FKIE_CVE-2026-74441
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-15 13:17 - Updated: 2026-08-23 13:16
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: ucsi: Fix race condition and ordering in port unregistration
A synchronization issue exists during port unregistration where pending
partner work items can race against workqueue destruction, leading to
use-after-free conditions:
cros_ec_ucsi cros_ec_ucsi.3.auto: error -ETIMEDOUT: PPM init failed
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000
RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0x83/0x4a0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
__cfi_delayed_work_timer_fn+0x10/0x10
run_timer_softirq+0x3b6/0xbd0
sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0x110
irq_exit_rcu+0x18d/0x330
fred_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5e/0x80
Fix this by ensuring strict ordering and proper serialization during
teardown:
1. Move ucsi_unregister_partner() to the beginning of the teardown
sequence and protect it under the connector mutex lock.
2. Ensure all pending partner tasks are explicitly flushed and finished
before the workqueue is destroyed.
3. Switch from mod_delayed_work() to a cancel_delayed_work() and
queue_delayed_work() sequence. This guarantees that items currently marked
as pending won't be scheduled an additional time, preventing a double
release of resources which leads to the following crash:
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address
0xdead000000000122: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
Workqueue: cros_ec_ucsi.3.auto-con2 ucsi_poll_worker
RIP: 0010:ucsi_poll_worker+0x65/0x1e0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
process_scheduled_works+0x218/0x6d0
worker_thread+0x188/0x3f0
__cfi_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
kthread+0x226/0x2a0
To ensure these rules are applied identically across both the normal
teardown and the ucsi_init() error paths, consolidate the cleanup logic
into a new helper, ucsi_unregister_port().
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "7b63c680ff605f60f056e5f2c323f1a602aee182",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b9aa02ca39a49740926c2c450a1505a4a0f8954a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "07f8aaffee705e552c1f723ac8bf7eb137ad59c2",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b9aa02ca39a49740926c2c450a1505a4a0f8954a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "11483d80267db97fbe49f2df66385434256cc3b0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b9aa02ca39a49740926c2c450a1505a4a0f8954a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "3f7b3728dd9011c915cbeaea77274ebe8366550d",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b9aa02ca39a49740926c2c450a1505a4a0f8954a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bc7a0f721123ea260a42f1ded06dab844ba49434",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b9aa02ca39a49740926c2c450a1505a4a0f8954a",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "7aa7d4bf9d3fa9a6a47b640ad103ab433b7ff261",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b9aa02ca39a49740926c2c450a1505a4a0f8954a",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/usb/typec/ucsi/ucsi.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.16"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.16",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.184",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.151",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.103",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.44",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.8",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nusb: typec: ucsi: Fix race condition and ordering in port unregistration\n\nA synchronization issue exists during port unregistration where pending\npartner work items can race against workqueue destruction, leading to\nuse-after-free conditions:\n\n cros_ec_ucsi cros_ec_ucsi.3.auto: error -ETIMEDOUT: PPM init failed\n BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000000\n RIP: 0010:__queue_work+0x83/0x4a0\n Call Trace:\n \u003cIRQ\u003e\n __cfi_delayed_work_timer_fn+0x10/0x10\n run_timer_softirq+0x3b6/0xbd0\n sched_clock_cpu+0xc/0x110\n irq_exit_rcu+0x18d/0x330\n fred_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5e/0x80\n\nFix this by ensuring strict ordering and proper serialization during\nteardown:\n\n1. Move ucsi_unregister_partner() to the beginning of the teardown\nsequence and protect it under the connector mutex lock.\n2. Ensure all pending partner tasks are explicitly flushed and finished\nbefore the workqueue is destroyed.\n3. Switch from mod_delayed_work() to a cancel_delayed_work() and\nqueue_delayed_work() sequence. This guarantees that items currently marked\nas pending won\u0027t be scheduled an additional time, preventing a double\nrelease of resources which leads to the following crash:\n\n Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address\n 0xdead000000000122: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI\n Workqueue: cros_ec_ucsi.3.auto-con2 ucsi_poll_worker\n RIP: 0010:ucsi_poll_worker+0x65/0x1e0\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n process_scheduled_works+0x218/0x6d0\n worker_thread+0x188/0x3f0\n __cfi_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n kthread+0x226/0x2a0\n\nTo ensure these rules are applied identically across both the normal\nteardown and the ucsi_init() error paths, consolidate the cleanup logic\ninto a new helper, ucsi_unregister_port()."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-74441",
"lastModified": "2026-08-23T13:16:43.717",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-08-15T13:17:48.643",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/07f8aaffee705e552c1f723ac8bf7eb137ad59c2"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11483d80267db97fbe49f2df66385434256cc3b0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f7b3728dd9011c915cbeaea77274ebe8366550d"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7aa7d4bf9d3fa9a6a47b640ad103ab433b7ff261"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7b63c680ff605f60f056e5f2c323f1a602aee182"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bc7a0f721123ea260a42f1ded06dab844ba49434"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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