FKIE_CVE-2026-8893
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-06-06 00:16 - Updated: 2026-07-23 07:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Express Payment For Stripe",
"vendor": "payaddons",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "1.28.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Express Payment For Stripe plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the \u0027type\u0027 attribute of the [stripe-express] shortcode in versions up to, and including, 1.28.0. This is due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping on the shortcode attribute value, which is concatenated into an HTML attribute in the rendered output of the register_shortcode() function without being passed through esc_attr() or any other escaping function. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with contributor-level access and above, to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El plugin Express Payment For Stripe para WordPress es vulnerable a cross-site scripting almacenado a trav\u00e9s del atributo \u0027type\u0027 del shortcode [stripe-express] en versiones hasta la 1.28.0, inclusive. Esto se debe a una sanitizaci\u00f3n de entrada y un escape de salida insuficientes en el valor del atributo del shortcode, que se concatena en un atributo HTML en la salida renderizada de la funci\u00f3n register_shortcode() sin ser pasado a trav\u00e9s de esc_attr() o cualquier otra funci\u00f3n de escape. Esto hace posible que atacantes autenticados, con acceso de nivel de colaborador y superior, inyecten scripts web arbitrarios en p\u00e1ginas que se ejecutar\u00e1n cada vez que un usuario acceda a una p\u00e1gina inyectada."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-8893",
"lastModified": "2026-07-23T07:10:00.113",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 6.4,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.1,
"impactScore": 2.7,
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-8893",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-06-06T11:36:11.585345Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-06-06T00:16:41.887",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-stripe-express/tags/1.28.0/includes/wp-stripe-shortcodes.php#L31"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/wp-stripe-express/tags/1.28.0/includes/wp-stripe-shortcodes.php#L46"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset?sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail=\u0026reponame=\u0026old=3553233%40wp-stripe-express\u0026new=3553233%40wp-stripe-express\u0026sfp_email=\u0026sfph_mail="
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/1a7dbb82-b484-4b86-b8dc-7a1e7291dec2?source=cve"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-79"
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
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