FKIE_CVE-2026-89815
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-16 11:16 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:18| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_pool.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "329ddc5d438f991f49e4fd24c704d1c7288d5e03",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b63d715b8090aed48bdef5930625946fa4c0d324",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a46ab76b6cf5478e2ac7b942a377c7a1827b436a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b63d715b8090aed48bdef5930625946fa4c0d324",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "941ac10529b3be5965a88d432a161ab459672ba8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b63d715b8090aed48bdef5930625946fa4c0d324",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/gpu/drm/ttm/ttm_pool.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.53",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/ttm: Drop tt-\u003erestore after successful restore\n\nttm_pool_restore_and_alloc() can successfully complete the restore\nprocess via ttm_pool_restore_commit(), but tt-\u003erestore is not dropped\nafterward. As a result, subsequent backup/restore flows observe what\nappears to be a completed restore, while in reality shmem handles are\nstill installed in tt-\u003epages, leading to the stack trace below.\n\nFix this by freeing and dropping tt-\u003erestore in\nttm_pool_restore_and_alloc() upon successful completion of the restore.\n\n20545 [\u00a0 309.784531] RIP: 0010:sg_alloc_append_table_from_pages+0x38c/0x490\n20547 [\u00a0 309.809570] RSP: 0018:ffffc9000623b838 EFLAGS: 00010206\n20548 [\u00a0 309.814827] RAX: 0000000000001000 RBX: ffff88816e42a160 RCX: 0000000000000000\n20549 [\u00a0 309.821986] RDX: 0000000000002000 RSI: 0000000000000003 RDI: 0000000000001000\n20550 [\u00a0 309.829147] RBP: ffff88816e42a168 R08: 0000000000000002 R09: 000000007ffff000\n20551 [\u00a0 309.836310] R10: ffffc9000623b928 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 000000007ffff000\n20552 [\u00a0 309.843471] R13: ffff88815ba5a100 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000001\n20553 [\u00a0 309.850634] FS:\u00a0 00007f9ff305e700(0000) GS:ffff888276c94000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n20554 [\u00a0 309.858749] CS:\u00a0 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n20555 [\u00a0 309.864519] CR2: 00007f9fca701000 CR3: 00000001565e2005 CR4: 0000000008f70ef0\n20556 [\u00a0 309.871678] PKRU: 55555558\n20557 [\u00a0 309.874403] Call Trace:\n20558 [\u00a0 309.876866]\u00a0 \u003cTASK\u003e\n20559 [\u00a0 309.878988]\u00a0 sg_alloc_table_from_pages_segment+0x60/0x100\n20560 [\u00a0 309.884415]\u00a0 ? ttm_resource_manager_usage+0x36/0x60 [ttm]\n20561 [\u00a0 309.889845]\u00a0 ? xe_tt_map_sg+0x7d/0xd0 [xe]\n20562 [\u00a0 309.894045]\u00a0 xe_tt_map_sg+0x7d/0xd0 [xe]\n20563 [\u00a0 309.898037]\u00a0 xe_bo_move+0x927/0xaa0 [xe]\n20564 [\u00a0 309.902029]\u00a0 ttm_bo_handle_move_mem+0xba/0x170 [ttm]\n20565 [\u00a0 309.907022]\u00a0 ttm_bo_validate+0xbe/0x190 [ttm]\n20566 [\u00a0 309.911405]\u00a0 xe_bo_validate+0x9a/0x120 [xe]\n20567 [\u00a0 309.915663]\u00a0 xe_gpuvm_validate+0xd9/0x140 [xe]\n20568 [\u00a0 309.920206]\u00a0 drm_gpuvm_validate+0x2f0/0x5b0 [drm_gpuvm]\n20569 [\u00a0 309.925459]\u00a0 ? drm_exec_lock_obj+0x63/0x210 [drm_exec]\n20570 [\u00a0 309.930627]\u00a0 xe_vm_validate_rebind+0x46/0xb0 [xe]\n20571 [\u00a0 309.935428]\u00a0 xe_exec_fn+0x20/0x40 [xe]\n20572 [\u00a0 309.939249]\u00a0 drm_gpuvm_exec_lock+0x78/0xc0 [drm_gpuvm]\n20573 [\u00a0 309.944410]\u00a0 xe_validation_exec_lock+0x5a/0xa0 [xe]\n20574 [\u00a0 309.949385]\u00a0 xe_exec_ioctl+0x806/0xc30 [xe]\n20575 [\u00a0 309.953639]\u00a0 ? ttwu_queue_wakelist+0xd9/0xf0\n20576 [\u00a0 309.957935]\u00a0 ? __pfx_xe_exec_fn+0x10/0x10 [xe]\n20577 [\u00a0 309.962449]\u00a0 ? __wake_up_common+0x73/0xa0\n20578 [\u00a0 309.966482]\u00a0 ? __pfx_xe_exec_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [xe]\n20579 [\u00a0 309.971263]\u00a0 drm_ioctl_kernel+0xa3/0x100\n20580 [\u00a0 309.975209]\u00a0 drm_ioctl+0x213/0x440\n20581 [\u00a0 309.978637]\u00a0 ? __pfx_xe_exec_ioctl+0x10/0x10 [xe]\n20582 [\u00a0 309.983415]\u00a0 xe_drm_ioctl+0x67/0xd0 [xe]\n20583 [\u00a0 309.987408]\u00a0 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x7f/0xd0"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89815",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:18:25.317",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-16T11:16:46.720",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/329ddc5d438f991f49e4fd24c704d1c7288d5e03"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/941ac10529b3be5965a88d432a161ab459672ba8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a46ab76b6cf5478e2ac7b942a377c7a1827b436a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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