FKIE_CVE-2026-90092

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-17 17:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:18
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: reject accept queue add unless BT_LISTEN New sk should not be added to parent socket accept queue after last l2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has run in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() and state set to BT_CLOSED, as that can result to UAF on dereferencing the dangling parent reference. l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() may race with parent l2cap_chan teardown, due to chan->state accessed without consistent locking: [Task 1] [Task 2] l2cap_sock_release(parent) l2cap_connect l2cap_sock_shutdown pchan = l2cap_global_chan_by_psm l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) l2cap_chan_close l2cap_sock_teardown_cb pchan->state = BT_CLOSED l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan) ------> l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) l2cap_new_connection l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) <-------- l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan) l2cap_sock_kill(parent) /* bt_sk(sk)->parent dangling */ Fix by adding check for sk_state == BT_LISTEN after acquiring sk lock in l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb(). Add lock_sock() around sk_state writes where missing, to avoid data races. Although the data races on pchan->state should be fixed too, this defensive sk_state check probably makes sense in any case.
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "bf61a65c6093970e3b50031c4b79ebf3bd411eba",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "0c17c8832562b2aac288e89cefd0f46074f54bcb",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "491e4c60017969b053888029998d2a61f298986a",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5105f3e6b2df619c635b5f6a49fac131a36c7952",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2a3a27aaf19bf069720e024ce6fde54e6bf80df9",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "c88c185ae0a1067823661b220aeea613df2c127b",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "87276dc15b559d32757a43b4415c8445fbae06c4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1810e42ff6716f320c7269d5850eca48b07b7427",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c47339e169bf4a0a4cfabb91351471f67744c2bc",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2ff1a41a912de8517b4482e946dd951b7d80edbf",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "d4bfa78fd67929b62b02013c107973e0c5b7aa9a",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2ff1a41a912de8517b4482e946dd951b7d80edbf",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1b1c0da227bf63479bac9982fc8d12df9aaea0fb",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "85426e97dc72f2088ba6d27e74cd58c3fbd43e31",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "a2dcf1a61d056aef15b63c6eae9441344d624389",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.1.188",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.1.175",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.6.157",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.6.140",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.12.110",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.12.88",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.18.52",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.18.30",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.11",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.10.258",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.16",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.15.209",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.1",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.0.7",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/bluetooth/l2cap_sock.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7.1"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7.1",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.188",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.157",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.110",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.52",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.6",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: reject accept queue add unless BT_LISTEN\n\nNew sk should not be added to parent socket accept queue after last\nl2cap_sock_cleanup_listen() has run in l2cap_sock_teardown_cb() and\nstate set to BT_CLOSED, as that can result to UAF on dereferencing the\ndangling parent reference.\n\nl2cap_sock_new_connection_cb() may race with parent l2cap_chan teardown,\ndue to chan-\u003estate accessed without consistent locking:\n\n  [Task 1]                           [Task 2]\n  l2cap_sock_release(parent)         l2cap_connect\n    l2cap_sock_shutdown                pchan = l2cap_global_chan_by_psm\n      l2cap_chan_lock(pchan)\n      l2cap_chan_close\n        l2cap_sock_teardown_cb\n          pchan-\u003estate = BT_CLOSED\n      l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan) ------\u003e l2cap_chan_lock(pchan)\n                                       l2cap_new_connection\n                                         l2cap_sock_new_connection_cb\n      l2cap_chan_lock(pchan) \u003c-------- l2cap_chan_unlock(pchan)\n      l2cap_sock_kill(parent)          /* bt_sk(sk)-\u003eparent dangling */\n\nFix by adding check for sk_state == BT_LISTEN after acquiring sk lock in\nl2cap_sock_new_connection_cb().  Add lock_sock() around sk_state writes\nwhere missing, to avoid data races.\n\nAlthough the data races on pchan-\u003estate should be fixed too, this\ndefensive sk_state check probably makes sense in any case."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-90092",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:18:58.417",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.0,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.1,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-17T17:17:00.757",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a3a27aaf19bf069720e024ce6fde54e6bf80df9"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/491e4c60017969b053888029998d2a61f298986a"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/87276dc15b559d32757a43b4415c8445fbae06c4"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf61a65c6093970e3b50031c4b79ebf3bd411eba"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c47339e169bf4a0a4cfabb91351471f67744c2bc"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4bfa78fd67929b62b02013c107973e0c5b7aa9a"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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