FKIE_CVE-2026-89646

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:18
Severity
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix leaked inode reference on writeback abort at umount ceph_dirty_folio() takes a wrbuffer claim on each newly dirtied folio: it bumps i_wrbuffer_ref (taking an ihold() on the 0->1 transition) and attaches the snap_context to folio->private. That claim is released only by ceph_put_wrbuffer_cap_refs(), which for a submitted write runs from writepages_finish(). In ceph_submit_write(), if ceph_inc_osd_stopping_blocker() fails -- which happens during umount -- the request is aborted before submission: the already-collected folios are only redirtied and unlocked, so writepages_finish() never runs and the claim is leaked. redirty_page_for_writepage() -> folio_redirty_for_writepage() -> filemap_dirty_folio() sets PG_dirty directly and does not go through ->dirty_folio, so ceph_dirty_folio() is not re-entered to rebalance it. Because every subsequent writeback also fails the osd_stopping_blocker, i_wrbuffer_ref never returns to 0, the ihold() is never dropped, and the inode cannot be evicted: VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of ceph kernel BUG at fs/super.c:650! Release the orphaned claim in the abort path before redirtying, via ceph_undo_wrbuffer_claim(): detach the snap_context, drop the wrbuffer reference (letting i_wrbuffer_ref reach 0 and iput() the inode), and drop the snap_context reference -- i.e. do what writepages_finish() would have done for these never-submitted folios. Only the locked_pages entries are undone; folios still in the fbatch were never dirty-cleared by this call (folio_clear_dirty_for_io() is the ownership-transfer point, and a successful move NULLs the fbatch slot), so they hold no claim this call owns.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac7a5a5385762df458d10cccc086a4e079be7409
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c25aee9c630fb86f98d79eccb75765067079b972
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec32015a955c5d326c5e26610edfdcccd52f2314
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/ceph/addr.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "ec32015a955c5d326c5e26610edfdcccd52f2314",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "fd7449d937e7fb3144770592927cf452bf66dbd3",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ac7a5a5385762df458d10cccc086a4e079be7409",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "fd7449d937e7fb3144770592927cf452bf66dbd3",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "c25aee9c630fb86f98d79eccb75765067079b972",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "fd7449d937e7fb3144770592927cf452bf66dbd3",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/ceph/addr.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.15"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.15",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.50",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nceph: fix leaked inode reference on writeback abort at umount\n\nceph_dirty_folio() takes a wrbuffer claim on each newly dirtied folio: it\nbumps i_wrbuffer_ref (taking an ihold() on the 0-\u003e1 transition) and\nattaches the snap_context to folio-\u003eprivate.  That claim is released only\nby ceph_put_wrbuffer_cap_refs(), which for a submitted write runs from\nwritepages_finish().\n\nIn ceph_submit_write(), if ceph_inc_osd_stopping_blocker() fails -- which\nhappens during umount -- the request is aborted before submission: the\nalready-collected folios are only redirtied and unlocked, so\nwritepages_finish() never runs and the claim is leaked.\nredirty_page_for_writepage() -\u003e folio_redirty_for_writepage() -\u003e\nfilemap_dirty_folio() sets PG_dirty directly and does not go through\n-\u003edirty_folio, so ceph_dirty_folio() is not re-entered to rebalance it.\nBecause every subsequent writeback also fails the osd_stopping_blocker,\ni_wrbuffer_ref never returns to 0, the ihold() is never dropped, and the\ninode cannot be evicted:\n\n  VFS: Busy inodes after unmount of ceph\n  kernel BUG at fs/super.c:650!\n\nRelease the orphaned claim in the abort path before redirtying, via\nceph_undo_wrbuffer_claim(): detach the snap_context, drop the wrbuffer\nreference (letting i_wrbuffer_ref reach 0 and iput() the inode), and drop\nthe snap_context reference -- i.e. do what writepages_finish() would have\ndone for these never-submitted folios.\n\nOnly the locked_pages entries are undone; folios still in the fbatch were\nnever dirty-cleared by this call (folio_clear_dirty_for_io() is the\nownership-transfer point, and a successful move NULLs the fbatch slot), so\nthey hold no claim this call owns."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-89646",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:18:01.820",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-11T20:19:50.477",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac7a5a5385762df458d10cccc086a4e079be7409"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c25aee9c630fb86f98d79eccb75765067079b972"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ec32015a955c5d326c5e26610edfdcccd52f2314"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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