FKIE_CVE-2026-80712

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-28 08:16 - Updated: 2026-08-29 07:16
Severity
8.4 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: spi: spi-qpic-snand: write the feature value before executing SET_FEATURE qcom_spi_send_cmdaddr() programs NAND_FLASH_CMD/NAND_EXEC_CMD and submits the descriptors, which makes the controller execute the command immediately. For SPINAND_SET_FEATURE the value to be written is only placed into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES afterwards, by qcom_spi_io_op(), in a second submission - so the chip is programmed with whatever that register happened to hold from a previous operation, and the intended value is only applied by the *next* SET_FEATURE. Measured on a TP-Link Archer AX55 v1 (IPQ5018, ESMT F50L1G41LB): writing 0x40 to the configuration register (0xb0) leaves the chip at 0x00, and the subsequent write of 0x00 leaves it at 0x40 - every write lands one operation late. This stayed unnoticed until v6.18 added SPI-NAND OTP support together with OTP entries for ESMT chips. spinand_otp_rw() enables OTP mode, reads, and disables it again, and mtd_otp_nvmem_add() does this during MTD registration. With the off-by-one, the "disable" write actually applies the previously requested value, so CFG_OTP_ENABLE ends up set: the chip stays in OTP mode, every subsequent array read returns the OTP area instead of the array (UBI reports an empty device) and all writes fail with -EIO because the OTP area is write protected. On this board that makes the whole flash unusable and the device unbootable. Write the feature value into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES as part of the same transaction, before NAND_EXEC_CMD. While at it, copy only the bytes the operation actually carries - the previous code dereferenced a 4-byte pointer on a one-byte buffer (spinand->scratchbuf). With this patch the flash contents read back bit-identical to a known-good dump of the same board taken under the vendor firmware (md5-verified across partitions), and writes work.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ba021079ef2ac6e21e3547328496ac42d22b56a
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/581e5166f0780103dc91c0d8ebc801f9af4824b0
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fd62901d6bf03f274a49dd0060793cc07dd51b0
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/spi/spi-qpic-snand.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "581e5166f0780103dc91c0d8ebc801f9af4824b0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7304d1909080ef0c9da703500a97f46c98393fcd",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "3ba021079ef2ac6e21e3547328496ac42d22b56a",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7304d1909080ef0c9da703500a97f46c98393fcd",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "8fd62901d6bf03f274a49dd0060793cc07dd51b0",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "7304d1909080ef0c9da703500a97f46c98393fcd",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "drivers/spi/spi-qpic-snand.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "6.15"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "6.15",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.44",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.8",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nspi: spi-qpic-snand: write the feature value before executing SET_FEATURE\n\nqcom_spi_send_cmdaddr() programs NAND_FLASH_CMD/NAND_EXEC_CMD and submits\nthe descriptors, which makes the controller execute the command\nimmediately. For SPINAND_SET_FEATURE the value to be written is only\nplaced into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES afterwards, by qcom_spi_io_op(), in a\nsecond submission - so the chip is programmed with whatever that register\nhappened to hold from a previous operation, and the intended value is only\napplied by the *next* SET_FEATURE.\n\nMeasured on a TP-Link Archer AX55 v1 (IPQ5018, ESMT F50L1G41LB): writing\n0x40 to the configuration register (0xb0) leaves the chip at 0x00, and the\nsubsequent write of 0x00 leaves it at 0x40 - every write lands one\noperation late.\n\nThis stayed unnoticed until v6.18 added SPI-NAND OTP support together\nwith OTP entries for ESMT chips. spinand_otp_rw() enables OTP mode,\nreads, and disables it again, and mtd_otp_nvmem_add() does this during\nMTD registration. With the off-by-one, the \"disable\" write actually\napplies the previously requested value, so CFG_OTP_ENABLE ends up set:\nthe chip stays in OTP mode, every subsequent array read returns the OTP\narea instead of the array (UBI reports an empty device) and all writes\nfail with -EIO because the OTP area is write protected. On this board\nthat makes the whole flash unusable and the device unbootable.\n\nWrite the feature value into NAND_FLASH_FEATURES as part of the same\ntransaction, before NAND_EXEC_CMD. While at it, copy only the bytes the\noperation actually carries - the previous code dereferenced a 4-byte\npointer on a one-byte buffer (spinand-\u003escratchbuf).\n\nWith this patch the flash contents read back bit-identical to a\nknown-good dump of the same board taken under the vendor firmware\n(md5-verified across partitions), and writes work."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-80712",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-29T07:16:52.640",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.4,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.5,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-08-28T08:16:56.850",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ba021079ef2ac6e21e3547328496ac42d22b56a"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/581e5166f0780103dc91c0d8ebc801f9af4824b0"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8fd62901d6bf03f274a49dd0060793cc07dd51b0"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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