FKIE_CVE-2026-90099
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-09-17 17:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: account classifier filter allocations to memcg
Allocations in the tc classifier *_change() paths (filter objects,
per-CPU counters, and per-filter aux data) use plain GFP_KERNEL without
__GFP_ACCOUNT, allowing unprivileged users to pin kernel memory outside
memcg charging. The shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array allocation in
cls_api.c was also uncharged; this patch closes it along with the
per-classifier filter-object/percpu/aux allocations that remain
unaccounted.
Add GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT to:
- the shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array (cls_api.c), common to every
filter of every classifier (32 pointers, 256 bytes);
- the filter-object, per-CPU-counter, and per-filter aux allocations in
cls_basic, cls_bpf, cls_cgroup, cls_flow, cls_flower, cls_fw,
cls_matchall, cls_route and cls_u32;
- the u32_init_knode() replace-path knode allocation (cls_u32.c), which
allocates the same struct tc_u_knode + sel.keys on every replace of an
existing knode and was missed by the create-path-only conversion.
Also fix the cls_basic error path: basic_change() inserts fnew into the
IDR before allocating the per-CPU counter. If alloc_percpu() fails the
errout path kfree'd fnew without idr_remove, leaving a dangling pointer
in the IDR. With GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT the percpu alloc becomes failable
on demand (memcg at memory.max), making the dead path attacker-reachable
and burning the handle permanently. Add the idr_remove on the percpu
failure path, matching the basic_set_parms failure-path pattern.
Note: vega@nebusec.ai provided a poc for basic_cls, but it was easy to
extend to the other classifiers.
Conditions to recreate the bug:
- CONFIG_NET_SCHED, CONFIG_NET_CLS_* (the classifier being used),
CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT, CONFIG_MEMCG, CONFIG_USER_NS, CONFIG_NET_NS.
- Unprivileged user in a fresh user+network namespace (unshare -Urn),
or root with CAP_NET_ADMIN.
- Create a large number of tc filters (e.g. tc filter add dev lo
ingress ... <classifier> ...) while watching a memcg-limited cgroup:
system slab grows far faster than memory.current, pinning kernel
memory outside memcg charging.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sched/cls_api.c",
"net/sched/cls_basic.c",
"net/sched/cls_bpf.c",
"net/sched/cls_cgroup.c",
"net/sched/cls_flow.c",
"net/sched/cls_flower.c",
"net/sched/cls_fw.c",
"net/sched/cls_matchall.c",
"net/sched/cls_route.c",
"net/sched/cls_u32.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "18c68c8f3d3ff0a4def1391021b439c4333a6c71",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0da974f4f303a6842516b764507e3c0a03f41e5a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1beb81947eb486716af80db7a584f9e9fef7e003",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0da974f4f303a6842516b764507e3c0a03f41e5a",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/sched/cls_api.c",
"net/sched/cls_basic.c",
"net/sched/cls_bpf.c",
"net/sched/cls_cgroup.c",
"net/sched/cls_flow.c",
"net/sched/cls_flower.c",
"net/sched/cls_fw.c",
"net/sched/cls_matchall.c",
"net/sched/cls_route.c",
"net/sched/cls_u32.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.18"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.18",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/sched: account classifier filter allocations to memcg\n\nAllocations in the tc classifier *_change() paths (filter objects,\nper-CPU counters, and per-filter aux data) use plain GFP_KERNEL without\n__GFP_ACCOUNT, allowing unprivileged users to pin kernel memory outside\nmemcg charging. The shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array allocation in\ncls_api.c was also uncharged; this patch closes it along with the\nper-classifier filter-object/percpu/aux allocations that remain\nunaccounted.\n\nAdd GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT to:\n- the shared tcf_exts_init_ex() action array (cls_api.c), common to every\n filter of every classifier (32 pointers, 256 bytes);\n- the filter-object, per-CPU-counter, and per-filter aux allocations in\n cls_basic, cls_bpf, cls_cgroup, cls_flow, cls_flower, cls_fw,\n cls_matchall, cls_route and cls_u32;\n- the u32_init_knode() replace-path knode allocation (cls_u32.c), which\n allocates the same struct tc_u_knode + sel.keys on every replace of an\n existing knode and was missed by the create-path-only conversion.\n\nAlso fix the cls_basic error path: basic_change() inserts fnew into the\nIDR before allocating the per-CPU counter. If alloc_percpu() fails the\nerrout path kfree\u0027d fnew without idr_remove, leaving a dangling pointer\nin the IDR. With GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT the percpu alloc becomes failable\non demand (memcg at memory.max), making the dead path attacker-reachable\nand burning the handle permanently. Add the idr_remove on the percpu\nfailure path, matching the basic_set_parms failure-path pattern.\n\nNote: vega@nebusec.ai provided a poc for basic_cls, but it was easy to\nextend to the other classifiers.\n\nConditions to recreate the bug:\n- CONFIG_NET_SCHED, CONFIG_NET_CLS_* (the classifier being used),\n CONFIG_NET_CLS_ACT, CONFIG_MEMCG, CONFIG_USER_NS, CONFIG_NET_NS.\n- Unprivileged user in a fresh user+network namespace (unshare -Urn),\n or root with CAP_NET_ADMIN.\n- Create a large number of tc filters (e.g. tc filter add dev lo\n ingress ... \u003cclassifier\u003e ...) while watching a memcg-limited cgroup:\n system slab grows far faster than memory.current, pinning kernel\n memory outside memcg charging."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90099",
"lastModified": "2026-09-17T17:17:01.567",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:01.567",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/18c68c8f3d3ff0a4def1391021b439c4333a6c71"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1beb81947eb486716af80db7a584f9e9fef7e003"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
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