FKIE_CVE-2026-81889
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-31 21:17 - Updated: 2026-08-31 21:17
Severity
Summary
elFinder is an open-source file manager for web, written in JavaScript using jQuery UI. Prior to 2.1.70, elFinder URL uploads in php/elFinder.class.php can bypass server-side request forgery protections when PHP cURL is unavailable because validate_address() validates $info['ip'], but get_remote_contents() selects fsock_get_contents(), which connects to $arr['host'] and performs a second DNS resolution. An attacker able to submit a URL upload can use DNS rebinding to have the first resolution return a public address and the connection resolution return a loopback or private address, causing the internal HTTP response body to be stored as an uploaded file and made readable through elFinder. After a successful fetch, get_headers($url, true) separately requests the original hostname without reusing the validated and pinned connection, creating an additional blind server-side request forgery path even when curl_get_contents() is selected. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.70.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"product": "elFinder",
"vendor": "Studio-42",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "\u003c 2.1.70"
}
]
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "elFinder is an open-source file manager for web, written in JavaScript using jQuery UI. Prior to 2.1.70, elFinder URL uploads in php/elFinder.class.php can bypass server-side request forgery protections when PHP cURL is unavailable because validate_address() validates $info[\u0027ip\u0027], but get_remote_contents() selects fsock_get_contents(), which connects to $arr[\u0027host\u0027] and performs a second DNS resolution. An attacker able to submit a URL upload can use DNS rebinding to have the first resolution return a public address and the connection resolution return a loopback or private address, causing the internal HTTP response body to be stored as an uploaded file and made readable through elFinder. After a successful fetch, get_headers($url, true) separately requests the original hostname without reusing the validated and pinned connection, creating an additional blind server-side request forgery path even when curl_get_contents() is selected. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.70."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-81889",
"lastModified": "2026-08-31T21:17:52.460",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 8.6,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 4.0,
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-31T21:17:52.460",
"references": [
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/commit/191372c1bbebbd36fb55af79a84b9984861390ff"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/commit/6d997386cd0f1abab4706c220b46b0aea0ecff51"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/releases/tag/2.1.70"
},
{
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"url": "https://github.com/Studio-42/elFinder/security/advisories/GHSA-8x3q-jpjh-qh5c"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-918"
}
],
"source": "security-advisories@github.com",
"type": "Primary"
}
]
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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