70f738b117a4a8c0fbe84cd79b3"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.