FKIE_CVE-2026-74619
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-22 16:16 - Updated: 2026-08-22 16:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: don't warn when the mount is completed from another user namespace
fsopen() records the caller's user namespace in fc->user_ns and hands
back an ordinary file descriptor. Nothing ties the task that calls
fsconfig(FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE) to the task that created the context. The
fd is inherited across fork() and exec() and it can be passed over a
unix socket.
Completing a context from another user namespace is allowed on purpose.
vfs_cmd_create() authorizes the create with mount_capable(), which for
FS_USERNS_MOUNT checks ns_capable(fc->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN), and that
succeeds for a task holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN in an ancestor of fc->user_ns.
So an unprivileged task can reach the WARN_ON() in ovl_fill_super():
create a user and a mount namespace in a child, call fsopen("overlay")
there, send the fscontext fd to the parent and let the parent issue
FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE. Both namespaces come from a plain unshare(1) and no
capability is needed anywhere:
WARNING: fs/overlayfs/super.c:1551 at ovl_fill_super+0x7b9/0x1e20 [overlay]
CPU: 3 UID: 1000 PID: 3243376 Comm: fswarn
Call Trace:
get_tree_nodev+0x71/0xa0
ovl_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [overlay]
vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0x100
vfs_cmd_create+0x60/0xf0
__do_sys_fsconfig+0x4b2/0x500
The child needs the mount namespace because fsopen() itself gates on
may_mount(), which asks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the user namespace owning
the caller's mount namespace. fsconfig() doesn't repeat that check.
It is a WARN_ON() and not a WARN_ON_ONCE(), so the condition can be
raised in a loop to taint the kernel and flood the log, and it panics a
kernel booted with panic_on_warn.
Keep refusing the mount and stop warning about it. ovl_parse_param()
already spells a user namespace check this way for Opt_override_creds.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/overlayfs/super.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "513478092966dc9818d96dd2b3ed613fd2f6e30e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1784fbc2ed9c888ea4e895f30a53207ed7ee8208",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "494346f2aab2489d379d43ff614aea447cf4e94d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1784fbc2ed9c888ea4e895f30a53207ed7ee8208",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "be161fa31e3e9cc828a3c1bd935edca461e8a7a1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1784fbc2ed9c888ea4e895f30a53207ed7ee8208",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "42d99fcd8006007e2f708bede6789f37f3910b30",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1784fbc2ed9c888ea4e895f30a53207ed7ee8208",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "63981fc786daaa626cb14d9be1406f674d79f98f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "1784fbc2ed9c888ea4e895f30a53207ed7ee8208",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/overlayfs/super.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.5"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.5",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.152",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.104",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.45",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.9",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\novl: don\u0027t warn when the mount is completed from another user namespace\n\nfsopen() records the caller\u0027s user namespace in fc-\u003euser_ns and hands\nback an ordinary file descriptor. Nothing ties the task that calls\nfsconfig(FSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE) to the task that created the context. The\nfd is inherited across fork() and exec() and it can be passed over a\nunix socket.\n\nCompleting a context from another user namespace is allowed on purpose.\nvfs_cmd_create() authorizes the create with mount_capable(), which for\nFS_USERNS_MOUNT checks ns_capable(fc-\u003euser_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN), and that\nsucceeds for a task holding CAP_SYS_ADMIN in an ancestor of fc-\u003euser_ns.\nSo an unprivileged task can reach the WARN_ON() in ovl_fill_super():\ncreate a user and a mount namespace in a child, call fsopen(\"overlay\")\nthere, send the fscontext fd to the parent and let the parent issue\nFSCONFIG_CMD_CREATE. Both namespaces come from a plain unshare(1) and no\ncapability is needed anywhere:\n\n WARNING: fs/overlayfs/super.c:1551 at ovl_fill_super+0x7b9/0x1e20 [overlay]\n CPU: 3 UID: 1000 PID: 3243376 Comm: fswarn\n Call Trace:\n get_tree_nodev+0x71/0xa0\n ovl_get_tree+0x15/0x20 [overlay]\n vfs_get_tree+0x2a/0x100\n vfs_cmd_create+0x60/0xf0\n __do_sys_fsconfig+0x4b2/0x500\n\nThe child needs the mount namespace because fsopen() itself gates on\nmay_mount(), which asks for CAP_SYS_ADMIN in the user namespace owning\nthe caller\u0027s mount namespace. fsconfig() doesn\u0027t repeat that check.\n\nIt is a WARN_ON() and not a WARN_ON_ONCE(), so the condition can be\nraised in a loop to taint the kernel and flood the log, and it panics a\nkernel booted with panic_on_warn.\n\nKeep refusing the mount and stop warning about it. ovl_parse_param()\nalready spells a user namespace check this way for Opt_override_creds."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-74619",
"lastModified": "2026-08-22T16:16:34.623",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-08-22T16:16:34.623",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42d99fcd8006007e2f708bede6789f37f3910b30"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/494346f2aab2489d379d43ff614aea447cf4e94d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/513478092966dc9818d96dd2b3ed613fd2f6e30e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63981fc786daaa626cb14d9be1406f674d79f98f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/be161fa31e3e9cc828a3c1bd935edca461e8a7a1"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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