FKIE_CVE-2026-89666

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:20
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: reject out-of-range nseconds in NFSv3 SETATTR and create ops A client can send an NFSv3 SETATTR, CREATE, MKDIR, SYMLINK or MKNOD carrying an atime or mtime whose nseconds field is out of range. The value is well-formed on the wire and decodes cleanly into a valid uint32, but it is not a valid timespec64: tv_nsec must be less than NSEC_PER_SEC. Nothing in the setattr path clamps it. notify_change() runs the time through timestamp_truncate(), which does not reduce tv_nsec below NSEC_PER_SEC when the filesystem supports nanosecond granularity (s_time_gran == 1), and the inode atime/mtime setters store it verbatim (only ctime is normalized, via inode_set_ctime_to_ts()). The un-normalized value then corrupts on-disk metadata: ext4's ext4_encode_extra_time() shifts tv_nsec left by EXT4_EPOCH_BITS, which overflows the 32-bit extra field and clobbers the seconds-epoch bits, so the stored seconds (and thus the year) are wrong on read-back. XFS with bigtime mis-stores the timestamp for the same reason. Validate the client-supplied atime/mtime in the proc handlers and return NFS3ERR_INVAL before anything is changed. RFC 1813 lists NFS3ERR_INVAL for SETATTR and describes it as the error for a value the server 'can not store ... in its own representation'; the client maps it to EINVAL. Checking in the proc handlers, rather than in nfsd_setattr(), keeps the rejection in front of object creation. The create operations create the object before nfsd_create_setattr() runs, so a late failure would leave the new object behind and turn a non-idempotent request into a namespace change that reports failure. The check is therefore done up front, for the create operations before the object is created. tv_nsec is a long, so the comparison casts it to unsigned long (the same width) rather than to u32, matching timespec64_valid(). A u32 cast would truncate on 64-bit; the unsigned long cast also rejects a value that became negative when an out-of-range u32 wire nseconds was assigned to a 32-bit long. Only client-supplied times are checked: SET_TO_SERVER_TIME requests carry no client value. The sattrguard3 ctime is deliberately left alone: an out-of-range guard simply never matches the object's ctime and yields NFS3ERR_NOT_SYNC via the existing guardtime comparison, which is the protocol-correct outcome rather than rejecting the request.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54e02f5e32c52fb395f2ee02986a6c6d5608d22b
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55341d8a5a0f5853e70d46f5a55cf06007808f1d
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98fc1d21a7b80324ba64b949ac6bcc00364dd068
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cacda0762d7af24a27f7265711bc05095ece56b9
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2543852152bcf9aeb57da17d9f9219f7df8aafb
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb0eca7720662ba5847df1510e73801f7f473094
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/nfsd/nfs3proc.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "cacda0762d7af24a27f7265711bc05095ece56b9",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "98fc1d21a7b80324ba64b949ac6bcc00364dd068",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "55341d8a5a0f5853e70d46f5a55cf06007808f1d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "54e02f5e32c52fb395f2ee02986a6c6d5608d22b",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "e2543852152bcf9aeb57da17d9f9219f7df8aafb",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "eb0eca7720662ba5847df1510e73801f7f473094",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/nfsd/nfs3proc.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.6.12"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.6.12",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.191",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.160",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.109",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.50",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: reject out-of-range nseconds in NFSv3 SETATTR and create ops\n\nA client can send an NFSv3 SETATTR, CREATE, MKDIR, SYMLINK or MKNOD\ncarrying an atime or mtime whose nseconds field is out of range. The\nvalue is well-formed on the wire and decodes cleanly into a valid\nuint32, but it is not a valid timespec64: tv_nsec must be less than\nNSEC_PER_SEC.\n\nNothing in the setattr path clamps it. notify_change() runs the time\nthrough timestamp_truncate(), which does not reduce tv_nsec below\nNSEC_PER_SEC when the filesystem supports nanosecond granularity\n(s_time_gran == 1), and the inode atime/mtime setters store it verbatim\n(only ctime is normalized, via inode_set_ctime_to_ts()). The\nun-normalized value then corrupts on-disk metadata: ext4\u0027s\next4_encode_extra_time() shifts tv_nsec left by EXT4_EPOCH_BITS, which\noverflows the 32-bit extra field and clobbers the seconds-epoch bits, so\nthe stored seconds (and thus the year) are wrong on read-back. XFS with\nbigtime mis-stores the timestamp for the same reason.\n\nValidate the client-supplied atime/mtime in the proc handlers and return\nNFS3ERR_INVAL before anything is changed. RFC 1813 lists NFS3ERR_INVAL\nfor SETATTR and describes it as the error for a value the server \u0027can\nnot store ... in its own representation\u0027; the client maps it to EINVAL.\n\nChecking in the proc handlers, rather than in nfsd_setattr(), keeps the\nrejection in front of object creation. The create operations create the\nobject before nfsd_create_setattr() runs, so a late failure would leave\nthe new object behind and turn a non-idempotent request into a namespace\nchange that reports failure. The check is therefore done up front, for\nthe create operations before the object is created.\n\ntv_nsec is a long, so the comparison casts it to unsigned long (the same\nwidth) rather than to u32, matching timespec64_valid(). A u32 cast would\ntruncate on 64-bit; the unsigned long cast also rejects a value that\nbecame negative when an out-of-range u32 wire nseconds was assigned to a\n32-bit long.\n\nOnly client-supplied times are checked: SET_TO_SERVER_TIME requests\ncarry no client value. The sattrguard3 ctime is deliberately left alone:\nan out-of-range guard simply never matches the object\u0027s ctime and yields\nNFS3ERR_NOT_SYNC via the existing guardtime comparison, which is the\nprotocol-correct outcome rather than rejecting the request."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-89666",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:20:25.267",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-09-11T20:19:53.050",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54e02f5e32c52fb395f2ee02986a6c6d5608d22b"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/55341d8a5a0f5853e70d46f5a55cf06007808f1d"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/98fc1d21a7b80324ba64b949ac6bcc00364dd068"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cacda0762d7af24a27f7265711bc05095ece56b9"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2543852152bcf9aeb57da17d9f9219f7df8aafb"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eb0eca7720662ba5847df1510e73801f7f473094"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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