FKIE_CVE-2026-89651

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:18
Severity
9.8 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: bound MDSCapAuth path and fs_name decode in handle_session() handle_session() decodes the MDSCapAuth records carried by a CEPH_SESSION_OPEN message (msg_version >= 6). For each record the match.path and match.fs_name byte strings are read by first decoding a 32-bit length and then copying that many bytes with the bare ceph_decode_copy(). Unlike the surrounding fields, which all use the _safe decode variants, these two copies are not preceded by a ceph_decode_need() bounds check, and the enclosing MDSCapAuth and MDSCapMatch struct_len fields are skipped rather than enforced as an upper bound. A length larger than the bytes remaining in the message front makes ceph_decode_copy() read past the end of the front buffer. The message front is a dedicated allocation (ceph_msg_new2() -> kvmalloc), so the over-read runs off that object. A malicious or compromised MDS can trigger this with the first post-connect message on mount, with no client-side user interaction; under KASAN it is reported as a slab-out-of-bounds read in handle_session(). Impact: a malicious MDS can force the kernel client to read up to 4 GiB past the message front allocation during session setup, crashing the client (out-of-bounds read). Switch both copies to ceph_decode_copy_safe(), which performs the ceph_decode_need() bounds check before the copy and branches to the existing bad label, matching the rest of the decoder and the error path that frees the partially decoded cap_auths array.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f892c767b30e4fb0c744c59f9235c717383d2cd
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77933e22adfe813be2bd10be08d6e950103c3967
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c37db86d2b5e9b57001ccae7e7a727e95a4f9c02
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc5c7dffda92ef372fa587c444a1c537373df824
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/ceph/mds_client.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "dc5c7dffda92ef372fa587c444a1c537373df824",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1d17de9534cb5a4c4c380d174cc2f9281b34f89e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c37db86d2b5e9b57001ccae7e7a727e95a4f9c02",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1d17de9534cb5a4c4c380d174cc2f9281b34f89e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5f892c767b30e4fb0c744c59f9235c717383d2cd",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1d17de9534cb5a4c4c380d174cc2f9281b34f89e",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "77933e22adfe813be2bd10be08d6e950103c3967",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "1d17de9534cb5a4c4c380d174cc2f9281b34f89e",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/ceph/mds_client.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.10"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.10",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.109",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.50",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: bound MDSCapAuth path and fs_name decode in handle_session()\n\nhandle_session() decodes the MDSCapAuth records carried by a\nCEPH_SESSION_OPEN message (msg_version \u003e= 6). For each record the\nmatch.path and match.fs_name byte strings are read by first decoding a\n32-bit length and then copying that many bytes with the bare\nceph_decode_copy(). Unlike the surrounding fields, which all use the\n_safe decode variants, these two copies are not preceded by a\nceph_decode_need() bounds check, and the enclosing MDSCapAuth and\nMDSCapMatch struct_len fields are skipped rather than enforced as an\nupper bound. A length larger than the bytes remaining in the message\nfront makes ceph_decode_copy() read past the end of the front buffer.\n\nThe message front is a dedicated allocation (ceph_msg_new2() -\u003e\nkvmalloc), so the over-read runs off that object. A malicious or\ncompromised MDS can trigger this with the first post-connect message on\nmount, with no client-side user interaction; under KASAN it is reported\nas a slab-out-of-bounds read in handle_session().\n\nImpact: a malicious MDS can force the kernel client to read up to 4 GiB\npast the message front allocation during session setup, crashing the\nclient (out-of-bounds read).\n\nSwitch both copies to ceph_decode_copy_safe(), which performs the\nceph_decode_need() bounds check before the copy and branches to the\nexisting bad label, matching the rest of the decoder and the error path\nthat frees the partially decoded cap_auths array."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-89651",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:18:02.547",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-11T20:19:51.150",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f892c767b30e4fb0c744c59f9235c717383d2cd"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77933e22adfe813be2bd10be08d6e950103c3967"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c37db86d2b5e9b57001ccae7e7a727e95a4f9c02"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc5c7dffda92ef372fa587c444a1c537373df824"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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