FKIE_CVE-2026-80672
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-28 08:16 - Updated: 2026-08-29 07:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs: fix u16 truncation of restart-area length check
ntfs_check_restart_area() validates that the $LogFile restart area and
its trailing log client record array fit within the system page size:
u16 ra_ofs, ra_len, ca_ofs;
...
ra_len = ca_ofs + le16_to_cpu(ra->log_clients) *
sizeof(struct log_client_record);
if (ra_ofs + ra_len > le32_to_cpu(rp->system_page_size) || ...)
return false;
ra_len is u16, but the right-hand side is computed in size_t
(sizeof(struct log_client_record) == 160). Both ca_ofs and log_clients
come straight from the on-disk restart area. With an on-disk
log_clients of 410 the product 410 * 160 = 65600; adding ca_ofs and
storing into the u16 ra_len truncates modulo 65536 (e.g. ca_ofs 64
gives ra_len 128), so the "fits in the page" check passes even though
the client array described by log_clients extends far beyond the page.
ntfs_check_log_client_array() then walks the array bounded only by the
on-disk log_clients count:
cr = ca + idx;
if (cr->prev_client != LOGFILE_NO_CLIENT) ...
For log_clients 410 it dereferences records up to ca + 409 * 160,
~64 KiB past the kvzalloc(system_page_size) restart-page buffer -- an
out-of-bounds read of attacker-controlled extent, reachable when a
crafted NTFS image is mounted (load_and_check_logfile() at mount time).
This is the in-kernel analogue of CVE-2022-30789, fixed in the ntfs-3g
userspace driver but never in this revived classic driver.
Compute the restart-area length in a u32 so the existing bounds check
rejects an over-large client array instead of being defeated by the
truncation. Widen ra_ofs and ca_ofs to u32 as well: both are loaded
from __le16 on-disk fields and every comparison already promotes to
int/size_t, so this changes no result and keeps the declaration uniform.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ntfs/logfile.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "07a4751ef3ccc8bfd17bfbb16e5003c03161790d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1e9ea7e04472d4e5e12e58c881eaacfb3e49b669",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "390936fb15053d8d8991ca3a22776e251a5a7f2f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1e9ea7e04472d4e5e12e58c881eaacfb3e49b669",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ntfs/logfile.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nntfs: fix u16 truncation of restart-area length check\n\nntfs_check_restart_area() validates that the $LogFile restart area and\nits trailing log client record array fit within the system page size:\n\n u16 ra_ofs, ra_len, ca_ofs;\n ...\n ra_len = ca_ofs + le16_to_cpu(ra-\u003elog_clients) *\n sizeof(struct log_client_record);\n if (ra_ofs + ra_len \u003e le32_to_cpu(rp-\u003esystem_page_size) || ...)\n return false;\n\nra_len is u16, but the right-hand side is computed in size_t\n(sizeof(struct log_client_record) == 160). Both ca_ofs and log_clients\ncome straight from the on-disk restart area. With an on-disk\nlog_clients of 410 the product 410 * 160 = 65600; adding ca_ofs and\nstoring into the u16 ra_len truncates modulo 65536 (e.g. ca_ofs 64\ngives ra_len 128), so the \"fits in the page\" check passes even though\nthe client array described by log_clients extends far beyond the page.\n\nntfs_check_log_client_array() then walks the array bounded only by the\non-disk log_clients count:\n\n cr = ca + idx;\n if (cr-\u003eprev_client != LOGFILE_NO_CLIENT) ...\n\nFor log_clients 410 it dereferences records up to ca + 409 * 160,\n~64 KiB past the kvzalloc(system_page_size) restart-page buffer -- an\nout-of-bounds read of attacker-controlled extent, reachable when a\ncrafted NTFS image is mounted (load_and_check_logfile() at mount time).\nThis is the in-kernel analogue of CVE-2022-30789, fixed in the ntfs-3g\nuserspace driver but never in this revived classic driver.\n\nCompute the restart-area length in a u32 so the existing bounds check\nrejects an over-large client array instead of being defeated by the\ntruncation. Widen ra_ofs and ca_ofs to u32 as well: both are loaded\nfrom __le16 on-disk fields and every comparison already promotes to\nint/size_t, so this changes no result and keeps the declaration uniform."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-80672",
"lastModified": "2026-08-29T07:16:49.610",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.0,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-28T08:16:52.510",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07a4751ef3ccc8bfd17bfbb16e5003c03161790d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/390936fb15053d8d8991ca3a22776e251a5a7f2f"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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