FKIE_CVE-2026-80557
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-26 15:17 - Updated: 2026-10-16 20:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check
ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the
buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid:
ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or
compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with
struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end,
leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.
The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has
no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past
the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed
directly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count.
The sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants
(ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32)
after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the
only site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight.
Fix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end,
*num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client
that calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges
beyond OSD session establishment.
[ idryomov: trim changelog ]
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ceph/osd_client.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "85479b7d65b4ebcb07fbbe57230976793974ab4a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a4ed38d7a180f184a6e7aedd09db9ca4b1e6a71c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "1c824e7c75bb4adf19553dd4ea944a5d83096be8",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a4ed38d7a180f184a6e7aedd09db9ca4b1e6a71c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f161be39201eb5f9b1f58fb8f90b8a9cd3931eb6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a4ed38d7a180f184a6e7aedd09db9ca4b1e6a71c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "eab3eeb68bfc639d74f27256f05546af5c4f787d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a4ed38d7a180f184a6e7aedd09db9ca4b1e6a71c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c59219a6b62d74936963983e5815524c3de8dd79",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a4ed38d7a180f184a6e7aedd09db9ca4b1e6a71c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "cb8246e5846dbbe34930903a90c7a90dd8e5910b",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a4ed38d7a180f184a6e7aedd09db9ca4b1e6a71c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7130d94846dadbb97b6b7f4d78a3a7bba6e3daa1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a4ed38d7a180f184a6e7aedd09db9ca4b1e6a71c",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "00ead17c7de137a692edee59f2772e6af687e8eb",
"status": "affected",
"version": "a4ed38d7a180f184a6e7aedd09db9ca4b1e6a71c",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ceph/osd_client.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.9"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.9",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.267",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.218",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.185",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.154",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.106",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.47",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.10",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check\n\nceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the\nbuffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid:\nceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or\ncompromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with\nstruct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end,\nleaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.\n\nThe immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has\nno preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past\nthe validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed\ndirectly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count.\n\nThe sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants\n(ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32)\nafter its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the\nonly site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight.\n\nFix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end,\n*num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern.\n\nAttacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph\ndeployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client\nthat calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges\nbeyond OSD session establishment.\n\n[ idryomov: trim changelog ]"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-80557",
"lastModified": "2026-10-16T20:18:00.017",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 9.8,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-80557",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-10-16T19:17:25.527528Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-26T15:17:10.400",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/00ead17c7de137a692edee59f2772e6af687e8eb"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c824e7c75bb4adf19553dd4ea944a5d83096be8"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7130d94846dadbb97b6b7f4d78a3a7bba6e3daa1"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/85479b7d65b4ebcb07fbbe57230976793974ab4a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c59219a6b62d74936963983e5815524c3de8dd79"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb8246e5846dbbe34930903a90c7a90dd8e5910b"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/eab3eeb68bfc639d74f27256f05546af5c4f787d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f161be39201eb5f9b1f58fb8f90b8a9cd3931eb6"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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