FKIE_CVE-2026-90109
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-09-17 17:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: sched: fix 32-bit backlog wrap in gred, bfifo and plug enqueue
gred_enqueue(), bfifo_enqueue() and plug_enqueue() admit a packet when the
current backlog plus the packet length fits within the queue limit:
sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (gred default VQ)
gred_backlog+qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= q->limit (gred configured VQ)
sch->qstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) <= sch->limit (bfifo)
sch->qstats.backlog + skb->len <= q->limit (plug)
sch->qstats.backlog and q->backlog are u32, and qdisc_pkt_len()/skb->len
are unsigned int, so all sums are computed in 32 bits and wrap at 2^32.
Once the true backlog exceeds 4 GiB the wrapped sum becomes small and
admission keeps succeeding, so the queue grows without bound and the kernel
can be driven to OOM.
Promote the sums to u64 so admission stops once the true backlog exceeds
the limit. The limit is u32, so the bounded queue stays below 2^32 and
the stored u32 backlog never wraps.
The bug can only be reproduced as root (albeit with ridiculous setup):
attach a gred (or bfifo/plug) qdisc with a limit near 4 GiB,
leaving the default VQ unconfigured (for gred), and drive >4 GiB of
queued traffic (e.g. via a size table / stab to inflate qdisc_pkt_len,
or sustained high-rate traffic). The u32 backlog+len sum wraps at 2^32,
admission keeps succeeding, and the queue grows unboundedly to OOM.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sched/sch_fifo.c",
"net/sched/sch_gred.c",
"net/sched/sch_plug.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "3fb51b3960342bbee563543f8d33710fd0fb5a96",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a3eb95f891d6130b1fc03dd07a8b54cf0a5c8ab8",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8b2d8c70b969bf84f9e248bfaf2a7135129f2eb6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a3eb95f891d6130b1fc03dd07a8b54cf0a5c8ab8",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d98b92f3d57976ae185238946ec5ea0be32195aa",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a3eb95f891d6130b1fc03dd07a8b54cf0a5c8ab8",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4c660ee8c809637909f4f7eb1017f7b9401c75c4",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a3eb95f891d6130b1fc03dd07a8b54cf0a5c8ab8",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sched/sch_fifo.c",
"net/sched/sch_gred.c",
"net/sched/sch_plug.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.110",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.52",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: sched: fix 32-bit backlog wrap in gred, bfifo and plug enqueue\n\ngred_enqueue(), bfifo_enqueue() and plug_enqueue() admit a packet when the\ncurrent backlog plus the packet length fits within the queue limit:\n\n sch-\u003eqstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) \u003c= sch-\u003elimit (gred default VQ)\n gred_backlog+qdisc_pkt_len(skb) \u003c= q-\u003elimit (gred configured VQ)\n sch-\u003eqstats.backlog + qdisc_pkt_len(skb) \u003c= sch-\u003elimit (bfifo)\n sch-\u003eqstats.backlog + skb-\u003elen \u003c= q-\u003elimit (plug)\n\nsch-\u003eqstats.backlog and q-\u003ebacklog are u32, and qdisc_pkt_len()/skb-\u003elen\nare unsigned int, so all sums are computed in 32 bits and wrap at 2^32.\nOnce the true backlog exceeds 4 GiB the wrapped sum becomes small and\nadmission keeps succeeding, so the queue grows without bound and the kernel\ncan be driven to OOM.\n\nPromote the sums to u64 so admission stops once the true backlog exceeds\nthe limit. The limit is u32, so the bounded queue stays below 2^32 and\nthe stored u32 backlog never wraps.\n\nThe bug can only be reproduced as root (albeit with ridiculous setup):\n attach a gred (or bfifo/plug) qdisc with a limit near 4 GiB,\n leaving the default VQ unconfigured (for gred), and drive \u003e4 GiB of\n queued traffic (e.g. via a size table / stab to inflate qdisc_pkt_len,\n or sustained high-rate traffic). The u32 backlog+len sum wraps at 2^32,\n admission keeps succeeding, and the queue grows unboundedly to OOM."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90109",
"lastModified": "2026-09-17T17:17:02.873",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:02.873",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3fb51b3960342bbee563543f8d33710fd0fb5a96"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4c660ee8c809637909f4f7eb1017f7b9401c75c4"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8b2d8c70b969bf84f9e248bfaf2a7135129f2eb6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d98b92f3d57976ae185238946ec5ea0be32195aa"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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