FKIE_CVE-2026-74472
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-15 13:17 - Updated: 2026-08-19 17:21
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev()
ublk_ctrl_add_dev() memcpy()s the userspace ublksrv_ctrl_dev_info into
ub->dev_info and then fixes up the fields the driver owns, but misses
->state and ->ublksrv_pid.
A device added with ->state = UBLK_S_DEV_LIVE passes the
"->state != UBLK_S_DEV_DEAD" test that ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() uses as its
proxy for "a disk is attached", while ->ub_disk is still NULL, so DEL_DEV
right after ADD_DEV oopses in del_gendisk(). UBLK_S_DEV_QUIESCED plus
UBLK_F_USER_RECOVERY dies one step earlier, in ublk_force_abort_dev(). A
poisoned ->state also gets START_USER_RECOVERY and the char device
read/write path onto a device that was never started, and wedges START_DEV
at -EEXIST. A poisoned ->ublksrv_pid just makes GET_DEV_INFO report an
unrelated task as the ublk server.
Reset both after the memcpy(), as ublk_detach_disk() does. Userspace only
ever reads these back, so correcting them silently breaks nothing.
ADD_DEV has copied ->state in unsanitized since ublk was merged, but back
then it was harmless: the gendisk was allocated during ADD_DEV, and both
teardown and the START_DEV -EEXIST check keyed off disk_live() rather than
->state. The oops became reachable once the disk allocation moved to
START_DEV and those checks switched to ->state.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/block/ublk_drv.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "787c944502e7e63d20a9201bada77e0dd924f458",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6d9e6dfdf3b207701471f364121c67eefb000682",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "ee41b00858ca65b4428e99efe39a4277c1f043d2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6d9e6dfdf3b207701471f364121c67eefb000682",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b67ce16b26ad0f14cfd6071013840aa95f823bea",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6d9e6dfdf3b207701471f364121c67eefb000682",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "205feb72e5beb3140e4e1403b6cff30cf739bab9",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6d9e6dfdf3b207701471f364121c67eefb000682",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "127033b79383a3e78361d7e971588aa8849f5124",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6d9e6dfdf3b207701471f364121c67eefb000682",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "e65848e4ce352bac9e3465099354c8b8f845391f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6d9e6dfdf3b207701471f364121c67eefb000682",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/block/ublk_drv.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.183",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.151",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.103",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.44",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev()\n\nublk_ctrl_add_dev() memcpy()s the userspace ublksrv_ctrl_dev_info into\nub-\u003edev_info and then fixes up the fields the driver owns, but misses\n-\u003estate and -\u003eublksrv_pid.\n\nA device added with -\u003estate = UBLK_S_DEV_LIVE passes the\n\"-\u003estate != UBLK_S_DEV_DEAD\" test that ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() uses as its\nproxy for \"a disk is attached\", while -\u003eub_disk is still NULL, so DEL_DEV\nright after ADD_DEV oopses in del_gendisk(). UBLK_S_DEV_QUIESCED plus\nUBLK_F_USER_RECOVERY dies one step earlier, in ublk_force_abort_dev(). A\npoisoned -\u003estate also gets START_USER_RECOVERY and the char device\nread/write path onto a device that was never started, and wedges START_DEV\nat -EEXIST. A poisoned -\u003eublksrv_pid just makes GET_DEV_INFO report an\nunrelated task as the ublk server.\n\nReset both after the memcpy(), as ublk_detach_disk() does. Userspace only\never reads these back, so correcting them silently breaks nothing.\n\nADD_DEV has copied -\u003estate in unsanitized since ublk was merged, but back\nthen it was harmless: the gendisk was allocated during ADD_DEV, and both\nteardown and the START_DEV -EEXIST check keyed off disk_live() rather than\n-\u003estate. The oops became reachable once the disk allocation moved to\nSTART_DEV and those checks switched to -\u003estate."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-74472",
"lastModified": "2026-08-19T17:21:04.490",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-08-15T13:17:51.953",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/127033b79383a3e78361d7e971588aa8849f5124"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/205feb72e5beb3140e4e1403b6cff30cf739bab9"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/787c944502e7e63d20a9201bada77e0dd924f458"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b67ce16b26ad0f14cfd6071013840aa95f823bea"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e65848e4ce352bac9e3465099354c8b8f845391f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ee41b00858ca65b4428e99efe39a4277c1f043d2"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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