FKIE_CVE-2026-89708

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:18
Severity
9.8 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: RCU-protect cl_cb_session to fix use-after-free on session teardown After a DESTROY_SESSION the per-session teardown path can free a session while rpciod still holds an inflight callback rpc_task that dereferences clp->cl_cb_session. nfsd4_probe_callback_sync() flushes cl_callback_wq, but once nfsd4_run_cb_work() has called rpc_call_async() the rpc_task lives on rpciod; flushing the workqueue does not wait for it. rpc_shutdown_client() does drain rpciod tasks, but uses a 1-second wait_event_timeout — tasks stuck in rpc_delay() (e.g. 2-second NFS4ERR_DELAY retries) can outlive the drain. destroy path rpciod ------------ ------ unhash_session(ses) nfsd4_probe_callback_sync(clp) flush_workqueue(cl_callback_wq) /* returns; rpc_task still live */ nfsd4_put_session_locked(ses) free_session(ses) -> kfree(ses) nfsd4_cb_sequence_done() reads cb_clp->cl_cb_session /* freed slab */ A second window exists in nfsd4_process_cb_update(). When __nfsd4_find_backchannel() returns NULL because unhash_session() has already removed the destroyed session from cl_sessions, setup_callback_client() takes the v4.1 early return so clp->cl_cb_session = ses never fires and the field retains a pointer to the about-to-be-freed session. Fix both by converting cl_cb_session to an RCU-protected pointer: - Move the cl_cb_session = ses assignment in setup_callback_client() to after rpc_create() succeeds, so it is only published when a working backchannel exists. Clear cl_cb_session on the error return in nfsd4_process_cb_update(). Both stores use rcu_assign_pointer(). - Annotate cl_cb_session with __rcu. All rpciod-side readers use rcu_read_lock()/rcu_dereference() and check for NULL, bailing to the appropriate error or requeue path: encode_cb_sequence4args(), decode_cb_sequence4resok(), nfsd41_cb_get_slot(), nfsd41_cb_release_slot(), nfsd4_cb_prepare(), and nfsd4_cb_sequence_done(). - Switch __free_session() from kfree() to kfree_rcu() so the session slab is not reclaimed until after an RCU grace period, guaranteeing that rpciod readers inside rcu_read_lock() never dereference freed memory. - Pass the session pointer to the nfsd_cb_seq_status and nfsd_cb_free_slot tracepoints instead of having them re-read cl_cb_session. - nfsd4_cb_prepare() calls rpc_exit() when the session is NULL, routing through the done/release path to requeue the callback.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01c5d5f58a5db9b0ee5afba2e49d3157788687b2
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13bdd486c3aad4fc19e6d8b9c3556a4b4c190b25
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2775ec1d617e665eab71ce0f13ab1f7959713a2b
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f164eb52b6f3cbf40f07fe379f9f421f88e02f76
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c",
            "fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c",
            "fs/nfsd/state.h",
            "fs/nfsd/trace.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "2775ec1d617e665eab71ce0f13ab1f7959713a2b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "dcbeaa68dbbdacbbb330a86c7fc95a28473fc209",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f164eb52b6f3cbf40f07fe379f9f421f88e02f76",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "dcbeaa68dbbdacbbb330a86c7fc95a28473fc209",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "13bdd486c3aad4fc19e6d8b9c3556a4b4c190b25",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "dcbeaa68dbbdacbbb330a86c7fc95a28473fc209",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "01c5d5f58a5db9b0ee5afba2e49d3157788687b2",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "dcbeaa68dbbdacbbb330a86c7fc95a28473fc209",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/nfsd/nfs4callback.c",
            "fs/nfsd/nfs4state.c",
            "fs/nfsd/state.h",
            "fs/nfsd/trace.h"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.6.38"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.6.38",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.111",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.50",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: RCU-protect cl_cb_session to fix use-after-free on session teardown\n\nAfter a DESTROY_SESSION the per-session teardown path can free a\nsession while rpciod still holds an inflight callback rpc_task that\ndereferences clp-\u003ecl_cb_session.  nfsd4_probe_callback_sync() flushes\ncl_callback_wq, but once nfsd4_run_cb_work() has called\nrpc_call_async() the rpc_task lives on rpciod; flushing the workqueue\ndoes not wait for it.  rpc_shutdown_client() does drain rpciod tasks,\nbut uses a 1-second wait_event_timeout \u2014 tasks stuck in rpc_delay()\n(e.g. 2-second NFS4ERR_DELAY retries) can outlive the drain.\n\n    destroy path                       rpciod\n    ------------                       ------\n    unhash_session(ses)\n    nfsd4_probe_callback_sync(clp)\n      flush_workqueue(cl_callback_wq)\n      /* returns; rpc_task still live */\n    nfsd4_put_session_locked(ses)\n    free_session(ses) -\u003e kfree(ses)\n                                       nfsd4_cb_sequence_done()\n                                         reads cb_clp-\u003ecl_cb_session\n                                         /* freed slab */\n\nA second window exists in nfsd4_process_cb_update().  When\n__nfsd4_find_backchannel() returns NULL because unhash_session() has\nalready removed the destroyed session from cl_sessions,\nsetup_callback_client() takes the v4.1 early return so\nclp-\u003ecl_cb_session = ses never fires and the field retains a pointer\nto the about-to-be-freed session.\n\nFix both by converting cl_cb_session to an RCU-protected pointer:\n\n  - Move the cl_cb_session = ses assignment in setup_callback_client()\n    to after rpc_create() succeeds, so it is only published when a\n    working backchannel exists.  Clear cl_cb_session on the error\n    return in nfsd4_process_cb_update().  Both stores use\n    rcu_assign_pointer().\n\n  - Annotate cl_cb_session with __rcu.  All rpciod-side readers use\n    rcu_read_lock()/rcu_dereference() and check for NULL, bailing to\n    the appropriate error or requeue path:\n    encode_cb_sequence4args(), decode_cb_sequence4resok(),\n    nfsd41_cb_get_slot(), nfsd41_cb_release_slot(),\n    nfsd4_cb_prepare(), and nfsd4_cb_sequence_done().\n\n  - Switch __free_session() from kfree() to kfree_rcu() so the\n    session slab is not reclaimed until after an RCU grace period,\n    guaranteeing that rpciod readers inside rcu_read_lock() never\n    dereference freed memory.\n\n  - Pass the session pointer to the nfsd_cb_seq_status and\n    nfsd_cb_free_slot tracepoints instead of having them re-read\n    cl_cb_session.\n\n  - nfsd4_cb_prepare() calls rpc_exit() when the session is NULL,\n    routing through the done/release path to requeue the callback."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-89708",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:18:09.590",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-89708",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-16T19:26:20.755207Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-11T20:19:58.140",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/01c5d5f58a5db9b0ee5afba2e49d3157788687b2"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13bdd486c3aad4fc19e6d8b9c3556a4b4c190b25"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2775ec1d617e665eab71ce0f13ab1f7959713a2b"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f164eb52b6f3cbf40f07fe379f9f421f88e02f76"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.




Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Loading timeline…




    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.