FKIE_CVE-2026-89966
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-16 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"mm/hugetlb_cma.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "10f616ef06c5bd2d656a0eebaf73f9b09d150c24",
"status": "affected",
"version": "eb02f14c4a2bf4c242d91c4a5d7fb57c3c0ad1b1",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7b8a8ae4dd176a232e973017d2aa3c536a7275e2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "eb02f14c4a2bf4c242d91c4a5d7fb57c3c0ad1b1",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"mm/hugetlb_cma.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.19"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.19",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/hugetlb_cma: fix null nodemask dereference in hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio\n\nalloc_buddy_hugetlb_folio_with_mpol() can pass a NULL nodemask to\nalloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio() as a fallback to allocate from all nodes. If\norder is gigantic, alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio() propagates the NULL\nnodemask down to hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio() via\nalloc_gigantic_frozen_folio().\n\nAdditionally, hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio() previously attempted\nallocation on hugetlb_cma[nid] without verifying if nid is included in the\ncaller\u0027s nodemask. Adding a node_isset(nid, *nodemask) check ensures the\ninitial preferred node allocation honors the memory policy / nodemask.\n\nHowever, hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio() dereferences the nodemask in\nnode_isset(nid, *nodemask) and for_each_node_mask(node, *nodemask),\nleading to a null pointer dereference kernel panic when nodemask is NULL.\n\nFix this by checking if nodemask is NULL in\nhugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio() and defaulting it to\ncpuset_current_mems_allowed. Enclose the allocation attempts within the\ncpuset seqcount retry loop so that if the cpuset changes concurrently\nduring allocation, the attempts are retried using the updated nodemask. \nThis ensures that the initial node check and fallback loop safely honor\nthe task\u0027s cpuset without violating cpuset constraints or causing NULL\npointer dereferences or unexpected allocation failures.\n\nFrom a userspace perspective, this bug allows an unprivileged user to\ncrash the kernel (trigger a panic) by requesting a gigantic hugepage\nallocation with MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY on a system where CMA is only\nconfigured on a subset of NUMA nodes.\n\nThis can be reproduced by booting a VM with two NUMA nodes, restricting\nCMA to Node 1 (e.g., hugetlb_cma=1:1G default_hugepagesz=1G hugepagesz=1G\nhugepages=0), and running a program that allocates a 1GB hugepage area\nwithout reserving, restricts allocation to Node 0 using mbind() with\nMPOL_PREFERRED_MANY, and triggers a page fault:\n\n void *ptr = mmap(NULL, 1UL \u003c\u003c 30, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,\n MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_HUGETLB |\n MAP_HUGE_1GB | MAP_NORESERVE, -1, 0);\n unsigned long nodemask = 1; /* Node 0 */\n mbind(ptr, 1UL \u003c\u003c 30, MPOL_PREFERRED_MANY, \u0026nodemask,\n sizeof(nodemask) * 8, 0);\n memset(ptr, 0, 1UL \u003c\u003c 30); /* Trigger fault */\n\nThis results in a NULL pointer dereference:\n\n BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000\n #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode\n #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page\n Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n RIP: 0010:hugetlb_cma_alloc_frozen_folio+0x75/0x120\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n only_alloc_fresh_hugetlb_folio.isra.0+0x2c/0x160\n alloc_surplus_hugetlb_folio+0x6d/0x100\n alloc_hugetlb_folio+0x3c5/0x660\n hugetlb_no_page+0x3d9/0x650"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89966",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:18:43.030",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-16T11:17:07.160",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/10f616ef06c5bd2d656a0eebaf73f9b09d150c24"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b8a8ae4dd176a232e973017d2aa3c536a7275e2"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.