FKIE_CVE-2026-89625
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:20| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hid/hid-sony.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "9405e50a64b07d9c6216381d7eac5373e8ce5077",
"status": "affected",
"version": "cc894ac553605c9193a7a94372ff2f8af5766f46",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "8c18db1d6618b37efdb819e35a44d16bfabf171b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "cc894ac553605c9193a7a94372ff2f8af5766f46",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "56ef23198bdd51644372b1a9917802544b30987a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "cc894ac553605c9193a7a94372ff2f8af5766f46",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0e3d42ef008f0931e3878b4f1b046b6e45a95bde",
"status": "affected",
"version": "cc894ac553605c9193a7a94372ff2f8af5766f46",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "114a58640aaf3c2eb97b5b01c75ab5e541d15d9c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "cc894ac553605c9193a7a94372ff2f8af5766f46",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3155dc327344d286f17345cd371be05e255a4328",
"status": "affected",
"version": "cc894ac553605c9193a7a94372ff2f8af5766f46",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a26705bd2e2728833e7a538ce91e58a5eeff496a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "cc894ac553605c9193a7a94372ff2f8af5766f46",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/hid/hid-sony.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.11"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.11",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.224",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.191",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.160",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.111",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nHID: sony: fix UAF of ghl_poke_timer / ghl_urb at driver unbind\n\nFor GHL (Guitar Hero Live) dongles, sony_probe() arms a periodic timer:\nghl_magic_poke() (the timer callback) submits sc-\u003eghl_urb, and the URB\ncompletion ghl_magic_poke_cb() re-arms the timer with mod_timer().\n\nsony_remove() drained the timer with timer_delete_sync() and then freed\nthe URB with usb_free_urb():\n\n\ttimer_delete_sync(\u0026sc-\u003eghl_poke_timer);\n\tusb_free_urb(sc-\u003eghl_urb);\n\ntimer_delete_sync() does not block re-arming, and while the URB is in\nflight the timer is not pending, so the sync delete is a no-op. A URB\ncompletion that runs after the delete re-arms the timer, and usb_free_urb()\nonly drops a reference -- it does not kill an in-flight URB. sc is\nallocated with devm_kzalloc() and freed once sony_remove() returns, so the\nre-armed ghl_poke_timer (embedded in sc) then fires on freed memory, a\nuse-after-free from timer softirq. This is a disconnect/rmmod race.\n\nPoison the URB first, then shut the timer down, before freeing the URB.\nusb_poison_urb() kills any in-flight URB and permanently rejects further\nsubmissions, so a poke timer that is still pending cannot re-submit the\nURB from ghl_magic_poke() in the window before timer_shutdown_sync() runs.\nusb_kill_urb() would not suffice: it only cancels the in-flight URB and\nleaves it submittable once it returns, so the pending timer could\nre-submit it and put a fresh URB in flight over the freed sc.\ntimer_shutdown_sync() then drains any last callback and blocks re-arming.\nThe probe error path is unaffected: it is only reached before the timer\nis armed.\n\nReproduced under KASAN on next-20260710 via dummy_hcd + raw-gadget\nemulation of the GHL PS4 dongle (VID 0x1430 / PID 0x07bb): hid-sony binds\nand arms the poke timer, the poke URB is held in flight, the driver is\nunbound (freeing sc), then the URB is released. The completion re-arms the\ntimer on the freed sc, and the re-armed timer fires ~8 s later:\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ghl_magic_poke+0x98/0xb0\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810b02fd50 by task swapper/0/0\n ghl_magic_poke+0x98/0xb0\n call_timer_fn+0x35/0x2b0\n __run_timers+0x69c/0x9a0\n run_timer_softirq+0x173/0x2a0\n Allocated by task 169: sony_probe\n Freed by task 338: devres_release_group \u003c- hid_device_remove (sony_remove)\n\nFound by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89625",
"lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:20:22.903",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:19:47.890",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0e3d42ef008f0931e3878b4f1b046b6e45a95bde"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/114a58640aaf3c2eb97b5b01c75ab5e541d15d9c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3155dc327344d286f17345cd371be05e255a4328"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56ef23198bdd51644372b1a9917802544b30987a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c18db1d6618b37efdb819e35a44d16bfabf171b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9405e50a64b07d9c6216381d7eac5373e8ce5077"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a26705bd2e2728833e7a538ce91e58a5eeff496a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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