FKIE_CVE-2026-8198
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-05-09 13:16 - Updated: 2026-07-24 08:10| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Activity Logs, User Activity Tracking, Multisite Activity Log from Logtivity",
"vendor": "logtivity",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "3.3.6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The Activity Logs, User Activity Tracking, Multisite Activity Log from Logtivity plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass to Information Disclosure in versions up to, and including, 3.3.6. This is due to a logic flaw in the verifyAuthorization method where requests without an Authorization header skip Bearer token validation and fall through to an unconditional return true statement, bypassing all authentication checks. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to access the /wp-json/logtivity/v1/options REST API endpoint and retrieve all plugin configuration options, including the logtivity_site_api_key which can be used to impersonate the site in API calls to the Logtivity service."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El plugin Activity Logs, User Activity Tracking, Multisite Activity Log de Logtivity para WordPress es vulnerable a omisi\u00f3n de autenticaci\u00f3n a revelaci\u00f3n de informaci\u00f3n en versiones hasta la 3.3.6, inclusive. Esto se debe a un fallo l\u00f3gico en el m\u00e9todo verifyAuthorization donde las solicitudes sin una cabecera Authorization omiten la validaci\u00f3n del token Bearer y pasan a una declaraci\u00f3n \u0027return true\u0027 incondicional, omitiendo todas las comprobaciones de autenticaci\u00f3n. Esto hace posible que atacantes no autenticados accedan al endpoint de la API REST /wp-json/logtivity/v1/options y recuperen todas las opciones de configuraci\u00f3n del plugin, incluyendo la logtivity_site_api_key que puede ser utilizada para suplantar el sitio en llamadas a la API al servicio Logtivity."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-8198",
"lastModified": "2026-07-24T08:10:00.150",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 1.4,
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-8198",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-05-11T18:00:16.438240Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-05-09T13:16:43.687",
"references": [
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/logtivity/tags/3.3.6/Core/Services/Logtivity_Rest_Endpoints.php#L47"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/logtivity/tags/3.3.6/Core/Services/Logtivity_Rest_Endpoints.php#L78"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/logtivity/tags/3.3.7/Core/Services/Logtivity_Rest_Endpoints.php#L47"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/logtivity/tags/3.3.7/Core/Services/Logtivity_Rest_Endpoints.php#L78"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3507386/"
},
{
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/65ca20b0-0831-4f60-9021-679be6c145ef?source=cve"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security@wordfence.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-200"
}
],
"source": "security@wordfence.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.