FKIE_CVE-2026-80810
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-04 16:18 - Updated: 2026-10-19 09:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/rsrc: fix folio size overflow in io_vec_fill_bvec()
io_vec_fill_bvec() computes the folio size with a plain int 1:
unsigned long folio_size = 1 << imu->folio_shift;
imu->folio_shift is unsigned int and comes from folio_shift() of the
folio backing the registered buffer, so it can be 32 or more on a 64 bit
kernel. Shifting int 1 that far is undefined, and on x86 and arm64 the
count is taken modulo 32, so a shift of 34 yields 4 rather than 16G.
Every other folio_shift shift in this file already uses 1UL.
The result is that the segment estimate and the fill loop disagree.
io_estimate_bvec_size() sizes the bvec array with the real shift:
max_segs += (iov[i].iov_len >> shift) + 2;
so a 1M iovec on a 16G folio is charged 2 segments, while
io_vec_fill_bvec() then walks the same iovec in folio_size chunks of 4
bytes and writes res_bvec[bvec_idx] a quarter of a million times, past
the end of the array it was given. src_bvec is advanced once per
iteration as well, so imu->bvec is read past its end at the same time.
validate_fixed_range() only checks that the range is inside the
registered buffer and does not bound the segment count.
Reaching it needs a folio with a shift of at least 32, which means a
gigantic hugetlb page: 16G on arm64 with 64K pages, where
CONT_PMD_SHIFT is 34 and hugetlb_add_hstate(CONT_PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)
registers that size, and likewise on powerpc. x86_64 tops out at 1G, so
a shift of 30, which still fits in int and is unaffected.
Use 1UL, as the rest of the file does.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"io_uring/rsrc.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "45c945107e007b1fb73e21cd220277652a45521a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9ef4cbbcb4ac3786a1a4164507511b76b2a572c5",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6b308c37fbeba3aa8c634fb1ed53e2f63a5d5a5c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9ef4cbbcb4ac3786a1a4164507511b76b2a572c5",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3267d7c8ba51642117f7bdd1ece02b2540668476",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9ef4cbbcb4ac3786a1a4164507511b76b2a572c5",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3f3a6a16bbe8bde76532d9415438f8cdef439e5d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9ef4cbbcb4ac3786a1a4164507511b76b2a572c5",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"io_uring/rsrc.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.47",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.11",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.2.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2.1",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.3",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nio_uring/rsrc: fix folio size overflow in io_vec_fill_bvec()\n\nio_vec_fill_bvec() computes the folio size with a plain int 1:\n\n\tunsigned long folio_size = 1 \u003c\u003c imu-\u003efolio_shift;\n\nimu-\u003efolio_shift is unsigned int and comes from folio_shift() of the\nfolio backing the registered buffer, so it can be 32 or more on a 64 bit\nkernel. Shifting int 1 that far is undefined, and on x86 and arm64 the\ncount is taken modulo 32, so a shift of 34 yields 4 rather than 16G.\nEvery other folio_shift shift in this file already uses 1UL.\n\nThe result is that the segment estimate and the fill loop disagree.\nio_estimate_bvec_size() sizes the bvec array with the real shift:\n\n\tmax_segs += (iov[i].iov_len \u003e\u003e shift) + 2;\n\nso a 1M iovec on a 16G folio is charged 2 segments, while\nio_vec_fill_bvec() then walks the same iovec in folio_size chunks of 4\nbytes and writes res_bvec[bvec_idx] a quarter of a million times, past\nthe end of the array it was given. src_bvec is advanced once per\niteration as well, so imu-\u003ebvec is read past its end at the same time.\nvalidate_fixed_range() only checks that the range is inside the\nregistered buffer and does not bound the segment count.\n\nReaching it needs a folio with a shift of at least 32, which means a\ngigantic hugetlb page: 16G on arm64 with 64K pages, where\nCONT_PMD_SHIFT is 34 and hugetlb_add_hstate(CONT_PMD_SHIFT - PAGE_SHIFT)\nregisters that size, and likewise on powerpc. x86_64 tops out at 1G, so\na shift of 30, which still fits in int and is unaffected.\n\nUse 1UL, as the rest of the file does."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-80810",
"lastModified": "2026-10-19T09:17:15.813",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-09-04T16:18:08.360",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3267d7c8ba51642117f7bdd1ece02b2540668476"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f3a6a16bbe8bde76532d9415438f8cdef439e5d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45c945107e007b1fb73e21cd220277652a45521a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6b308c37fbeba3aa8c634fb1ed53e2f63a5d5a5c"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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