FKIE_CVE-2026-80682
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-28 08:16 - Updated: 2026-08-29 07:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv/mm: use physical alignment for vmemmap_start_pfn
RISC-V computes vmemmap_start_pfn by rounding phys_ram_base down to
VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. That alignment must therefore be expressed in the
physical-address domain.
Commit 476849b0fba4 ("riscv/mm: align vmemmap to maximal folio size")
attempted to account for the maximal folio alignment by feeding
MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN directly into VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. However,
MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN is measured in bytes of struct page storage,
whereas VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN is used to align a physical address.
The mask-based compound_info encoding requires pfn_to_page(0) to be
naturally aligned to MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN. Commit 9f94db4c7eaa
("mm/sparse: check memmap alignment for compound_info_has_mask()") added a
check for that requirement and exposed the unit mismatch on systems such
as QEMU virt, where the DRAM base is not aligned to MAX_FOLIO_NR_PAGES *
PAGE_SIZE.
Here is the log:
[ 0.000000][ C0] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 0.000000][ C0] WARNING: mm/sparse.c:365 at sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe, CPU#0: swapper/0
[ 0.000000][ C0] Modules linked in:
[ 0.000000][ C0] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 7.2.0-rc3-g1d8304bdd65f #2 PREEMPT
[ 0.000000][ C0] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 0.000000][ C0] epc : sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe
[ 0.000000][ C0] ra : sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe
[ 0.000000][ C0] epc : ffffffff86851c88 ra : ffffffff86851c88 sp : ffffffff88807a30
[ 0.000000][ C0] gp : ffffffff8a3bf240 tp : ffffffff88842080 t0 : ff600000ffab6000
[ 0.000000][ C0] t1 : 000000017fab6000 t2 : 65203a6573726363 s0 : ffffffff88807bc0
[ 0.000000][ C0] s1 : 000000000e000000 a0 : 0000000000000007 a1 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] a2 : 0000000000000002 a3 : ffffffff86851c88 a4 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] a5 : ffffffff88843080 a6 : 0000000000000003 a7 : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] s2 : ff60000000000000 s3 : 0040000000000000 s4 : 0004000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] s5 : ffffffff8a4d92e0 s6 : ff600000ffab55e0 s7 : ffffffff88384d00
[ 0.000000][ C0] s8 : 0000000000000003 s9 : ffffffff88384cc1 s10: ffffffff88384cc0
[ 0.000000][ C0] s11: ffffffff8a4daae0 t3 : ffffffff915e8b20 t4 : ffffffff915e8b20
[ 0.000000][ C0] t5 : ffffffff915e8b20 t6 : ffffffff915e8bc8 ssp : 0000000000000000
[ 0.000000][ C0] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: ffffffff86851c88 cause: 0000000000000003
[ 0.000000][ C0] [<ffffffff86851c88>] sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe
[ 0.000000][ C0] [<ffffffff8683d396>] mm_core_init_early+0x116/0x1e30
[ 0.000000][ C0] [<ffffffff86801edc>] start_kernel+0xd2/0x848
Convert MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN to the equivalent physical alignment
before using it in VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. This keeps the existing
round_down() logic while making the resulting vmemmap base satisfy the
mask-alignment requirement.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/riscv/mm/init.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "11ad86830a78ea4e1942afc73c10e4ca8e69e03f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "476849b0fba4450f5adf22196bcff9c24c673bc4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "45ebe4540817cb540a59e4dc04014ac5dddc9990",
"status": "affected",
"version": "476849b0fba4450f5adf22196bcff9c24c673bc4",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/riscv/mm/init.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nriscv/mm: use physical alignment for vmemmap_start_pfn\n\nRISC-V computes vmemmap_start_pfn by rounding phys_ram_base down to\nVMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. That alignment must therefore be expressed in the\nphysical-address domain.\n\nCommit 476849b0fba4 (\"riscv/mm: align vmemmap to maximal folio size\")\nattempted to account for the maximal folio alignment by feeding\nMAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN directly into VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. However,\nMAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN is measured in bytes of struct page storage,\nwhereas VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN is used to align a physical address.\n\nThe mask-based compound_info encoding requires pfn_to_page(0) to be\nnaturally aligned to MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN. Commit 9f94db4c7eaa\n(\"mm/sparse: check memmap alignment for compound_info_has_mask()\") added a\ncheck for that requirement and exposed the unit mismatch on systems such\nas QEMU virt, where the DRAM base is not aligned to MAX_FOLIO_NR_PAGES *\nPAGE_SIZE.\n\nHere is the log:\n[ 0.000000][ C0] ------------[ cut here ]------------\n[ 0.000000][ C0] WARNING: mm/sparse.c:365 at sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe, CPU#0: swapper/0\n[ 0.000000][ C0] Modules linked in:\n[ 0.000000][ C0] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper Not tainted 7.2.0-rc3-g1d8304bdd65f #2 PREEMPT \n[ 0.000000][ C0] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)\n[ 0.000000][ C0] epc : sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe\n[ 0.000000][ C0] ra : sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe\n[ 0.000000][ C0] epc : ffffffff86851c88 ra : ffffffff86851c88 sp : ffffffff88807a30\n[ 0.000000][ C0] gp : ffffffff8a3bf240 tp : ffffffff88842080 t0 : ff600000ffab6000\n[ 0.000000][ C0] t1 : 000000017fab6000 t2 : 65203a6573726363 s0 : ffffffff88807bc0\n[ 0.000000][ C0] s1 : 000000000e000000 a0 : 0000000000000007 a1 : 0000000000000000\n[ 0.000000][ C0] a2 : 0000000000000002 a3 : ffffffff86851c88 a4 : 0000000000000000\n[ 0.000000][ C0] a5 : ffffffff88843080 a6 : 0000000000000003 a7 : 0000000000000000\n[ 0.000000][ C0] s2 : ff60000000000000 s3 : 0040000000000000 s4 : 0004000000000000\n[ 0.000000][ C0] s5 : ffffffff8a4d92e0 s6 : ff600000ffab55e0 s7 : ffffffff88384d00\n[ 0.000000][ C0] s8 : 0000000000000003 s9 : ffffffff88384cc1 s10: ffffffff88384cc0\n[ 0.000000][ C0] s11: ffffffff8a4daae0 t3 : ffffffff915e8b20 t4 : ffffffff915e8b20\n[ 0.000000][ C0] t5 : ffffffff915e8b20 t6 : ffffffff915e8bc8 ssp : 0000000000000000\n[ 0.000000][ C0] status: 0000000200000100 badaddr: ffffffff86851c88 cause: 0000000000000003\n[ 0.000000][ C0] [\u003cffffffff86851c88\u003e] sparse_init+0x58a/0x6fe\n[ 0.000000][ C0] [\u003cffffffff8683d396\u003e] mm_core_init_early+0x116/0x1e30\n[ 0.000000][ C0] [\u003cffffffff86801edc\u003e] start_kernel+0xd2/0x848\n\nConvert MAX_FOLIO_VMEMMAP_ALIGN to the equivalent physical alignment\nbefore using it in VMEMMAP_ADDR_ALIGN. This keeps the existing\nround_down() logic while making the resulting vmemmap base satisfy the\nmask-alignment requirement."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-80682",
"lastModified": "2026-08-29T07:16:50.703",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-28T08:16:53.607",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11ad86830a78ea4e1942afc73c10e4ca8e69e03f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/45ebe4540817cb540a59e4dc04014ac5dddc9990"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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