FKIE_CVE-2026-80939
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-11 20:18 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/core.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/mac80211.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/pci.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/pci.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8851be.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8852ae.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8852be.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8852bte.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8852ce.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8922ae.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8922de.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "dfe2b5b2056918d186ad890079a9e7ec1898429a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0b38e6277aed8a59ccb64fcc1172d962c1f11b4c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9693980cd7d2f5b17e5ef5922b922f2e1a770fca",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0b38e6277aed8a59ccb64fcc1172d962c1f11b4c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c1f214dd1351244156deb57761b14190a233aef6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0b38e6277aed8a59ccb64fcc1172d962c1f11b4c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "667c12782aaf8dd3cb2213e528fe63a73cb63345",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0b38e6277aed8a59ccb64fcc1172d962c1f11b4c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/core.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/mac80211.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/pci.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/pci.h",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8851be.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8852ae.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8852be.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8852bte.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8852ce.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8922ae.c",
"drivers/net/wireless/realtek/rtw89/rtw8922de.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.12"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.12",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.112",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.52",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.4",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: rtw89: pci: add .shutdown callback to stop rfkill polling on reboot\n\nSince the hardware rfkill polling was introduced, arm64 platforms can\npanic with an asynchronous SError during warm reboot:\n\n SError Interrupt on CPU8, code 0x00000000be000011 -- SError\n Workqueue: events_power_efficient rfkill_poll [rfkill]\n rtw89_pci_ops_read8+0x94/0x160 [rtw89_pci]\n rtw89_core_rfkill_poll+0x50/0x1e0 [rtw89_core]\n rtw89_ops_rfkill_poll+0x40/0x68 [rtw89_core]\n ieee80211_rfkill_poll+0x3c/0x70 [mac80211]\n cfg80211_rfkill_poll+0x40/0x2a0 [cfg80211]\n rfkill_poll+0x30/0x88 [rfkill]\n Kernel panic - not syncing: Asynchronous SError Interrupt\n\nOn the reboot path the kernel only runs device_shutdown(), which calls\neach driver\u0027s .shutdown callback; .remove is not invoked. The rtw89 PCI\ndriver had no .shutdown callback, so nothing stopped the rfkill polling\nwork while the platform was tearing the PCIe link down. Once the link\nis gone, the next MMIO read from the poll handler targets a\nnon-responding device and is reported as a fatal asynchronous SError on\narm64.\n\nAdd rtw89_pci_shutdown(), wired to all rtw89 PCI device drivers, which\nsets a new RTW89_FLAG_SHUTDOWN flag (mirroring the USB\nRTW89_FLAG_UNPLUGGED pattern). When the flag is set,\nrtw89_ops_rfkill_poll() returns early, so no MMIO read is issued to the\nchip after shutdown begins and the SError no longer occurs.\n\nThis does not call the full .remove path from .shutdown, to keep the\nshutdown handler minimal and avoid running the non-idempotent teardown\ntwice."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-80939",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:17:25.123",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-11T20:18:58.553",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/667c12782aaf8dd3cb2213e528fe63a73cb63345"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9693980cd7d2f5b17e5ef5922b922f2e1a770fca"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c1f214dd1351244156deb57761b14190a233aef6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dfe2b5b2056918d186ad890079a9e7ec1898429a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.