FKIE_CVE-2026-86462

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-16 09:17 - Updated: 2026-09-18 14:29
Severity
9.1 (Critical) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Summary
Apache Airflow FAB provider: changing a user's password through the Admin user-edit PATCH endpoint does not invalidate that user's existing database-backed sessions. An attacker who already holds a copy of the victim's session cookie keeps full access as that user after the password change, so the password reset does not evict them. Affects deployments using the FAB auth manager with database-backed sessions; an administrator (or the user themselves) performing a routine password change is the trigger, and no attacker interaction with the endpoint is needed. This is a second, independent route to the outcome addressed by CVE-2026-82311, which corrected an identifier comparison in the session-invalidation helper. That fix does not repair this endpoint, because the PATCH path never calls the helper at all. Deployments that applied the CVE-2026-82311 fix must also upgrade for this one. Users of apache-airflow-providers-fab are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.0 or later, which fixes the issue.
References
security@apache.orghttps://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/72657Patch, Vendor Advisory
security@apache.orghttps://lists.apache.org/thread/7sr4sggfv5fhhl3qgphcq0rlhg81do1sMailing List, Vendor Advisory
security@apache.orghttps://lists.apache.org/thread/7sr4sggfv5fhhl3qgphcq0rlhg81do1s?users@airflow.apache.orgVendor Advisory
security@apache.orghttps://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-82311US Government Resource
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
apache apache-airflow-providers-fab *
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://pypi.python.org",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "apache-airflow-providers-fab",
          "packageURL": "pkg:pypi/apache-airflow-providers-fab",
          "product": "Apache Airflow FAB provider",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "3.9.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.2.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "configurations": [
    {
      "nodes": [
        {
          "cpeMatch": [
            {
              "criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:apache:apache-airflow-providers-fab:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
              "matchCriteriaId": "694445E4-472C-48B7-8B7D-4E6A31F2E1BF",
              "versionEndExcluding": "3.9.0",
              "versionStartIncluding": "3.2.0",
              "vulnerable": true
            }
          ],
          "negate": false,
          "operator": "OR"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Apache Airflow FAB provider: changing a user\u0027s password through the Admin user-edit PATCH endpoint does not invalidate that user\u0027s existing database-backed sessions. An attacker who already holds a copy of the victim\u0027s session cookie keeps full access as that user after the password change, so the password reset does not evict them. Affects deployments using the FAB auth manager with database-backed sessions; an administrator (or the user themselves) performing a routine password change is the trigger, and no attacker interaction with the endpoint is needed.\n\nThis is a second, independent route to the outcome addressed by CVE-2026-82311, which corrected an identifier comparison in the session-invalidation helper. That fix does not repair this endpoint, because the PATCH path never calls the helper at all. Deployments that applied the CVE-2026-82311 fix must also upgrade for this one.\n\nUsers of apache-airflow-providers-fab are recommended to upgrade to version 3.9.0 or later, which fixes the issue."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-86462",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-18T14:29:11.393",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 9.1,
          "baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
        "impactScore": 5.2,
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-86462",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "yes"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-17T19:24:26.346666Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-16T09:17:07.090",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "tags": [
        "Patch",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://github.com/apache/airflow/pull/72657"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "tags": [
        "Mailing List",
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/7sr4sggfv5fhhl3qgphcq0rlhg81do1s"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "tags": [
        "Vendor Advisory"
      ],
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread/7sr4sggfv5fhhl3qgphcq0rlhg81do1s?users@airflow.apache.org"
    },
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "tags": [
        "US Government Resource"
      ],
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-82311"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Analyzed",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-613"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}



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