FKIE_CVE-2026-90178
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-09-17 17:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (coretemp) Fix core_data leak on CPUs without PTS
pdata->core_data is allocated in init_temp_data() when the first core
temp_data of a package is created, but it is only released from
destroy_temp_data(), and only in the branch that handles the package
temp_data.
Package temp_data is created solely when the CPU supports
X86_FEATURE_PTS. On a CPU without it, coretemp_cpu_online() never calls
coretemp_add_core() with pkg_flag set, so pdata->pkg_data stays NULL.
coretemp_cpu_offline() then skips the removal of the package interface,
destroy_temp_data() is never called for package data, and the array is
still allocated when coretemp_device_remove() frees the platform data
that pointed at it.
Release the array in coretemp_device_remove(). destroy_temp_data() sets
pdata->core_data to NULL when it frees it, so the added kfree() is a
no-op on CPUs that do have PTS.
Tested on an Intel Core i5-1135G7. The driver was instrumented to log
every allocation and release of pdata->core_data, and the PTS check in
coretemp_cpu_online() was patched out to emulate a CPU without package
thermal support. Without this change the array was allocated and never
released, and coretemp_device_remove() still saw a non-NULL pointer.
With it the array is released and the pointer accounting balances. On an
unmodified build the release still happens via the package temp_data and
the added kfree() sees NULL, with no slab warnings over repeated module
load and unload cycles.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "dc0d79b1be384e7f6a2308356afd10dcf3bf940f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1a793caf6f6991716cb07583ed7c27de84ef0cba",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "86c1617b7d4b001b20a71deda3c791538a4fa6aa",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1a793caf6f6991716cb07583ed7c27de84ef0cba",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9b23a010a1e8232974617c412cb9f578f3378b70",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1a793caf6f6991716cb07583ed7c27de84ef0cba",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0cd8450c257faa0cece0e0c43d3b55d1a389acc7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1a793caf6f6991716cb07583ed7c27de84ef0cba",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hwmon/coretemp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.9"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.9",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.110",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.52",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwmon: (coretemp) Fix core_data leak on CPUs without PTS\n\npdata-\u003ecore_data is allocated in init_temp_data() when the first core\ntemp_data of a package is created, but it is only released from\ndestroy_temp_data(), and only in the branch that handles the package\ntemp_data.\n\nPackage temp_data is created solely when the CPU supports\nX86_FEATURE_PTS. On a CPU without it, coretemp_cpu_online() never calls\ncoretemp_add_core() with pkg_flag set, so pdata-\u003epkg_data stays NULL.\ncoretemp_cpu_offline() then skips the removal of the package interface,\ndestroy_temp_data() is never called for package data, and the array is\nstill allocated when coretemp_device_remove() frees the platform data\nthat pointed at it.\n\nRelease the array in coretemp_device_remove(). destroy_temp_data() sets\npdata-\u003ecore_data to NULL when it frees it, so the added kfree() is a\nno-op on CPUs that do have PTS.\n\nTested on an Intel Core i5-1135G7. The driver was instrumented to log\nevery allocation and release of pdata-\u003ecore_data, and the PTS check in\ncoretemp_cpu_online() was patched out to emulate a CPU without package\nthermal support. Without this change the array was allocated and never\nreleased, and coretemp_device_remove() still saw a non-NULL pointer.\nWith it the array is released and the pointer accounting balances. On an\nunmodified build the release still happens via the package temp_data and\nthe added kfree() sees NULL, with no slab warnings over repeated module\nload and unload cycles."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90178",
"lastModified": "2026-09-17T17:17:11.807",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:11.807",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0cd8450c257faa0cece0e0c43d3b55d1a389acc7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/86c1617b7d4b001b20a71deda3c791538a4fa6aa"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b23a010a1e8232974617c412cb9f578f3378b70"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc0d79b1be384e7f6a2308356afd10dcf3bf940f"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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