FKIE_CVE-2026-85736
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-06 21:17 - Updated: 2026-11-09 23:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "chartbrew",
"vendor": "chartbrew",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 5.2.3"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Chartbrew is an open-source web application that can connect directly to databases and APIs and use the data to create charts. Prior to 5.2.3, connection creation or update stored attacker-chosen absolute SSL and SSH file paths, and later connection cleanup passed those stored paths to fs.unlink without a path restriction. The vulnerable surface is data-connection certificate and SSH-key cleanup when a connection is removed. A user with createOwn and deleteOwn permissions on their own team stores a target path in a connection and then deletes the connection to trigger cleanup; default self-signup grants teamOwner these permissions. The cleanup routine treats the stored SSL or SSH path as a managed certificate path and unlinks the referenced file; duplicateConnection provides a second advisory-identified trigger. The attacker must be able to create or update and then delete a connection on their own team. The default container runs Chartbrew as uid 0, while deployments with a less-privileged process are limited by that process\u0027s deletion permissions. The attacker can delete files such as /code/.env or application source, causing integrity loss and service disruption. This issue is fixed in version 5.2.3."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-85736",
"lastModified": "2026-11-09T23:17:26.467",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.2,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-85736",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-09T22:35:13.400161Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-06T21:17:11.757",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/commit/aa931cc868eff8c4343ae2263539fa2d0d4a0943"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/releases/tag/v5.2.3"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/chartbrew/chartbrew/security/advisories/GHSA-p5h6-f969-jpfv"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-73"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
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Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
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