FKIE_CVE-2026-90096
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-09-17 17:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: invalidate the correct range after O_APPEND direct write
fuse_direct_write_iter() captures pos before generic_write_checks(),
which moves ki_pos to EOF for O_APPEND writes:
fuse_direct_write_iter()
{
pos = iocb->ki_pos; /* 0 (user-supplied) */
generic_write_checks(); /* ki_pos -> EOF */
fuse_direct_io(); /* writes at EOF, correct */
invalidate(pos, pos + res); /* [0, res) -- wrong */
}
The post-write invalidation targets a stale range instead of the
actual written range at EOF.
This can cause data inconsistency when the file size is not
page-aligned. The tail page straddling EOF has a valid portion
before EOF that concurrent readers can fault back in during the
DIO write window:
Tail page (file size X not page-aligned):
page_start X (EOF) page_end
|--- valid data ----|-- stale --|
CPU0 (O_APPEND DIO writer) CPU1 (buffered reader)
-------------------------- ----------------------
invalidate [X, X+len)
tail page evicted
FUSE_WRITE in flight ...
read [page_start, X)
tail page re-faulted
[X, page_end) = stale
FUSE_WRITE completes
i_size = X + len
invalidate [0, len) <- WRONG
tail page still cached
read [X, X+len)
hits stale tail page
returns old data
Fix by reading pos back from iocb->ki_pos after generic_write_checks(),
as generic_file_direct_write() does.
Also fix a typo in the comment ("may have" -> "may have competed").
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/fuse/file.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "833963069adf86dcbdffd4e7d7b3171f95070b77",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2b0408d0284f4ff376cf5610fa8c9905e93c2541",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "26d7e1f5c407b5859122b5cd47d7ebbf4b4c1cd2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2b0408d0284f4ff376cf5610fa8c9905e93c2541",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/fuse/file.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfuse: invalidate the correct range after O_APPEND direct write\n\nfuse_direct_write_iter() captures pos before generic_write_checks(),\nwhich moves ki_pos to EOF for O_APPEND writes:\n\n fuse_direct_write_iter()\n {\n pos = iocb-\u003eki_pos; /* 0 (user-supplied) */\n generic_write_checks(); /* ki_pos -\u003e EOF */\n fuse_direct_io(); /* writes at EOF, correct */\n invalidate(pos, pos + res); /* [0, res) -- wrong */\n }\n\nThe post-write invalidation targets a stale range instead of the\nactual written range at EOF.\n\nThis can cause data inconsistency when the file size is not\npage-aligned. The tail page straddling EOF has a valid portion\nbefore EOF that concurrent readers can fault back in during the\nDIO write window:\n\n Tail page (file size X not page-aligned):\n\n page_start X (EOF) page_end\n |--- valid data ----|-- stale --|\n\n CPU0 (O_APPEND DIO writer) CPU1 (buffered reader)\n -------------------------- ----------------------\n invalidate [X, X+len)\n tail page evicted\n FUSE_WRITE in flight ...\n read [page_start, X)\n tail page re-faulted\n [X, page_end) = stale\n FUSE_WRITE completes\n i_size = X + len\n invalidate [0, len) \u003c- WRONG\n tail page still cached\n read [X, X+len)\n hits stale tail page\n returns old data\n\nFix by reading pos back from iocb-\u003eki_pos after generic_write_checks(),\nas generic_file_direct_write() does.\n\nAlso fix a typo in the comment (\"may have\" -\u003e \"may have competed\")."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90096",
"lastModified": "2026-09-17T17:17:01.233",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:01.233",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/26d7e1f5c407b5859122b5cd47d7ebbf4b4c1cd2"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/833963069adf86dcbdffd4e7d7b3171f95070b77"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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