FKIE_CVE-2026-77769
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-21 11:17 - Updated: 2026-10-27 11:17| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"packageURL": "pkg:github/Openpanel-dev/openpanel",
"product": "openpanel",
"programFiles": [
"packages/trpc/src/routers/report.ts",
"packages/db/src/services/reports.service.ts"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/Openpanel-dev/openpanel",
"vendor": "Openpanel-dev",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0a51b6805eed0b3da8376175acd5fa3d26819cb6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
}
],
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The report.list procedure in packages/trpc/src/routers/report.ts accepted a projectId and a dashboardId and returned getReportsByDashboardId(dashboardId). The enforceAccess middleware in packages/trpc/src/trpc.ts verified membership for the supplied projectId, but nothing verified that the supplied dashboardId belonged to that project, and getReportsByDashboardId in packages/db/src/services/reports.service.ts selects reports by dashboardId alone with no project scoping. An authenticated user could therefore pair a projectId from their own organization, which satisfies the middleware, with a dashboardId belonging to another organization and receive every report in that dashboard. A correctly scoped helper, listReportsCore, already existed in the same service file and resolves the dashboard through getDashboardById(dashboardId, projectId) before returning reports, but the router did not use it."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "El procedimiento report.list en packages/trpc/src/routers/report.ts aceptaba un projectId y un dashboardId y devolv\u00eda getReportsByDashboardId(dashboardId). El middleware enforceAccess en packages/trpc/src/trpc.ts verificaba la membres\u00eda para el projectId proporcionado, pero nada verificaba que el dashboardId proporcionado perteneciera a ese proyecto, y getReportsByDashboardId en packages/db/src/services/reports.service.ts selecciona informes solo por dashboardId sin alcance de proyecto. Un usuario autenticado podr\u00eda, por lo tanto, emparejar un projectId de su propia organizaci\u00f3n, lo que satisface el middleware, con un dashboardId perteneciente a otra organizaci\u00f3n y recibir cada informe en ese dashboard. Una funci\u00f3n auxiliar con el alcance correcto, listReportsCore, ya exist\u00eda en el mismo archivo de servicio y resuelve el dashboard a trav\u00e9s de getDashboardById(dashboardId, projectId) antes de devolver los informes, pero el router no lo usaba."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-77769",
"lastModified": "2026-10-27T11:17:38.247",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "NONE",
"baseScore": 6.5,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "NONE",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 3.6,
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 7.1,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-77769",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "poc"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-08-26T17:22:58.316361Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-21T11:17:07.430",
"references": [
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://github.com/Openpanel-dev/openpanel"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://github.com/Openpanel-dev/openpanel/blob/e8a0602cda5a4d4b463f11d298a1b078c446bf33/packages/trpc/src/routers/report.ts"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://github.com/Openpanel-dev/openpanel/commit/0a51b6805eed0b3da8376175acd5fa3d26819cb6"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://github.com/Openpanel-dev/openpanel/security/advisories/GHSA-3q95-vc6f-vc9v"
},
{
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openpanel-report-list-queries-reports-by-an-unverified-dashboardid-crossing-organization-boundaries"
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"url": "https://github.com/Openpanel-dev/openpanel/security/advisories/GHSA-3q95-vc6f-vc9v"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"vulnStatus": "Deferred",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-639"
}
],
"source": "disclosure@vulncheck.com",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
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