FKIE_CVE-2026-80872
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-04 17:16 - Updated: 2026-09-04 17:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ALSA: hda/tas2781: Cancel async firmware request at unbind
TAS2781 HDA I2C and SPI queue RCA firmware loading from component
bind with request_firmware_nowait(). The firmware loader keeps the
callback module pinned and holds a device reference, but the callback
still uses driver-private HDA state.
Component unbind removes controls and DSP state immediately. Later
device removal tears down the TAS2781 private data, including
codec_lock. If the async firmware callback runs after unbind has
started, it can operate on state that is being torn down.
Cancel or synchronize the async firmware request before removing
controls and DSP state. A queued callback is cancelled, and an
already-running callback is allowed to finish before unbind continues.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/tas2781_hda_i2c.c",
"sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/tas2781_hda_spi.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "f8272331da877eec8fe8e89a1e98e6a710e12490",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5be27f1e3ec98975c18a91e220d4847d0dec9671",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "da9e3be9cf31d7138d23e9e2f7ba1c102ef09f07",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5be27f1e3ec98975c18a91e220d4847d0dec9671",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5367e2ad14f0ae9350a7aaf2e77c87de39a43ae9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5be27f1e3ec98975c18a91e220d4847d0dec9671",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/tas2781_hda_i2c.c",
"sound/hda/codecs/side-codecs/tas2781_hda_spi.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.6"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.6",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.40",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nALSA: hda/tas2781: Cancel async firmware request at unbind\n\nTAS2781 HDA I2C and SPI queue RCA firmware loading from component\nbind with request_firmware_nowait(). The firmware loader keeps the\ncallback module pinned and holds a device reference, but the callback\nstill uses driver-private HDA state.\n\nComponent unbind removes controls and DSP state immediately. Later\ndevice removal tears down the TAS2781 private data, including\ncodec_lock. If the async firmware callback runs after unbind has\nstarted, it can operate on state that is being torn down.\n\nCancel or synchronize the async firmware request before removing\ncontrols and DSP state. A queued callback is cancelled, and an\nalready-running callback is allowed to finish before unbind continues."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-80872",
"lastModified": "2026-09-04T17:16:59.160",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-04T17:16:59.160",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5367e2ad14f0ae9350a7aaf2e77c87de39a43ae9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/da9e3be9cf31d7138d23e9e2f7ba1c102ef09f07"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f8272331da877eec8fe8e89a1e98e6a710e12490"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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