FKIE_CVE-2026-89546

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:17
Severity
9.8 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: close backchannel before destroying callback service A backchannel receive can complete a request while the NFS callback service is being torn down. xprt_complete_bc_request() removes the request from bc_pa_list, drops bc_alloc_count, marks the request in use, and then asks xprt_enqueue_bc_request() to hand it to the callback service. If teardown has already cleared xprt->bc_serv, xprt_enqueue_bc_request() currently returns without enqueueing or freeing the committed request. The xprt_get() taken on entry is leaked as well. If the producer wins the race before bc_serv is cleared, it can also enqueue onto sv_cb_list after nfs_callback_down() has stopped the callback threads, leaving the request linked to a svc_serv that is about to be freed. Close the producer side before callback threads are stopped. Add xprt_svc_shutdown_bc() to clear xprt->bc_serv under bc_pa_lock, and call it on callback shutdown and callback-start failure before stopping the service threads. Requests that lose the NULL transition in xprt_enqueue_bc_request() are released through the normal backchannel free path after balancing bc_slot_count. Finally, drain any remaining sv_cb_list requests after the callback threads have stopped and before svc_destroy() frees the service.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3674f780f47d2906b5a0f7199b66973067bdfeca
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6debde9e3e6ae21dcca75837b4247b13ca4ea2b8
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/nfs/callback.c",
            "include/linux/sunrpc/bc_xprt.h",
            "net/sunrpc/backchannel_rqst.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "6debde9e3e6ae21dcca75837b4247b13ca4ea2b8",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "441244d4273a8037b265fd254dfdaca5fa736ee2",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3674f780f47d2906b5a0f7199b66973067bdfeca",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "441244d4273a8037b265fd254dfdaca5fa736ee2",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "fs/nfs/callback.c",
            "include/linux/sunrpc/bc_xprt.h",
            "net/sunrpc/backchannel_rqst.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.19"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.19",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSUNRPC: close backchannel before destroying callback service\n\nA backchannel receive can complete a request while the NFS callback\nservice is being torn down.  xprt_complete_bc_request() removes the\nrequest from bc_pa_list, drops bc_alloc_count, marks the request in use,\nand then asks xprt_enqueue_bc_request() to hand it to the callback\nservice.\n\nIf teardown has already cleared xprt-\u003ebc_serv, xprt_enqueue_bc_request()\ncurrently returns without enqueueing or freeing the committed request.\nThe xprt_get() taken on entry is leaked as well.  If the producer wins\nthe race before bc_serv is cleared, it can also enqueue onto sv_cb_list\nafter nfs_callback_down() has stopped the callback threads, leaving the\nrequest linked to a svc_serv that is about to be freed.\n\nClose the producer side before callback threads are stopped.  Add\nxprt_svc_shutdown_bc() to clear xprt-\u003ebc_serv under bc_pa_lock, and call\nit on callback shutdown and callback-start failure before stopping the\nservice threads.  Requests that lose the NULL transition in\nxprt_enqueue_bc_request() are released through the normal backchannel\nfree path after balancing bc_slot_count.  Finally, drain any remaining\nsv_cb_list requests after the callback threads have stopped and before\nsvc_destroy() frees the service."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-89546",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:17:49.723",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-11T20:19:37.960",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3674f780f47d2906b5a0f7199b66973067bdfeca"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6debde9e3e6ae21dcca75837b4247b13ca4ea2b8"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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