FKIE_CVE-2026-89482
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "32ea8ce96b9bd797c59c351ce490ffd97adaa8c0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "25e5cb780e62bde432b401f312bb847edc78b432",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "dd8906bb8f8d5bf1c9f861e1382c82b87bfe7cab",
"status": "affected",
"version": "25e5cb780e62bde432b401f312bb847edc78b432",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7ed0b61bbc145988be292c4d3ec580aebd8d2bcd",
"status": "affected",
"version": "25e5cb780e62bde432b401f312bb847edc78b432",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b96e1ff75e5c0ad6e077ac002b1d30b0a2b49528",
"status": "affected",
"version": "25e5cb780e62bde432b401f312bb847edc78b432",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b36161701cb366f416afdcf70771d432a7c74753",
"status": "affected",
"version": "25e5cb780e62bde432b401f312bb847edc78b432",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6a01b58263108eaf9869bb6f82f07709240c6589",
"status": "affected",
"version": "25e5cb780e62bde432b401f312bb847edc78b432",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "641ad3a30ba560f0a9a610376c568d7b75d2a2aa",
"status": "affected",
"version": "25e5cb780e62bde432b401f312bb847edc78b432",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3a4aa9e6ad3e35f8e24d5eaf38ee4d437075fb36",
"status": "affected",
"version": "25e5cb780e62bde432b401f312bb847edc78b432",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "f507ae6e33cbe56c4e3fe000434fc0ecc263d098",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "b1458c16f4e26e87492e58e4d24a1873bd09232a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.4.36",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.6.8",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/nvme/host/tcp.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.7"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.7",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.270",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.221",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.188",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.157",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.109",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.50",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnvme-tcp: do not accept C2HData based on blk_rq_payload_bytes() alone\n\nCommit 25e5cb780e62 (\"nvme-tcp: fix possible crash in write_zeroes\nprocessing\") established that blk_rq_payload_bytes() must not be read\nwithout first checking blk_rq_nr_phys_segments(), and recorded the\nresult in nvme_tcp_setup_cmd_pdu() as req-\u003edata_len. The receive side\nwas left as it was.\n\nThe two differ for REQ_OP_WRITE_ZEROES, which has no physical segments\nbut a non-zero blk_rq_bytes(), so setup leaves req-\u003eiter untouched\nwhile the receive gate lets a C2HData through and nvme_tcp_recv_data()\ncopies into whatever the previous command on that tag left there. The\ndriver-private area is zeroed only when the tag set is allocated.\n\nReproduced with a test target that leaves a residual iterator on a tag\nand then sends a C2HData for a WRITE_ZEROES command on the same tag:\n\nBUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in _copy_to_iter+0x642/0x1330\nWrite of size 512 at addr ffe728c2175dfa81 by task kworker/0:1H/103\n\nCPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 103 Comm: kworker/0:1H Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-NVMETCP-gf5098b6bae76 #1 PREEMPT(lazy)\nHardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014\nWorkqueue: nvme_tcp_wq nvme_tcp_io_work\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70\n kasan_report+0xce/0x100\n ? _copy_to_iter+0x642/0x1330\n kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0\n __asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60\n _copy_to_iter+0x642/0x1330\n ? __pfx_sock_has_perm+0x10/0x10\n ? worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10\n ? __pfx__copy_to_iter+0x10/0x10\n ? _raw_spin_lock_bh+0x83/0xe0\n ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_bh+0x10/0x10\n __skb_datagram_iter+0xf3/0x820\n ? __pfx_simple_copy_to_iter+0x10/0x10\n ? __asan_memcpy+0x3c/0x60\n ? skb_copy_bits+0x58d/0x830\n skb_copy_datagram_iter+0x37/0x120\n nvme_tcp_recv_skb+0xa07/0x4320\n ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_recv_skb+0x10/0x10\n __tcp_read_sock+0x1ab/0x810\n ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_recv_skb+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_lock_sock_nested+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx___tcp_read_sock+0x10/0x10\n nvme_tcp_try_recv+0x152/0x1e0\n ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_try_recv+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10\n nvme_tcp_io_work+0x1e4/0x6c0\n ? __schedule+0x181a/0x49f0\n ? __pfx_nvme_tcp_io_work+0x10/0x10\n process_one_work+0x633/0x1030\n\nKeep the blk_rq_payload_bytes() test and add req-\u003edata_len to it. The\nold test is what rejects a C2HData naming a tag that is no longer in\nflight, because blk_update_request() zeroes rq-\u003e__data_len on\ncompletion; req-\u003edata_len and req-\u003ecurr_bio are driver-private and\nsurvive completion, so they cannot stand in for it. Setup initialises\nthe iterator only when both req-\u003ecurr_bio and req-\u003edata_len are set, so\nthe gate now tests the same two."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-89482",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:17:41.540",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-89482",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-16T19:22:37.965026Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:19:29.730",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/32ea8ce96b9bd797c59c351ce490ffd97adaa8c0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a4aa9e6ad3e35f8e24d5eaf38ee4d437075fb36"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/641ad3a30ba560f0a9a610376c568d7b75d2a2aa"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a01b58263108eaf9869bb6f82f07709240c6589"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7ed0b61bbc145988be292c4d3ec580aebd8d2bcd"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b36161701cb366f416afdcf70771d432a7c74753"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b96e1ff75e5c0ad6e077ac002b1d30b0a2b49528"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dd8906bb8f8d5bf1c9f861e1382c82b87bfe7cab"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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