FKIE_CVE-2026-90108
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-09-17 17:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: free stashed qentry before overwrite in REQ_ADD_LINK to ADD_LINK transition
When smc_llc_event_handler() transitions the local LLC flow from
SMC_LLC_FLOW_REQ_ADD_LINK to SMC_LLC_FLOW_ADD_LINK on arrival of an ADD_LINK
request, it calls smc_llc_flow_qentry_set() unconditionally:
if (lgr->llc_flow_lcl.type == SMC_LLC_FLOW_REQ_ADD_LINK) {
lgr->llc_flow_lcl.type = SMC_LLC_FLOW_ADD_LINK;
smc_llc_flow_qentry_set(&lgr->llc_flow_lcl, qentry);
...
}
A CONFIRM_LINK or ADD_LINK_CONT arriving while flow->type is
SMC_LLC_FLOW_REQ_ADD_LINK is stashed into flow->qentry via the
SMC_LLC_CONFIRM_LINK / SMC_LLC_ADD_LINK_CONT handler (which stores into
flow->qentry for any non-NONE flow type). When the subsequent ADD_LINK
arrives, the REQ_ADD_LINK branch overwrites flow->qentry with the new pointer
without first freeing the stashed allocation, leaking one kmalloc object.
The stashed entry has no consumer: smc_llc_wait() is only called from
llc_add_link_work, which is not yet scheduled while the flow type remains
REQ_ADD_LINK. No waiter is sleeping on llc_msg_waiter at this point.
It is safe to unconditionally free any stashed qentry before
the overwrite.
Call smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() before smc_llc_flow_qentry_set() in the
REQ_ADD_LINK branch. smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() already checks flow->qentry
before freeing, so the normal path where no entry is stashed is a no-op.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/smc/smc_llc.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "7dd55348c0d9399a9448847819e9f3904ae507ad",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b4ba4652b3f8b7c9bbb5786f8acf4724bdab2196",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "056395acb7041b3a1f2baa08d89a1938a8b8776a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b4ba4652b3f8b7c9bbb5786f8acf4724bdab2196",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b08aacfb226a840628151643b6a34eecf545d311",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b4ba4652b3f8b7c9bbb5786f8acf4724bdab2196",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0fb9a513766071ea9d5f3bf988e39241b8e9ee3b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b4ba4652b3f8b7c9bbb5786f8acf4724bdab2196",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e25a602c45c76a7130878db72bcf6f76df04bf85",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b4ba4652b3f8b7c9bbb5786f8acf4724bdab2196",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "036322025d6e440cb75fc6fecbba9a16b271a2ae",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b4ba4652b3f8b7c9bbb5786f8acf4724bdab2196",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/smc/smc_llc.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.188",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.157",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.110",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.52",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/smc: free stashed qentry before overwrite in REQ_ADD_LINK to ADD_LINK transition\n\nWhen smc_llc_event_handler() transitions the local LLC flow from\nSMC_LLC_FLOW_REQ_ADD_LINK to SMC_LLC_FLOW_ADD_LINK on arrival of an ADD_LINK\nrequest, it calls smc_llc_flow_qentry_set() unconditionally:\n\n\tif (lgr-\u003ellc_flow_lcl.type == SMC_LLC_FLOW_REQ_ADD_LINK) {\n\t\tlgr-\u003ellc_flow_lcl.type = SMC_LLC_FLOW_ADD_LINK;\n\t\tsmc_llc_flow_qentry_set(\u0026lgr-\u003ellc_flow_lcl, qentry);\n\t\t...\n\t}\n\nA CONFIRM_LINK or ADD_LINK_CONT arriving while flow-\u003etype is\nSMC_LLC_FLOW_REQ_ADD_LINK is stashed into flow-\u003eqentry via the\nSMC_LLC_CONFIRM_LINK / SMC_LLC_ADD_LINK_CONT handler (which stores into\nflow-\u003eqentry for any non-NONE flow type). When the subsequent ADD_LINK\narrives, the REQ_ADD_LINK branch overwrites flow-\u003eqentry with the new pointer\nwithout first freeing the stashed allocation, leaking one kmalloc object.\n\nThe stashed entry has no consumer: smc_llc_wait() is only called from\nllc_add_link_work, which is not yet scheduled while the flow type remains\nREQ_ADD_LINK. No waiter is sleeping on llc_msg_waiter at this point.\nIt is safe to unconditionally free any stashed qentry before\nthe overwrite.\n\nCall smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() before smc_llc_flow_qentry_set() in the\nREQ_ADD_LINK branch. smc_llc_flow_qentry_del() already checks flow-\u003eqentry\nbefore freeing, so the normal path where no entry is stashed is a no-op."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90108",
"lastModified": "2026-09-17T17:17:02.730",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:02.730",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/036322025d6e440cb75fc6fecbba9a16b271a2ae"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/056395acb7041b3a1f2baa08d89a1938a8b8776a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fb9a513766071ea9d5f3bf988e39241b8e9ee3b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7dd55348c0d9399a9448847819e9f3904ae507ad"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b08aacfb226a840628151643b6a34eecf545d311"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e25a602c45c76a7130878db72bcf6f76df04bf85"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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