FKIE_CVE-2026-74714

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-22 16:16 - Updated: 2026-08-22 16:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: tcp: Fix use-after-free in bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch() reqsk_queue_hash_req() publishes a TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request_sock onto the ehash chain, drops the bucket lock, and only afterwards sets rsk_refcnt to 3. Lockless readers such as __inet_lookup_established() handle this with refcount_inc_not_zero(), but bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch() uses plain sock_hold() while holding the bucket lock, on the assumption that the lock guarantees sk_refcnt > 0. That assumption does not hold for request_sock: CPU 0 CPU 1 ----- ----- tcp_conn_request() reqsk_queue_hash_req() inet_ehash_insert(req) spin_lock(bucket) __sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(req) // rsk_refcnt == 0 spin_unlock(bucket) bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch() spin_lock(bucket) sock_hold(req) <-- addition on 0 spin_unlock(bucket) refcount_set(&req->rsk_refcnt, 3) // clobbers saturated value which surfaces as: refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free. WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x48/0x90, CPU#1 Call Trace: bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch+0x14e/0x170 bpf_iter_tcp_batch+0x53/0x200 bpf_iter_tcp_seq_next+0x27/0x70 bpf_seq_read+0x107/0x410 vfs_read+0xb9/0x380 The iterator's stolen reference is lost when the publishing CPU's refcount_set() overwrites the count, leaving the socket one reference short. When the last legitimate owner drops its reference the reqsk is freed while still reachable, leading to use-after-free. This reproduces in seconds with tcp_syncookies=0, a handful of threads doing connect()/close() to a local listener while others read an iter/tcp link in a tight loop. Use refcount_inc_not_zero() and skip the socket on failure. A skipped socket is still part of the bucket, so keep counting it in expected. The reallocations are sized from expected, and a request sock whose refcount gets published while the lock is held across the last realloc must already have room. A skipped socket is counted in expected but never batched, so end_sk can be short of expected on a batch that is actually complete. Decide completeness by whether the walk left any socket behind instead. The WARN after the locked realloc checks the same, replacing an end_sk == expected check that could not hold on that path since commit cdec67a489d4 ("bpf: tcp: Make sure iter->batch always contains a full bucket snapshot"). If every matching socket in a bucket is mid-init (refcount 0), end_sk stays 0. Advance to the next bucket rather than returning a batch entry that was never filled this round.
References
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d2b60a4bc0499f62ff8520af6309bbe170882fd
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97e74d3e45d653c07c2d406fc530a9bbe3df8396
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc0295f89296ed351fc4b0b48fee887ba02c5d24
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cefcbbe20846a45f9a7dae868f7ef1000953e2df
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ddbe966b5d1fe212ada749bc3d0b410f1a7dea74
416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5fd3f514e27db1f05fbd72ba615d74941e23c51
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "defaultStatus": "unaffected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "lessThan": "cc0295f89296ed351fc4b0b48fee887ba02c5d24",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "04c7820b776f1c4b48698574c47de9e940d368e8",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "ddbe966b5d1fe212ada749bc3d0b410f1a7dea74",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "04c7820b776f1c4b48698574c47de9e940d368e8",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "7d2b60a4bc0499f62ff8520af6309bbe170882fd",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "04c7820b776f1c4b48698574c47de9e940d368e8",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "cefcbbe20846a45f9a7dae868f7ef1000953e2df",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "04c7820b776f1c4b48698574c47de9e940d368e8",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "97e74d3e45d653c07c2d406fc530a9bbe3df8396",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "04c7820b776f1c4b48698574c47de9e940d368e8",
              "versionType": "git"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "e5fd3f514e27db1f05fbd72ba615d74941e23c51",
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "04c7820b776f1c4b48698574c47de9e940d368e8",
              "versionType": "git"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "defaultStatus": "affected",
          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c"
          ],
          "repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
          "vendor": "Linux",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "5.15"
            },
            {
              "lessThan": "5.15",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "0",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.1.183",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.6.152",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.12.104",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "6.18.45",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.1.9",
              "versionType": "semver"
            },
            {
              "lessThanOrEqual": "*",
              "status": "unaffected",
              "version": "7.2",
              "versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbpf: tcp: Fix use-after-free in bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch()\n\nreqsk_queue_hash_req() publishes a TCP_NEW_SYN_RECV request_sock onto\nthe ehash chain, drops the bucket lock, and only afterwards sets\nrsk_refcnt to 3.\n\nLockless readers such as __inet_lookup_established() handle this with\nrefcount_inc_not_zero(), but bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch() uses plain\nsock_hold() while holding the bucket lock, on the assumption that the\nlock guarantees sk_refcnt \u003e 0. That assumption does not hold for\nrequest_sock:\n\n  CPU 0                                CPU 1\n  -----                                -----\n  tcp_conn_request()\n   reqsk_queue_hash_req()\n    inet_ehash_insert(req)\n     spin_lock(bucket)\n     __sk_nulls_add_node_rcu(req)      // rsk_refcnt == 0\n     spin_unlock(bucket)\n                                       bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch()\n                                        spin_lock(bucket)\n                                        sock_hold(req)   \u003c-- addition on 0\n                                        spin_unlock(bucket)\n    refcount_set(\u0026req-\u003ersk_refcnt, 3)  // clobbers saturated value\n\nwhich surfaces as:\n\n  refcount_t: addition on 0; use-after-free.\n  WARNING: lib/refcount.c:25 at refcount_warn_saturate+0x48/0x90, CPU#1\n  Call Trace:\n   bpf_iter_tcp_established_batch+0x14e/0x170\n   bpf_iter_tcp_batch+0x53/0x200\n   bpf_iter_tcp_seq_next+0x27/0x70\n   bpf_seq_read+0x107/0x410\n   vfs_read+0xb9/0x380\n\nThe iterator\u0027s stolen reference is lost when the publishing CPU\u0027s\nrefcount_set() overwrites the count, leaving the socket one reference\nshort. When the last legitimate owner drops its reference the reqsk is\nfreed while still reachable, leading to use-after-free.\n\nThis reproduces in seconds with tcp_syncookies=0, a handful of threads\ndoing connect()/close() to a local listener while others read an\niter/tcp link in a tight loop.\n\nUse refcount_inc_not_zero() and skip the socket on failure. A skipped\nsocket is still part of the bucket, so keep counting it in expected.\nThe reallocations are sized from expected, and a request sock whose\nrefcount gets published while the lock is held across the last realloc\nmust already have room.\n\nA skipped socket is counted in expected but never batched, so end_sk\ncan be short of expected on a batch that is actually complete. Decide\ncompleteness by whether the walk left any socket behind instead. The\nWARN after the locked realloc checks the same, replacing an\nend_sk == expected check that could not hold on that path since\ncommit cdec67a489d4 (\"bpf: tcp: Make sure iter-\u003ebatch always\ncontains a full bucket snapshot\").\n\nIf every matching socket in a bucket is mid-init (refcount 0), end_sk\nstays 0. Advance to the next bucket rather than returning a batch entry\nthat was never filled this round."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-74714",
  "lastModified": "2026-08-22T16:16:46.170",
  "metrics": {},
  "published": "2026-08-22T16:16:46.170",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7d2b60a4bc0499f62ff8520af6309bbe170882fd"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/97e74d3e45d653c07c2d406fc530a9bbe3df8396"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cc0295f89296ed351fc4b0b48fee887ba02c5d24"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cefcbbe20846a45f9a7dae868f7ef1000953e2df"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ddbe966b5d1fe212ada749bc3d0b410f1a7dea74"
    },
    {
      "source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5fd3f514e27db1f05fbd72ba615d74941e23c51"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
  "vulnStatus": "Received"
}



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