FKIE_CVE-2026-90095
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-09-17 17:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: Fix the condition to enable over-io-uring
The existing condition in fuse_uring_cmd() is there only to avoid
disabling io-uring for connections that already run with it, missing
was a condition to refuse any IORING_OP_URING_CMD if the
connection/channel didn't get enabled because of missing FUSE_INIT
reply flag FUSE_OVER_IO_URING. Without the reply flag the barrier in
fuse_uring_ready() doesn't work and IO could already be going on and
cause deadlock states (at a minimum one between fch->bg_lock and
queue->lock).
The change itself is trivial, but brings behavior change,
FUSE_OVER_IO_URING has to be set in the FUSE_INIT_REPLY by fuse servers
to accept any IORING_OP_URING_CMD. Libfuse does that and the only
non-libfuse implementation I found (fractal-fuse) also does it.
Qemu patches for fuse-io-uring are not merged yet, as far as I know.
Moved up is the smp_load_acquire(&fch->initialized) check, as a
fuse-server implementation might try to setup io-uring before FUSE_INIT
is processed and might have gotten -EOPNOTSUPP instead of -EAGAIN.
Also fixed is a stale comment that explains the handling of the
FUSE_OVER_IO_URING flag in early RFC versions.
If there should be a report from any library or application we
probably need to revert this commit.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/fuse/dev_uring.c",
"fs/fuse/inode.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "8f9a725d89711ad027f6b7183586ef91528f106d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3393ff964e0fa5def66570c54a4612bf9df06b76",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1f59015e958174e89be58cc8db16d70a60d17255",
"status": "affected",
"version": "3393ff964e0fa5def66570c54a4612bf9df06b76",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/fuse/dev_uring.c",
"fs/fuse/inode.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.14"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.14",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.6",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3-rc1",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfuse: Fix the condition to enable over-io-uring\n\nThe existing condition in fuse_uring_cmd() is there only to avoid\ndisabling io-uring for connections that already run with it, missing\nwas a condition to refuse any IORING_OP_URING_CMD if the\nconnection/channel didn\u0027t get enabled because of missing FUSE_INIT\nreply flag FUSE_OVER_IO_URING. Without the reply flag the barrier in\nfuse_uring_ready() doesn\u0027t work and IO could already be going on and\ncause deadlock states (at a minimum one between fch-\u003ebg_lock and\nqueue-\u003elock).\n\nThe change itself is trivial, but brings behavior change,\nFUSE_OVER_IO_URING has to be set in the FUSE_INIT_REPLY by fuse servers\nto accept any IORING_OP_URING_CMD. Libfuse does that and the only\nnon-libfuse implementation I found (fractal-fuse) also does it.\nQemu patches for fuse-io-uring are not merged yet, as far as I know.\n\nMoved up is the smp_load_acquire(\u0026fch-\u003einitialized) check, as a\nfuse-server implementation might try to setup io-uring before FUSE_INIT\nis processed and might have gotten -EOPNOTSUPP instead of -EAGAIN.\n\nAlso fixed is a stale comment that explains the handling of the\nFUSE_OVER_IO_URING flag in early RFC versions.\n\nIf there should be a report from any library or application we\nprobably need to revert this commit."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-90095",
"lastModified": "2026-09-17T17:17:01.123",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-17T17:17:01.123",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f59015e958174e89be58cc8db16d70a60d17255"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f9a725d89711ad027f6b7183586ef91528f106d"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
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They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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