FKIE_CVE-2026-90187

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:20
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: null_blk: free zones array on device power-off null_init_zoned_dev() allocates dev->zones when a zoned device is powered on, but null_del_dev() never frees it on power-off; dev->zones is only freed later in null_free_dev(), when the configfs directory is removed. If the device is powered off and then on again, null_init_zoned_dev() allocates a new array and overwrites the dev->zones pointer, leaking the previous allocation each power cycle. Free dev->zones in null_del_dev() via null_free_zoned_dev() to solve it. And calling null_free_zoned_dev() in null_free_dev() is no longer necessary because every caller already invokes null_del_dev() first: via nullb_group_drop_item() before nullb_device_release(), in the null_add_dev() error path of null_create_dev(), and in null_destroy_dev(). Remove the redundant call. And take &lock around zone_cond_store() in the two store wrappers to serialize dev->zones check-and-deref against its alloc/free, which already run under &lock. The reason there was no problem before is that only nullb_device_release() or null_exit() frees the dev->zones, which guarantees that subsequent users won't access the configfs interface.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/056be41932c95aabdb3c2967d1ef4978f17a0225
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08a31a2cc3d1cea67ccd292d01511cd0a72d4656
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a3afab87124171022fb3579502fa38ef5b311c9
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26d21585caa61c30d0f3044a1e6d172456148c9f
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a6357a9b935a34f5508618fee8a7fffbf7722a8
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2437d37fcc31fce8a5da1cc1739e284814d2491
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/block/null_blk/main.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "26d21585caa61c30d0f3044a1e6d172456148c9f",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ca4b2a011948fae4e4d31490107db4926385a983",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "08a31a2cc3d1cea67ccd292d01511cd0a72d4656",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ca4b2a011948fae4e4d31490107db4926385a983",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "056be41932c95aabdb3c2967d1ef4978f17a0225",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ca4b2a011948fae4e4d31490107db4926385a983",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b2437d37fcc31fce8a5da1cc1739e284814d2491",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ca4b2a011948fae4e4d31490107db4926385a983",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "0a3afab87124171022fb3579502fa38ef5b311c9",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ca4b2a011948fae4e4d31490107db4926385a983",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2a6357a9b935a34f5508618fee8a7fffbf7722a8",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "ca4b2a011948fae4e4d31490107db4926385a983",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/block/null_blk/main.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "4.19"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "4.19",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.191",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.160",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.110",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.52",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnull_blk: free zones array on device power-off\n\nnull_init_zoned_dev() allocates dev-\u003ezones when a zoned device is powered\non, but null_del_dev() never frees it on power-off; dev-\u003ezones is only\nfreed later in null_free_dev(), when the configfs directory is removed. If\nthe device is powered off and then on again, null_init_zoned_dev()\nallocates a new array and overwrites the dev-\u003ezones pointer, leaking the\nprevious allocation each power cycle.\n\nFree dev-\u003ezones in null_del_dev() via null_free_zoned_dev() to solve it.\nAnd calling null_free_zoned_dev() in null_free_dev() is no longer necessary\nbecause every caller already invokes null_del_dev() first: via\nnullb_group_drop_item() before nullb_device_release(), in the\nnull_add_dev() error path of null_create_dev(), and in null_destroy_dev().\nRemove the redundant call.\n\nAnd take \u0026lock around zone_cond_store() in the two store wrappers to\nserialize dev-\u003ezones check-and-deref against its alloc/free, which already\nrun under \u0026lock. The reason there was no problem before is that only\nnullb_device_release() or null_exit() frees the dev-\u003ezones, which\nguarantees that subsequent users won\u0027t access the configfs interface."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-90187",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:20:45.803",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-09-17T17:17:13.270",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/056be41932c95aabdb3c2967d1ef4978f17a0225"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/08a31a2cc3d1cea67ccd292d01511cd0a72d4656"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0a3afab87124171022fb3579502fa38ef5b311c9"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26d21585caa61c30d0f3044a1e6d172456148c9f"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a6357a9b935a34f5508618fee8a7fffbf7722a8"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b2437d37fcc31fce8a5da1cc1739e284814d2491"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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