FKIE_CVE-2026-89857

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-16 11:16 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:18
Severity
9.8 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: qla2xxx: Hold qpair lock when sending NVMe LS reject qla_nvme_ls_reject_iocb() allocates from and advances the request ring through __qla2x00_alloc_iocbs() (which assumes the hardware_lock is held) and qla2x00_start_iocbs() (which advances the ring and rings the request-in doorbell), but takes no lock itself. Two of its callers invoke it without the producer lock held: - qla_nvme_xmt_ls_rsp(), the NVMe-FC .xmt_ls_rsp transport callback, on its error path, and - qla2xxx_process_purls_pkt(), run from the purex work/DPC context. Both use ha->base_qpair, whose qp_lock_ptr is hardware_lock, so they can run concurrently with normal I/O submission on the base ring and corrupt the ring producer state, leading to duplicated or dropped commands. The third caller, qla2xxx_process_purls_iocb(), runs inside qla24xx_process_response_queue() with the qpair lock already held and is safe; that is also why the lock cannot be taken inside the helper itself (it would recursively re-acquire hardware_lock on the response path). Take qp_lock_ptr around the two unlocked callers and document the helper as caller-locked. Both run in process context, so spin_lock_irqsave() is used and nothing in the locked region sleeps.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11834e5773e20fd3742d7eb900876e66b9e7d029
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7eb618877503edbf17aa65e357a81bda1fc8f163
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b02ff132017b28222187ebcf95ce7f4cb576cd36
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3a362466db6b8ec47cc537ac641ac197fa69b5d
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f743488e4a203049f27ec5d8cd0caccc483af01e
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_nvme.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "7eb618877503edbf17aa65e357a81bda1fc8f163",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "875386b98857822b77ac7f95bdf367b70af5b78c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b3a362466db6b8ec47cc537ac641ac197fa69b5d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "875386b98857822b77ac7f95bdf367b70af5b78c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "11834e5773e20fd3742d7eb900876e66b9e7d029",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "875386b98857822b77ac7f95bdf367b70af5b78c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b02ff132017b28222187ebcf95ce7f4cb576cd36",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "875386b98857822b77ac7f95bdf367b70af5b78c",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f743488e4a203049f27ec5d8cd0caccc483af01e",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "875386b98857822b77ac7f95bdf367b70af5b78c",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/scsi/qla2xxx/qla_nvme.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.6"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.6",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.157",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.110",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.51",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.5",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Hold qpair lock when sending NVMe LS reject\n\nqla_nvme_ls_reject_iocb() allocates from and advances the request ring\nthrough __qla2x00_alloc_iocbs() (which assumes the hardware_lock is\nheld) and qla2x00_start_iocbs() (which advances the ring and rings the\nrequest-in doorbell), but takes no lock itself. Two of its callers\ninvoke it without the producer lock held:\n\n - qla_nvme_xmt_ls_rsp(), the NVMe-FC .xmt_ls_rsp transport callback, on\n   its error path, and\n\n - qla2xxx_process_purls_pkt(), run from the purex work/DPC context.\n\nBoth use ha-\u003ebase_qpair, whose qp_lock_ptr is hardware_lock, so they can\nrun concurrently with normal I/O submission on the base ring and corrupt\nthe ring producer state, leading to duplicated or dropped commands. The\nthird caller, qla2xxx_process_purls_iocb(), runs inside\nqla24xx_process_response_queue() with the qpair lock already held and is\nsafe; that is also why the lock cannot be taken inside the helper itself\n(it would recursively re-acquire hardware_lock on the response path).\n\nTake qp_lock_ptr around the two unlocked callers and document the helper\nas caller-locked. Both run in process context, so spin_lock_irqsave() is\nused and nothing in the locked region sleeps."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-89857",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:18:30.110",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-16T11:16:53.573",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11834e5773e20fd3742d7eb900876e66b9e7d029"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7eb618877503edbf17aa65e357a81bda1fc8f163"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b02ff132017b28222187ebcf95ce7f4cb576cd36"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3a362466db6b8ec47cc537ac641ac197fa69b5d"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f743488e4a203049f27ec5d8cd0caccc483af01e"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.