FKIE_CVE-2026-72444
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-15 06:22 - Updated: 2026-08-17 06:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
flow_dissector: check device type before reading ETH_ADDRS
__skb_flow_dissect() unconditionally reads 12 bytes from eth_hdr(skb)
when FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_ETH_ADDRS is requested. This assumes the skb
has a valid Ethernet header at mac_header, which is not always the case.
The problem can be triggered by:
1. Creating a TUN device in L3 mode (IFF_TUN, hard_header_len=0)
2. Attaching a multiq qdisc with a flower filter matching on eth_src
3. Sending a packet through AF_PACKET
Since TUN in L3 mode has no link-layer header, mac_header points to
the L3 data area. The flow dissector reads 12 bytes of uninitialized
skb memory, which then propagates through fl_set_masked_key() and is
used as a rhashtable lookup key in __fl_lookup(), as reported by KMSAN.
Rejecting the filter in the control path (at tc filter add time) is
not feasible because TC filter blocks can be shared between arbitrary
devices -- a filter installed on an Ethernet device may later classify
packets on a headerless device through a shared block. The device
association is not fixed at filter creation time.
Fix this by gating the memcpy on dev->type == ARPHRD_ETHER, which
ensures only true Ethernet-framed packets have their addresses read.
This is more precise than the previous hard_header_len >= 12 check,
which would incorrectly pass for non-Ethernet link types like IPoIB
(ARPHRD_INFINIBAND, hard_header_len=24) and FDDI (hard_header_len=21)
whose L2 headers are not in Ethernet format. Additionally check
skb_mac_header_was_set() to guard against the pathological case where
mac_header is the unset sentinel (~0U), which would cause eth_hdr() to
return a wild pointer.
For the act_mirred redirect case (Ethernet packet redirected to a
non-Ethernet device sharing a TC block), zeroing the key is the correct
behavior: the packet is now being classified on the target device, where
Ethernet address matching is not semantically meaningful.
Note: on non-Ethernet devices, the zeroed key will match a filter
configured with all-zero MAC addresses. This is an improvement over the
previous behavior where uninitialized memory could randomly match any
filter.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/core/flow_dissector.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "0fe6455b8e1a22414f39c07bc90a1df12b52ec74",
"status": "affected",
"version": "67a900cc0436d74e7ff89042371760def087680d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "9a65860959db594dfc1820c7fdc09285fb7556bf",
"status": "affected",
"version": "67a900cc0436d74e7ff89042371760def087680d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "594c90b197141944f25991b8314de5c26ee27a7e",
"status": "affected",
"version": "67a900cc0436d74e7ff89042371760def087680d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c6d3bcb0f934d4297ac5fa1c8656ae40694fb601",
"status": "affected",
"version": "67a900cc0436d74e7ff89042371760def087680d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "825de39f0c35a112148799b3cbe45af3766c018a",
"status": "affected",
"version": "67a900cc0436d74e7ff89042371760def087680d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bf6e8af2c8be77489bedeae9f8a9654cb710e500",
"status": "affected",
"version": "67a900cc0436d74e7ff89042371760def087680d",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/core/flow_dissector.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "4.2"
},
{
"lessThan": "4.2",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.178",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.145",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.97",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.40",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nflow_dissector: check device type before reading ETH_ADDRS\n\n__skb_flow_dissect() unconditionally reads 12 bytes from eth_hdr(skb)\nwhen FLOW_DISSECTOR_KEY_ETH_ADDRS is requested. This assumes the skb\nhas a valid Ethernet header at mac_header, which is not always the case.\n\nThe problem can be triggered by:\n 1. Creating a TUN device in L3 mode (IFF_TUN, hard_header_len=0)\n 2. Attaching a multiq qdisc with a flower filter matching on eth_src\n 3. Sending a packet through AF_PACKET\n\nSince TUN in L3 mode has no link-layer header, mac_header points to\nthe L3 data area. The flow dissector reads 12 bytes of uninitialized\nskb memory, which then propagates through fl_set_masked_key() and is\nused as a rhashtable lookup key in __fl_lookup(), as reported by KMSAN.\n\nRejecting the filter in the control path (at tc filter add time) is\nnot feasible because TC filter blocks can be shared between arbitrary\ndevices -- a filter installed on an Ethernet device may later classify\npackets on a headerless device through a shared block. The device\nassociation is not fixed at filter creation time.\n\nFix this by gating the memcpy on dev-\u003etype == ARPHRD_ETHER, which\nensures only true Ethernet-framed packets have their addresses read.\nThis is more precise than the previous hard_header_len \u003e= 12 check,\nwhich would incorrectly pass for non-Ethernet link types like IPoIB\n(ARPHRD_INFINIBAND, hard_header_len=24) and FDDI (hard_header_len=21)\nwhose L2 headers are not in Ethernet format. Additionally check\nskb_mac_header_was_set() to guard against the pathological case where\nmac_header is the unset sentinel (~0U), which would cause eth_hdr() to\nreturn a wild pointer.\n\nFor the act_mirred redirect case (Ethernet packet redirected to a\nnon-Ethernet device sharing a TC block), zeroing the key is the correct\nbehavior: the packet is now being classified on the target device, where\nEthernet address matching is not semantically meaningful.\n\nNote: on non-Ethernet devices, the zeroed key will match a filter\nconfigured with all-zero MAC addresses. This is an improvement over the\nprevious behavior where uninitialized memory could randomly match any\nfilter."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-72444",
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:19:11.817",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "LOCAL",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 7.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 1.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-15T06:22:18.280",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0fe6455b8e1a22414f39c07bc90a1df12b52ec74"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/594c90b197141944f25991b8314de5c26ee27a7e"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/825de39f0c35a112148799b3cbe45af3766c018a"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9a65860959db594dfc1820c7fdc09285fb7556bf"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bf6e8af2c8be77489bedeae9f8a9654cb710e500"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c6d3bcb0f934d4297ac5fa1c8656ae40694fb601"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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