FKIE_CVE-2026-80925
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-09 17:17 - Updated: 2026-10-30 13:20
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vlan: fix skb_under_panic and races when toggling HW VLAN offload
Toggling hardware VLAN TX offload (NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX or
NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX) on a lower device invokes vlan_transfer_features(),
which dynamically changed vlandev->hard_header_len.
This causes two issues:
1. Lockless TX paths (e.g. packet_snd in af_packet.c, ip6_finish_output2)
read dev->hard_header_len without holding RTNL lock. Mutating
hard_header_len dynamically under RTNL creates a data race where upper
layers reserve insufficient headroom based on a stale hard_header_len,
resulting in skb_under_panic when vlan_dev_hard_header() is called.
2. In addition, vlan_transfer_features() updated hard_header_len without
updating header_ops, causing a mismatch between allocated headroom
and header creation.
Always setting dev->hard_header_len = real_dev->hard_header_len and
dev->needed_headroom = real_dev->needed_headroom + VLAN_HLEN unconditionally
ensures:
- dev->hard_header_len remains 100% static and immutable at real_dev->hard_header_len,
eliminating all dynamic runtime updates and data races on hard_header_len.
- Upper layers allocating skbs via LL_RESERVED_SPACE() will always reserve
sufficient headroom for software VLAN tag insertion (real_dev->hard_header_len +
real_dev->needed_headroom + VLAN_HLEN).
- vlandev inherits real_dev->needed_tailroom so underlying trailer/padding/ICV
requirements are honored.
- AF_PACKET SOCK_RAW network header offsets remain correctly aligned at
real_dev->hard_header_len.
- vlan_header_ops is used unconditionally.
Note to stable teams: Make sure to backport these commits:
e16e960d55a4 ("ipvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev")
cef51860becd ("macvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from lowerdev")
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/8021q/vlan_dev.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "69f2fc6e761ee68a4c0c8e416ae88c573d4d7319",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b38d7a4bc9c17e1d437696da25f9fbc286614d9d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b30fe4de285b9bdaf9508740191f69f7cd83b8fa",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1517d1996b5236fe69eccd9d253f725e06996eb1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a29f3b884ba50217e6f50414f568073221e2bb07",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "447cbe95ebb95392b5d8f6a01c0556826919ce23",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/8021q/vlan_dev.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.12"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.12",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.191",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.158",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.111",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.51",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.3",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nvlan: fix skb_under_panic and races when toggling HW VLAN offload\n\nToggling hardware VLAN TX offload (NETIF_F_HW_VLAN_CTAG_TX or\nNETIF_F_HW_VLAN_STAG_TX) on a lower device invokes vlan_transfer_features(),\nwhich dynamically changed vlandev-\u003ehard_header_len.\n\nThis causes two issues:\n1. Lockless TX paths (e.g. packet_snd in af_packet.c, ip6_finish_output2)\n read dev-\u003ehard_header_len without holding RTNL lock. Mutating\n hard_header_len dynamically under RTNL creates a data race where upper\n layers reserve insufficient headroom based on a stale hard_header_len,\n resulting in skb_under_panic when vlan_dev_hard_header() is called.\n2. In addition, vlan_transfer_features() updated hard_header_len without\n updating header_ops, causing a mismatch between allocated headroom\n and header creation.\n\nAlways setting dev-\u003ehard_header_len = real_dev-\u003ehard_header_len and\ndev-\u003eneeded_headroom = real_dev-\u003eneeded_headroom + VLAN_HLEN unconditionally\nensures:\n- dev-\u003ehard_header_len remains 100% static and immutable at real_dev-\u003ehard_header_len,\n eliminating all dynamic runtime updates and data races on hard_header_len.\n- Upper layers allocating skbs via LL_RESERVED_SPACE() will always reserve\n sufficient headroom for software VLAN tag insertion (real_dev-\u003ehard_header_len +\n real_dev-\u003eneeded_headroom + VLAN_HLEN).\n- vlandev inherits real_dev-\u003eneeded_tailroom so underlying trailer/padding/ICV\n requirements are honored.\n- AF_PACKET SOCK_RAW network header offsets remain correctly aligned at\n real_dev-\u003ehard_header_len.\n- vlan_header_ops is used unconditionally.\n\nNote to stable teams: Make sure to backport these commits:\n\ne16e960d55a4 (\"ipvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from phy_dev\")\ncef51860becd (\"macvlan: inherit needed_headroom and needed_tailroom from lowerdev\")"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-80925",
"lastModified": "2026-10-30T13:20:13.850",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-09T17:17:47.763",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1517d1996b5236fe69eccd9d253f725e06996eb1"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/447cbe95ebb95392b5d8f6a01c0556826919ce23"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/69f2fc6e761ee68a4c0c8e416ae88c573d4d7319"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a29f3b884ba50217e6f50414f568073221e2bb07"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b30fe4de285b9bdaf9508740191f69f7cd83b8fa"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b38d7a4bc9c17e1d437696da25f9fbc286614d9d"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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