FKIE_CVE-2026-80602
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-28 08:16 - Updated: 2026-08-28 08:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
perf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage
A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from
the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space
even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors
supporting X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, perf can still report SYSRET/ERET
entries for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel.
E.g.
$ perf record -e cycles -o - -j any,save_type,u -- \
perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \
perf script -i - -F brstack|tr ' ' '\n'| \
grep -E '0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}'
...
0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a38f1a/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a39157/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a2c628/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a41b60/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8bef1c30/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8e4d3c90/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH
...
The reason is that the hardware filter only considers the privilege
level applicable to the branch target. Extend software filtering to
also validate the branch-from addresses against br_sel, so that any
branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped
when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/events/amd/lbr.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "5be478c1e08981ca91b34de310d7e2638171d9d8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f4f925dae7419fc7a10af539c073871927ce3a24",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "208ecca408b1707ad86ea247d3d3e09d3606fc13",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f4f925dae7419fc7a10af539c073871927ce3a24",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5ab0eba9c8819506bcb72348fd701f8a9006f95e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f4f925dae7419fc7a10af539c073871927ce3a24",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "fb3b76b5ad2ebad63dd76f8b65b624eaf638b73f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f4f925dae7419fc7a10af539c073871927ce3a24",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2a892294b83f541115c94b0bb637f39bef187657",
"status": "affected",
"version": "f4f925dae7419fc7a10af539c073871927ce3a24",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"arch/x86/events/amd/lbr.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.145",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.97",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.40",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nperf/x86/amd/lbr: Fix kernel address leakage\n\nA user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from\nthe kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space\neven when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors\nsupporting X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2, perf can still report SYSRET/ERET\nentries for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel.\n\nE.g.\n\n $ perf record -e cycles -o - -j any,save_type,u -- \\\n perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \\\n perf script -i - -F brstack|tr \u0027 \u0027 \u0027\\n\u0027| \\\n grep -E \u00270x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}\u0027\n\n ...\n 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a38f1a/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH\n 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a39157/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH\n 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a2c628/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH\n 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a41b60/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH\n 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH\n 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a90a260db/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH\n 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8bef1c30/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH\n 0xffffffff81001268/0x717a8e4d3c90/M/-/-/0/ERET/NON_SPEC_CORRECT_PATH\n ...\n\nThe reason is that the hardware filter only considers the privilege\nlevel applicable to the branch target. Extend software filtering to\nalso validate the branch-from addresses against br_sel, so that any\nbranch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped\nwhen PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-80602",
"lastModified": "2026-08-28T08:16:44.070",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-08-28T08:16:44.070",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/208ecca408b1707ad86ea247d3d3e09d3606fc13"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a892294b83f541115c94b0bb637f39bef187657"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5ab0eba9c8819506bcb72348fd701f8a9006f95e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5be478c1e08981ca91b34de310d7e2638171d9d8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb3b76b5ad2ebad63dd76f8b65b624eaf638b73f"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Nomenclature
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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