FKIE_CVE-2026-80944

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:18 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:17
Severity
7.8 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: Detach sync cmd buffer on interrupted wait mwifiex synchronous commands keep the caller-provided data buffer in cmd_node->data_buf. Several callers pass stack-allocated objects there. If wait_event_interruptible_timeout() is interrupted, the caller can return and release that stack object while the firmware command is still the current command. A late firmware response then reaches the normal response handler, which can copy data through cmd_node->data_buf into the stale stack address. This fixes a stack corruption observed during repeated association and disassociation cycles. The panic trace showed the command wait being interrupted immediately before a bad pointer dereference: cmd_wait_q terminated: -512 Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 002c583837384662 Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted ... Tainted: [M]=MACHINE_CHECK The fault address decodes as little-endian ASCII: 0x002c583837384662 -> "bF878X,\0" which is a fragment of the VERSION_EXT firmware string exposed as debugfs "verext": w8997o-V4, RF878X, FP92, 16.92.21.p153.7 The same runs also showed corrupted control data containing: 0x2400372e333531 -> "153.7\0$" which is the tail of the same VERSION_EXT string. This points at a late VERSION_EXT response writing through a stale stack-backed data_buf after the interrupted wait returned. After cancelling pending commands on an interrupted or timed-out wait, detach the caller-owned data buffer from the still-current command. This preserves the existing command cancellation behaviour while preventing a late response from writing through a pointer whose lifetime ended with the waiting caller. Tested on an i.MX8MP board using an 88W8997.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20ee9c03f261bf6ac59331e2ca7b46b23646412a
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c67b8c50286e0cb7f18d667e6a37a2ec6e08ff9
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9024c7729eb523cf4f3a4203966d3a4aaabf030d
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e06c9c8a1f10c55d9bc5d139656d58795e64483
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1bbeb8970eeb6c6bf3cd5314138103f7b69446d
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d29a165588b6a0cf7a38db5cbd602aef7ef8c658
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef06882c7d8a7400b67d0d003b1008093dd589ed
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2134d6ff30cd6e1bf63d6b0a5d8e0839f0168b3
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "8c67b8c50286e0cb7f18d667e6a37a2ec6e08ff9",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3d026d09b28dda24777129a931634949c75a9181",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "9024c7729eb523cf4f3a4203966d3a4aaabf030d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3d026d09b28dda24777129a931634949c75a9181",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "9e06c9c8a1f10c55d9bc5d139656d58795e64483",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3d026d09b28dda24777129a931634949c75a9181",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "f2134d6ff30cd6e1bf63d6b0a5d8e0839f0168b3",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3d026d09b28dda24777129a931634949c75a9181",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "20ee9c03f261bf6ac59331e2ca7b46b23646412a",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3d026d09b28dda24777129a931634949c75a9181",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "b1bbeb8970eeb6c6bf3cd5314138103f7b69446d",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3d026d09b28dda24777129a931634949c75a9181",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "d29a165588b6a0cf7a38db5cbd602aef7ef8c658",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3d026d09b28dda24777129a931634949c75a9181",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ef06882c7d8a7400b67d0d003b1008093dd589ed",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3d026d09b28dda24777129a931634949c75a9181",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/net/wireless/marvell/mwifiex/sta_ioctl.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "3.15"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3.15",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.10.270",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "5.15.221",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.188",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.157",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.109",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.50",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2.4",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.3",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mwifiex: Detach sync cmd buffer on interrupted wait\n\nmwifiex synchronous commands keep the caller-provided data buffer in\ncmd_node-\u003edata_buf. Several callers pass stack-allocated objects there.\n\nIf wait_event_interruptible_timeout() is interrupted, the caller can\nreturn and release that stack object while the firmware command is still\nthe current command. A late firmware response then reaches the normal\nresponse handler, which can copy data through cmd_node-\u003edata_buf into the\nstale stack address.\n\nThis fixes a stack corruption observed during repeated association and\ndisassociation cycles. The panic trace showed the command wait being\ninterrupted immediately before a bad pointer dereference:\n\n  cmd_wait_q terminated: -512\n  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address 002c583837384662\n  Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted\n  ...\n  Tainted: [M]=MACHINE_CHECK\n\nThe fault address decodes as little-endian ASCII:\n\n  0x002c583837384662 -\u003e \"bF878X,\\0\"\n\nwhich is a fragment of the VERSION_EXT firmware string exposed as\ndebugfs \"verext\":\n\n  w8997o-V4, RF878X, FP92, 16.92.21.p153.7\n\nThe same runs also showed corrupted control data containing:\n\n  0x2400372e333531 -\u003e \"153.7\\0$\"\n\nwhich is the tail of the same VERSION_EXT string. This points at a late\nVERSION_EXT response writing through a stale stack-backed data_buf after\nthe interrupted wait returned.\n\nAfter cancelling pending commands on an interrupted or timed-out wait,\ndetach the caller-owned data buffer from the still-current command. This\npreserves the existing command cancellation behaviour while preventing a\nlate response from writing through a pointer whose lifetime ended with the\nwaiting caller.\n\nTested on an i.MX8MP board using an 88W8997."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-80944",
  "lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:17:25.653",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 7.8,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-80944",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "none"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-10-16T19:21:27.519317Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-11T20:18:59.923",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/20ee9c03f261bf6ac59331e2ca7b46b23646412a"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8c67b8c50286e0cb7f18d667e6a37a2ec6e08ff9"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9024c7729eb523cf4f3a4203966d3a4aaabf030d"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9e06c9c8a1f10c55d9bc5d139656d58795e64483"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b1bbeb8970eeb6c6bf3cd5314138103f7b69446d"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d29a165588b6a0cf7a38db5cbd602aef7ef8c658"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef06882c7d8a7400b67d0d003b1008093dd589ed"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f2134d6ff30cd6e1bf63d6b0a5d8e0839f0168b3"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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