FKIE_CVE-2026-81015

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:19 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:17
Severity
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: platform/x86/amd/pmc: Fix LPS0 and debugfs leaks when STB init fails amd_pmc_probe() registers the LPS0 s2idle handler with acpi_register_lps0_dev() and creates the driver's debugfs directory before calling amd_stb_s2d_init(), which is the last step in probe that can fail. When amd_stb_s2d_init() fails (for example the S2D telemetry region cannot be ioremapped on a long-running system, or the SMU rejects the S2D setup) the error path only calls pci_dev_put() and returns. This leaves amd_pmc_s2idle_dev_ops on the global lps0_s2idle_devops_head list and leaks the debugfs directory, while the devm-managed resources backing the handler are torn down. Reloading the module then walks the corrupted list in acpi_register_lps0_dev() and hits: list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev, but was NULL. kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29! acpi_register_lps0_dev+0x44/0x80 amd_pmc_probe+0x224/0x380 [amd_pmc] platform_probe+0x67/0x90 Even without a reload, the stale registration means the next s2idle transition calls into torn-down driver state. Unwind the debugfs directory and the LPS0 registration on the amd_stb_s2d_init() error path. acpi_unregister_lps0_dev() is safe to call unconditionally here: it is guarded on the same conditions as acpi_register_lps0_dev(), which is exactly what amd_pmc_remove() already relies on.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30e5f4d0cd0be655c800f10ae3e530391aa6c1b5
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76f650a76d6a36a4bee79d94db90a0e935a95477
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc9aa5fe21c3966c80647ed6574b94b863f23c62
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d201c09c2428a4a8fd3bdcb032ae99f1e016458c
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "d201c09c2428a4a8fd3bdcb032ae99f1e016458c",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "49de59f69a76f538bfa5d0638a8c98d052546567",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "bc9aa5fe21c3966c80647ed6574b94b863f23c62",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "83ad6974dd3bf34c080b3c08d36d02ebc3bd6da8",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "30e5f4d0cd0be655c800f10ae3e530391aa6c1b5",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "83ad6974dd3bf34c080b3c08d36d02ebc3bd6da8",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "76f650a76d6a36a4bee79d94db90a0e935a95477",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "83ad6974dd3bf34c080b3c08d36d02ebc3bd6da8",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/platform/x86/amd/pmc/pmc.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.14"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.14",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.50",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nplatform/x86/amd/pmc: Fix LPS0 and debugfs leaks when STB init fails\n\namd_pmc_probe() registers the LPS0 s2idle handler with\nacpi_register_lps0_dev() and creates the driver\u0027s debugfs directory before\ncalling amd_stb_s2d_init(), which is the last step in probe that can fail.\n\nWhen amd_stb_s2d_init() fails (for example the S2D telemetry region cannot\nbe ioremapped on a long-running system, or the SMU rejects the S2D setup)\nthe error path only calls pci_dev_put() and returns.  This leaves\namd_pmc_s2idle_dev_ops on the global lps0_s2idle_devops_head list and leaks\nthe debugfs directory, while the devm-managed resources backing the handler\nare torn down.\n\nReloading the module then walks the corrupted list in\nacpi_register_lps0_dev() and hits:\n\n  list_add corruption. next-\u003eprev should be prev, but was NULL.\n  kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29!\n   acpi_register_lps0_dev+0x44/0x80\n   amd_pmc_probe+0x224/0x380 [amd_pmc]\n   platform_probe+0x67/0x90\n\nEven without a reload, the stale registration means the next s2idle\ntransition calls into torn-down driver state.\n\nUnwind the debugfs directory and the LPS0 registration on the\namd_stb_s2d_init() error path.  acpi_unregister_lps0_dev() is safe to call\nunconditionally here: it is guarded on the same conditions as\nacpi_register_lps0_dev(), which is exactly what amd_pmc_remove() already\nrelies on."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-81015",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:17:34.923",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-11T20:19:10.437",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/30e5f4d0cd0be655c800f10ae3e530391aa6c1b5"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76f650a76d6a36a4bee79d94db90a0e935a95477"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc9aa5fe21c3966c80647ed6574b94b863f23c62"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d201c09c2428a4a8fd3bdcb032ae99f1e016458c"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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