Vulnerability-Lookup

FKIE_CVE-2026-82436

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-11-09 10:17 - Updated: 2026-11-09 11:17

Severity

Summary

Description `DefaultStateSerializer`, used to persist and restore stateful bolt checkpoints, configured Kryo with class registration disabled and an instantiation strategy that constructs objects without invoking their constructors, then deserialized whatever bytes the state store returned. A party able to write to the topology's keyspace in the state store, for example a co-tenant of a shared Redis instance or anyone with network access to it, could therefore place a serialized object graph that executes code inside the worker JVM when the state is restored. This requires the Redis-backed state provider, which is not the default. Write access to a state-store key is a data-plane privilege; code execution in the worker JVM is not, so the two are not equivalent. Mitigation Upgrade to 3.1.0, where the state serializer requires registered classes. Note that this is a behaviour change for existing state: checkpoints written by an affected version may fail to restore, and a migration step may be required. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict network and credential access to the state store to the cluster itself. Credit The ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm.

References

	URL	Tags
	security@apache.org	https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/q5vqclkjdvngwkffcbwbwyym410sp8sc
	af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108	http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/09/1

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "collectionURL": "https://repo.maven.apache.org/maven2",
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "packageName": "org.apache.storm:storm-client",
          "packageURL": "pkg:maven/org.apache.storm/storm-client",
          "product": "Apache Storm Client",
          "vendor": "Apache Software Foundation",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "3.1.0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.0.0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "Description\n\n`DefaultStateSerializer`, used to persist and restore stateful bolt checkpoints, configured Kryo with class\nregistration disabled and an instantiation strategy that constructs objects without invoking their\nconstructors, then deserialized whatever bytes the state store returned. A party able to write to the\ntopology\u0027s keyspace in the state store, for example a co-tenant of a shared Redis instance or anyone with\nnetwork access to it, could therefore place a serialized object graph that executes code inside the worker\nJVM when the state is restored.\n\nThis requires the Redis-backed state provider, which is not the default. Write access to a state-store key\nis a data-plane privilege; code execution in the worker JVM is not, so the two are not equivalent.\n\nMitigation\n\nUpgrade to 3.1.0, where the state serializer requires registered classes.\n\nNote that this is a behaviour change for existing state: checkpoints written by an affected version may fail\nto restore, and a migration step may be required. Users who cannot upgrade immediately should restrict\nnetwork and credential access to the state store to the cluster itself.\n\nCredit\n\nThe ASF -- found using Claude agents to study the security of open-source projects, validated and reported by Apache Storm."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-82436",
  "lastModified": "2026-11-09T11:17:26.213",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-11-09T10:17:11.633",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/q5vqclkjdvngwkffcbwbwyym410sp8sc"
    },
    {
      "source": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/09/1"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security@apache.org",
  "vulnStatus": "Received",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-502"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security@apache.org",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-82436 (GCVE-0-2026-82436)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-09 10:03 – Updated: 2026-11-09 10:13

Title

Apache Storm Client: Deserialization of Untrusted Data from the State Store

Summary

Severity

No CVSS data available.

CWE

CWE-502 - Deserialization of untrusted data

Assigner

apache CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 1238 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/q5vqclkjdvng…	vendor-advisory
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/11/09/1

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
Apache Software Foundation	Apache Storm Client	Affected: 3.0.0 , < 3.1.0 (semver)

Credits

The ASF using Claude Agents

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
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          "dateUpdated": "2026-11-09T10:13:14.284Z",
          "orgId": "af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108",
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      "source": {
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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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