FKIE_CVE-2026-89956
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-16 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:20| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_ops.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "3ea443510739468238324234eaab0d37922283f5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c1ee8983aa377fef4f725162f4f3aa5f9575d4a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "22dc712c170efc1a549e3f872467c880be995ac7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c1ee8983aa377fef4f725162f4f3aa5f9575d4a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "530ee1cc71562b6799b9ece187b6c1b757a2c6fa",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c1ee8983aa377fef4f725162f4f3aa5f9575d4a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "647916988272fe5ecb4bb30cd02b51af9960618a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c1ee8983aa377fef4f725162f4f3aa5f9575d4a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0fd74477d05743d4cd9b25a3b667daa278d53b93",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c1ee8983aa377fef4f725162f4f3aa5f9575d4a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7fa61c29850d05e40ca9ed41bfdf57673023f581",
"status": "affected",
"version": "2c1ee8983aa377fef4f725162f4f3aa5f9575d4a",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/s390/crypto/vfio_ap_ops.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.191",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.160",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.51",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ns390/vfio-ap: Fix missing lock required to access list of ap_matrix_mdev objects\n\nIn order to traverse or add/remove ap_matrix_mdev objects in the\nmatrix_dev-\u003emdev_list, the matrix_dev-\u003eguests_lock mutex must be held.\nThere are two functions that access the list without holding the mutex:\n\nvfio_ap_mdev_probe function\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nThe vfio_ap_mdev_probe function uses the matrix_dev-\u003emdevs_lock\nmutex to guard the add of a newly created ap_matrix_mdev object to the\nmatrix_dev-\u003emdev_list. This mutex does not protect list access; its purpose\nis to guard against concurrent access to fields contained in an\nap_matrix_mdev object. This could lead to kernel memory corruption or\nuse-after-free if another mdev is created or removed concurrently.\n\nThe adding of an ap_matrix_mdev object to matrix_dev-\u003emdev_list\nis now guarded by the matrix_dev-\u003eguests_lock which is the correct\nway to protect against concurrent mdev_list access.\n\nAlso removed the following two lines of code because the matrix_mdev is\nallocated via vfio_alloc_device macro which uses kzalloc, so req_trigger\nand cfg_chg_trigger are already zero-initialised when the struct is\nallocated before the call to vfio_register_emulated_iommu_dev. This\nprevents a window whereby these triggers are set to NULL after\nthe device is exposed to userspace.\n\nmatrix_mdev-\u003ereq_trigger = NULL;\nmatrix_mdev-\u003ecfg_chg_trigger = NULL;\n\nvfio_ap_mdev_for_queue function\n~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~\nThe status_show function that supports display of the status attribute of\nthe devices in /sys/bus/ap/devices calls the vfio_ap_mdev_for_queue\nfunction which iterates the matrix_dev-\u003emdev_list to find the object\nrepresenting the queue device whose status is to be displayed. In order to\ntraverse this list, the matrix_dev-\u003eguests_lock mutex must be held.\n\nTo fix this, the guests_lock mutex is taken prior to taking the\nmatrix_dev-\u003emdevs_lock mutex in the status_show function. It is taken\nthere rather than the vfio_ap_mdev_for_queue function - where it is\nneeded - because it must be taken prior to the mdevs_lock mutex in order to\nadhere to the proper locking order and prevent a lockdep splat; also\nbecause the mdevs_lock is needed there to access fields within\nthe matrix_mdev object in that function.\n\nSee the vfio-ap-locking.rst in the linux kernel tree."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89956",
"lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:20:36.793",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-16T11:17:05.920",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fd74477d05743d4cd9b25a3b667daa278d53b93"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/22dc712c170efc1a549e3f872467c880be995ac7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ea443510739468238324234eaab0d37922283f5"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/530ee1cc71562b6799b9ece187b6c1b757a2c6fa"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/647916988272fe5ecb4bb30cd02b51af9960618a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7fa61c29850d05e40ca9ed41bfdf57673023f581"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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