FKIE_CVE-2026-89542

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:17
Severity
9.8 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: SUNRPC: harden gss_krb5_unwrap_v2 against short tokens gss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reads the EC and RRC header fields at ptr+4 and ptr+6 before validating that the token is at least GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN (16) bytes long, and its rotate_left() helper passes buf->len - base to xdr_buf_subsegment() without verifying that base <= buf->len. When a caller hands in a sub-16-byte token, or a token whose declared len leaves base past the end of the buffer, three distinct failures follow: gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(offset, len, buf) ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset ec = *(ptr + 4) /* OOB read on short head */ rrc = *(ptr + 6) /* OOB read on short head */ rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc) xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, base, buf->len - base) /* u32 wrap when base > len */ _rotate_left(&subbuf, shift) shift %= buf->len /* divide-by-zero when base == len */ After decryption, the cleanup arithmetic has the same shape: movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len); movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen > buf->head[0].iov_len); The BUG_ON re-adds the value just subtracted, so it reduces to min(A, B) > A and is permanently false; it cannot catch the unsigned underflow of movelen, which then drives a ~UINT_MAX-byte memmove(). Add four defense-in-depth guards inside the unwrap core so it is safe regardless of what its callers validate: - reject tokens with len - offset < GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN before touching ptr+4/ptr+6; - bail from rotate_left() when buf->len <= base, covering both the underflow and zero-length cases; - return early from _rotate_left() when buf->len is zero, so the shift %= buf->len modulo cannot fault; - replace the dead BUG_ON with a live check that returns GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN before the movelen subtraction.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/075d7cfc4df8c54cb202ba8b28420370c03ba9b6
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/299d281c7225ded15b28cb861a98d818d82787fc
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6959297aaa9572783d620a226d73c3fb94494888
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/806584a4b67a7233870c33e5b8f872e76dd02988
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84ddbc8d084c0251d534f14f5d1a7da05be56404
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7894e10572d53eb10109b8d07459cc8d3435811
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dddcb0f4b7e27fac16a78ea9a1c8ec2e8a241087
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2591660e0eb263c9415bf0d0bb1b111e62df7a4
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "299d281c7225ded15b28cb861a98d818d82787fc",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "84ddbc8d084c0251d534f14f5d1a7da05be56404",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "075d7cfc4df8c54cb202ba8b28420370c03ba9b6",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f2591660e0eb263c9415bf0d0bb1b111e62df7a4",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "dddcb0f4b7e27fac16a78ea9a1c8ec2e8a241087",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "806584a4b67a7233870c33e5b8f872e76dd02988",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "a7894e10572d53eb10109b8d07459cc8d3435811",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6959297aaa9572783d620a226d73c3fb94494888",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "de9c17eb4a912c9028f7b470eb80815144883b26",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/sunrpc/auth_gss/gss_krb5_wrap.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "2.6.35"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "2.6.35",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.10.270",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.15.221",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.188",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.157",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.109",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.50",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSUNRPC: harden gss_krb5_unwrap_v2 against short tokens\n\ngss_krb5_unwrap_v2() reads the EC and RRC header fields at ptr+4 and\nptr+6 before validating that the token is at least GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN\n(16) bytes long, and its rotate_left() helper passes buf-\u003elen - base\nto xdr_buf_subsegment() without verifying that base \u003c= buf-\u003elen. When\na caller hands in a sub-16-byte token, or a token whose declared len\nleaves base past the end of the buffer, three distinct failures follow:\n\n    gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(offset, len, buf)\n      ptr = buf-\u003ehead[0].iov_base + offset\n      ec  = *(ptr + 4)              /* OOB read on short head */\n      rrc = *(ptr + 6)              /* OOB read on short head */\n      rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc)\n        xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, \u0026subbuf,\n                           base, buf-\u003elen - base)   /* u32 wrap when base \u003e len */\n        _rotate_left(\u0026subbuf, shift)\n          shift %= buf-\u003elen         /* divide-by-zero when base == len */\n\nAfter decryption, the cleanup arithmetic has the same shape:\n\n    movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf-\u003ehead[0].iov_len, len);\n    movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip;\n    BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen \u003e\n                                            buf-\u003ehead[0].iov_len);\n\nThe BUG_ON re-adds the value just subtracted, so it reduces to\nmin(A, B) \u003e A and is permanently false; it cannot catch the unsigned\nunderflow of movelen, which then drives a ~UINT_MAX-byte memmove().\n\nAdd four defense-in-depth guards inside the unwrap core so it is safe\nregardless of what its callers validate:\n\n  - reject tokens with len - offset \u003c GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN before\n    touching ptr+4/ptr+6;\n  - bail from rotate_left() when buf-\u003elen \u003c= base, covering both the\n    underflow and zero-length cases;\n  - return early from _rotate_left() when buf-\u003elen is zero, so the\n    shift %= buf-\u003elen modulo cannot fault;\n  - replace the dead BUG_ON with a live check that returns\n    GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN before the movelen subtraction."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-89542",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:17:49.160",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 9.8,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-89542",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-16T19:23:31.016705Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-11T20:19:37.380",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/075d7cfc4df8c54cb202ba8b28420370c03ba9b6"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/299d281c7225ded15b28cb861a98d818d82787fc"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6959297aaa9572783d620a226d73c3fb94494888"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/806584a4b67a7233870c33e5b8f872e76dd02988"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/84ddbc8d084c0251d534f14f5d1a7da05be56404"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7894e10572d53eb10109b8d07459cc8d3435811"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dddcb0f4b7e27fac16a78ea9a1c8ec2e8a241087"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2591660e0eb263c9415bf0d0bb1b111e62df7a4"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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