FKIE_CVE-2026-72441
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-15 06:22 - Updated: 2026-08-17 06:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ieee802154: fix kernel-infoleak in dgram_recvmsg()
KMSAN reported a kernel-infoleak in move_addr_to_user():
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user
include/linux/instrumented.h:131 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _inline_copy_to_user
include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xcc/0x120
lib/usercopy.c:26
instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:131 [inline]
_inline_copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0xcc/0x120 lib/usercopy.c:26
copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
move_addr_to_user+0x2e7/0x440 net/socket.c:302
____sys_recvmsg+0x232/0x610 net/socket.c:2925
...
Uninit was stored to memory at:
ieee802154_addr_to_sa include/net/ieee802154_netdev.h:369 [inline]
dgram_recvmsg+0xa09/0xbe0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:739
The issue occurs because the `pan_id` field of `struct ieee802154_addr`
is left uninitialized when the address mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`.
The execution flow is as follows:
1. `__ieee802154_rx_handle_packet()` declares a local `struct
ieee802154_hdr hdr` on the stack.
2. `ieee802154_hdr_pull()` calls `ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` to parse
the source and destination addresses into this structure.
3. If the address mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`,
`ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` previously only set the `mode` field,
leaving the `pan_id` field containing uninitialized stack memory.
4. This uninitialized `pan_id` is later copied into a `struct
sockaddr_ieee802154` in `dgram_recvmsg()` via `ieee802154_addr_to_sa()`.
5. Finally, `move_addr_to_user()` copies the socket address structure to
user space, leaking the uninitialized bytes.
Fix this by using `memset` to zero out the address structure in
`ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` when the mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ieee802154/header_ops.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "a2ee1a038a16e286d084bc293a7522d010a59ec3",
"status": "affected",
"version": "94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "09cfe665f2c5d7a8a5ed4d6b487434a011325368",
"status": "affected",
"version": "94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "c88e687e44cb9c7690f5039a5a5941dba1f6a204",
"status": "affected",
"version": "94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "71b5add66c51d6764325de5f2e300bbf4f39e7a6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "fc8766467b53335220b4b594ba15bc8f8cee0c76",
"status": "affected",
"version": "94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "de3bd9809af7555611334cb6a071806744430ef7",
"status": "affected",
"version": "94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "f14802465f5956baafe5f4b4541eb626b06b41f1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4db86f8ab11b5a41bfc36680be837e6ac1375ec6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "94b4f6c21cf54029377a0645675a9d81b6cf890d",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/ieee802154/header_ops.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "3.15"
},
{
"lessThan": "3.15",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.261",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.212",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.178",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.145",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.97",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.40",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nieee802154: fix kernel-infoleak in dgram_recvmsg()\n\nKMSAN reported a kernel-infoleak in move_addr_to_user():\n\nBUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in instrument_copy_to_user\ninclude/linux/instrumented.h:131 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _inline_copy_to_user\ninclude/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]\nBUG: KMSAN: kernel-infoleak in _copy_to_user+0xcc/0x120\nlib/usercopy.c:26\n instrument_copy_to_user include/linux/instrumented.h:131 [inline]\n _inline_copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]\n _copy_to_user+0xcc/0x120 lib/usercopy.c:26\n copy_to_user include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]\n move_addr_to_user+0x2e7/0x440 net/socket.c:302\n ____sys_recvmsg+0x232/0x610 net/socket.c:2925\n ...\n Uninit was stored to memory at:\n ieee802154_addr_to_sa include/net/ieee802154_netdev.h:369 [inline]\n dgram_recvmsg+0xa09/0xbe0 net/ieee802154/socket.c:739\n\nThe issue occurs because the `pan_id` field of `struct ieee802154_addr`\nis left uninitialized when the address mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`.\nThe execution flow is as follows:\n\n1. `__ieee802154_rx_handle_packet()` declares a local `struct\nieee802154_hdr hdr` on the stack.\n2. `ieee802154_hdr_pull()` calls `ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` to parse\nthe source and destination addresses into this structure.\n3. If the address mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`,\n`ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` previously only set the `mode` field,\nleaving the `pan_id` field containing uninitialized stack memory.\n4. This uninitialized `pan_id` is later copied into a `struct\nsockaddr_ieee802154` in `dgram_recvmsg()` via `ieee802154_addr_to_sa()`.\n5. Finally, `move_addr_to_user()` copies the socket address structure to\nuser space, leaking the uninitialized bytes.\n\nFix this by using `memset` to zero out the address structure in\n`ieee802154_hdr_get_addr()` when the mode is `IEEE802154_ADDR_NONE`."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-72441",
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:19:11.477",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-08-15T06:22:17.937",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/09cfe665f2c5d7a8a5ed4d6b487434a011325368"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4db86f8ab11b5a41bfc36680be837e6ac1375ec6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/71b5add66c51d6764325de5f2e300bbf4f39e7a6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a2ee1a038a16e286d084bc293a7522d010a59ec3"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c88e687e44cb9c7690f5039a5a5941dba1f6a204"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/de3bd9809af7555611334cb6a071806744430ef7"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f14802465f5956baafe5f4b4541eb626b06b41f1"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc8766467b53335220b4b594ba15bc8f8cee0c76"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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