FKIE_CVE-2026-80563
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-26 15:17 - Updated: 2026-08-26 15:17
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: sloppy-logic-analyzer: fix use-after-free via debugfs trigger on unbind
The "trigger" debugfs file has a hand-rolled ->write handler
(trigger_write()) that dereferences the per-device gpio_la_poll_priv. The
file is created with debugfs_create_file_unsafe(), and the handler never
takes a debugfs reference. Nothing keeps the object alive while the
handler runs.
priv is allocated with devm_kzalloc(). devres frees it when the platform
device is unbound. debugfs_create_file_unsafe() installs no full_proxy
wrapper, so debugfs_remove_recursive() in gpio_la_poll_remove() does not
wait for an in-flight trigger_write(). The blob_lock taken there does not
help, because trigger_write() never takes it. A write that races an unbind
therefore writes into freed memory:
trigger_write() gpio_la_poll_remove()
priv = m->private
buf = memdup_user() [may sleep]
mutex_lock(&priv->blob_lock)
debugfs_remove_recursive() [no wait]
mutex_unlock(&priv->blob_lock)
(remove returns; devres frees priv)
priv->trig_data = buf <-- use-after-free write
priv->trig_len = count
The race is reachable by root via
/sys/bus/platform/drivers/gpio-sloppy-logic-analyzer/unbind.
Create "trigger" with debugfs_create_file() instead. Its full_proxy
wrapper makes debugfs_remove_recursive() drain any in-flight ->write
before it returns.
The use-after-free is confirmed under KASAN with a minimal reproducer of
the same debugfs_create_file_unsafe() plus devm_kzalloc() pattern
(available on request); it produces a slab-use-after-free write in the
handler.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/gpio/gpio-sloppy-logic-analyzer.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "49a1ebb1ef2c8ada300c174b65273810abb4e326",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7828b7bbbf2074dd7dd14d87f50bc5ce9036d692",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "23e9f32c0c7d2043e39655cff5ee3ddf29a43f80",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7828b7bbbf2074dd7dd14d87f50bc5ce9036d692",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "24bef4918f6ab806260476e2f93d8f791fd17449",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7828b7bbbf2074dd7dd14d87f50bc5ce9036d692",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "44f3468a0aef1aabdad551898ab7cfa2a9d20e99",
"status": "affected",
"version": "7828b7bbbf2074dd7dd14d87f50bc5ce9036d692",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/gpio/gpio-sloppy-logic-analyzer.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.11"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.11",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.105",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.46",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.10",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ngpio: sloppy-logic-analyzer: fix use-after-free via debugfs trigger on unbind\n\nThe \"trigger\" debugfs file has a hand-rolled -\u003ewrite handler\n(trigger_write()) that dereferences the per-device gpio_la_poll_priv. The\nfile is created with debugfs_create_file_unsafe(), and the handler never\ntakes a debugfs reference. Nothing keeps the object alive while the\nhandler runs.\n\npriv is allocated with devm_kzalloc(). devres frees it when the platform\ndevice is unbound. debugfs_create_file_unsafe() installs no full_proxy\nwrapper, so debugfs_remove_recursive() in gpio_la_poll_remove() does not\nwait for an in-flight trigger_write(). The blob_lock taken there does not\nhelp, because trigger_write() never takes it. A write that races an unbind\ntherefore writes into freed memory:\n\n trigger_write() gpio_la_poll_remove()\n priv = m-\u003eprivate\n buf = memdup_user() [may sleep]\n mutex_lock(\u0026priv-\u003eblob_lock)\n debugfs_remove_recursive() [no wait]\n mutex_unlock(\u0026priv-\u003eblob_lock)\n (remove returns; devres frees priv)\n priv-\u003etrig_data = buf \u003c-- use-after-free write\n priv-\u003etrig_len = count\n\nThe race is reachable by root via\n/sys/bus/platform/drivers/gpio-sloppy-logic-analyzer/unbind.\n\nCreate \"trigger\" with debugfs_create_file() instead. Its full_proxy\nwrapper makes debugfs_remove_recursive() drain any in-flight -\u003ewrite\nbefore it returns.\n\nThe use-after-free is confirmed under KASAN with a minimal reproducer of\nthe same debugfs_create_file_unsafe() plus devm_kzalloc() pattern\n(available on request); it produces a slab-use-after-free write in the\nhandler."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-80563",
"lastModified": "2026-08-26T15:17:11.310",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-08-26T15:17:11.310",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/23e9f32c0c7d2043e39655cff5ee3ddf29a43f80"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24bef4918f6ab806260476e2f93d8f791fd17449"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44f3468a0aef1aabdad551898ab7cfa2a9d20e99"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49a1ebb1ef2c8ada300c174b65273810abb4e326"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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