FKIE_CVE-2026-74667
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-22 16:16 - Updated: 2026-10-14 13:10
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/packet: reset the MAC header on the packet-socket transmit path
packet_parse_headers() resets the MAC header only for a SOCK_RAW frame
whose socket did not bind a protocol. A protocol-bound SOCK_RAW socket,
any SOCK_DGRAM frame, and the legacy SOCK_PACKET path therefore leave
skb->mac_header unset here.
For frames sent via __dev_queue_xmit() this is harmless: it resets the
MAC header unconditionally. But the packet-socket PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS
path uses dev_direct_xmit(), which does not, so the frame reaches
ndo_start_xmit() with the MAC header unset. A driver that reads
eth_hdr(skb) on transmit then dereferences skb->head + (u16)~0, an
out-of-bounds access ~64 KiB past the head -- the same class fixed for
one consumer in commit f5089008f90c ("macsec: do not read an unset MAC
header in macsec_encrypt()").
packet_parse_headers() runs only on the transmit path, where skb->data
points at the start of the L2 header for every packet-socket type
regardless of its length: SOCK_RAW and SOCK_PACKET carry a user-supplied
header and SOCK_DGRAM has one built by dev_hard_header(). Reset the MAC
header unconditionally, mirroring __dev_queue_xmit(), so the frame is
anchored on the bypass path too.
Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis;
verified against source and matched to the macsec KASAN report in
f5089008f90c. Compile-tested.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/packet/af_packet.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "1e43a1d66615f411d427f9df1f46dd049d9e3681",
"status": "affected",
"version": "75c65772c3d18447d62d3aca5f91b06c16cc25e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4057853a91fb796c4f47c7d1baf1aa085394148e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "75c65772c3d18447d62d3aca5f91b06c16cc25e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "2610ed4e86a4590234a9d70518c469751c5af231",
"status": "affected",
"version": "75c65772c3d18447d62d3aca5f91b06c16cc25e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b47ba8fe6e1d2df8c92048de5afafd059447dc30",
"status": "affected",
"version": "75c65772c3d18447d62d3aca5f91b06c16cc25e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "284f3e7a3f1a743fdf89e304fd1f19d5ffcff46d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "75c65772c3d18447d62d3aca5f91b06c16cc25e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "971aa7d99242bbf09513e27b7a243f0b29ff23ae",
"status": "affected",
"version": "75c65772c3d18447d62d3aca5f91b06c16cc25e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "fdd4d7d52358a58e351dd9d82530c04eba8ccd7a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "75c65772c3d18447d62d3aca5f91b06c16cc25e4",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c2707480cfbf19c7619acc9c089d17f20869821f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "75c65772c3d18447d62d3aca5f91b06c16cc25e4",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/packet/af_packet.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.1"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.1",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.265",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.216",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.183",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.152",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.104",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.45",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.9",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet/packet: reset the MAC header on the packet-socket transmit path\n\npacket_parse_headers() resets the MAC header only for a SOCK_RAW frame\nwhose socket did not bind a protocol. A protocol-bound SOCK_RAW socket,\nany SOCK_DGRAM frame, and the legacy SOCK_PACKET path therefore leave\nskb-\u003emac_header unset here.\n\nFor frames sent via __dev_queue_xmit() this is harmless: it resets the\nMAC header unconditionally. But the packet-socket PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS\npath uses dev_direct_xmit(), which does not, so the frame reaches\nndo_start_xmit() with the MAC header unset. A driver that reads\neth_hdr(skb) on transmit then dereferences skb-\u003ehead + (u16)~0, an\nout-of-bounds access ~64 KiB past the head -- the same class fixed for\none consumer in commit f5089008f90c (\"macsec: do not read an unset MAC\nheader in macsec_encrypt()\").\n\npacket_parse_headers() runs only on the transmit path, where skb-\u003edata\npoints at the start of the L2 header for every packet-socket type\nregardless of its length: SOCK_RAW and SOCK_PACKET carry a user-supplied\nheader and SOCK_DGRAM has one built by dev_hard_header(). Reset the MAC\nheader unconditionally, mirroring __dev_queue_xmit(), so the frame is\nanchored on the bypass path too.\n\nFound by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis;\nverified against source and matched to the macsec KASAN report in\nf5089008f90c. Compile-tested."
},
{
"lang": "es",
"value": "En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\n\nnet/packet: restablecer la cabecera MAC en la ruta de transmisi\u00f3n del socket de paquetes\n\npacket_parse_headers() restablece la cabecera MAC solo para una trama SOCK_RAW cuyo socket no vincul\u00f3 un protocolo. Un socket SOCK_RAW vinculado a un protocolo, cualquier trama SOCK_DGRAM y la ruta SOCK_PACKET heredada, por lo tanto, dejan skb -\u003e mac_header sin establecer aqu\u00ed.\n\nPara las tramas enviadas a trav\u00e9s de __dev_queue_xmit() esto es inofensivo: restablece la cabecera MAC incondicionalmente. Pero la ruta PACKET_QDISC_BYPASS del socket de paquetes utiliza dev_direct_xmit(), que no lo hace, por lo que la trama llega a ndo_start_xmit() con la cabecera MAC sin establecer. Un controlador que lee eth_hdr(skb) en la transmisi\u00f3n luego desreferencia skb -\u003e head + (u16)~0, un acceso fuera de l\u00edmites ~64 KiB m\u00e1s all\u00e1 de la cabecera -- la misma clase corregida para un consumidor en el commit f5089008f90c (\u0027macsec: no leer una cabecera MAC sin establecer en macsec_encrypt()\u0027).\n\npacket_parse_headers() se ejecuta solo en la ruta de transmisi\u00f3n, donde skb -\u003e data apunta al inicio de la cabecera L2 para cada tipo de socket de paquetes, independientemente de su longitud: SOCK_RAW y SOCK_PACKET llevan una cabecera proporcionada por el usuario y SOCK_DGRAM tiene una construida por dev_hard_header(). Restablecer la cabecera MAC incondicionalmente, reflejando __dev_queue_xmit(), para que la trama tambi\u00e9n est\u00e9 anclada en la ruta de bypass.\n\nEncontrado por 0sec (https://0sec.ai) utilizando an\u00e1lisis de c\u00f3digo fuente automatizado; verificado contra el c\u00f3digo fuente y emparejado con el informe KASAN de macsec en f5089008f90c. Compilado y probado."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-74667",
"lastModified": "2026-10-14T13:10:00.187",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-22T16:16:40.580",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e43a1d66615f411d427f9df1f46dd049d9e3681"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2610ed4e86a4590234a9d70518c469751c5af231"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/284f3e7a3f1a743fdf89e304fd1f19d5ffcff46d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4057853a91fb796c4f47c7d1baf1aa085394148e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/971aa7d99242bbf09513e27b7a243f0b29ff23ae"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b47ba8fe6e1d2df8c92048de5afafd059447dc30"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c2707480cfbf19c7619acc9c089d17f20869821f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fdd4d7d52358a58e351dd9d82530c04eba8ccd7a"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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