FKIE_CVE-2026-72407
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-15 06:22 - Updated: 2026-08-17 06:19
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
geneve: validate inner network offset in geneve_gro_complete()
Even with both paths gated on gs->gro_hint, geneve_gro_complete()
re-derives the inner dispatch type and length from the packet and the
current gs->gro_hint, independently of geneve_gro_receive(). The two can
disagree if gs->gro_hint flips under a concurrent geneve_quiesce()/
geneve_unquiesce() (sk_user_data is NULL across a synchronize_net()), or if
the re-read option bytes differ from the ones receive parsed.
geneve_gro_receive() already records the inner network header position in
NAPI_GRO_CB()->inner_network_offset. Have geneve_gro_complete() compute the
offset it is about to dispatch at, adding ETH_HLEN in the ETH_P_TEB case
where eth_gro_complete() steps over the inner MAC header, and bail out if
it lands past inner_network_offset.
Use a lower bound rather than exact equality: between gh_len and the inner
L3 header, geneve_gro_receive() may also have pulled an inner VLAN tag
(vlan_gro_receive() advances the recorded offset past it), which only moves
inner_network_offset further out. A valid frame therefore always satisfies
inner_nh <= inner_network_offset, while a gh_len inflated by a hint
gro_receive() did not honour dispatches past the validated inner header,
i.e. the out-of-bounds completion. Only the latter is rejected.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/geneve.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "e2087447f562692ff0cd08a0554d8d4ad083aa5c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "fd0dd796576e1a560e1441e665810129f0a82be0",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "cbb0d30a1ad6fc9439b1dc9b4f5a7a9140d3b11f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "fd0dd796576e1a560e1441e665810129f0a82be0",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"drivers/net/geneve.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ngeneve: validate inner network offset in geneve_gro_complete()\n\nEven with both paths gated on gs-\u003egro_hint, geneve_gro_complete()\nre-derives the inner dispatch type and length from the packet and the\ncurrent gs-\u003egro_hint, independently of geneve_gro_receive(). The two can\ndisagree if gs-\u003egro_hint flips under a concurrent geneve_quiesce()/\ngeneve_unquiesce() (sk_user_data is NULL across a synchronize_net()), or if\nthe re-read option bytes differ from the ones receive parsed.\n\ngeneve_gro_receive() already records the inner network header position in\nNAPI_GRO_CB()-\u003einner_network_offset. Have geneve_gro_complete() compute the\noffset it is about to dispatch at, adding ETH_HLEN in the ETH_P_TEB case\nwhere eth_gro_complete() steps over the inner MAC header, and bail out if\nit lands past inner_network_offset.\n\nUse a lower bound rather than exact equality: between gh_len and the inner\nL3 header, geneve_gro_receive() may also have pulled an inner VLAN tag\n(vlan_gro_receive() advances the recorded offset past it), which only moves\ninner_network_offset further out. A valid frame therefore always satisfies\ninner_nh \u003c= inner_network_offset, while a gh_len inflated by a hint\ngro_receive() did not honour dispatches past the validated inner header,\ni.e. the out-of-bounds completion. Only the latter is rejected."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-72407",
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:19:07.453",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 10.0,
"baseSeverity": "CRITICAL",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
"impactScore": 6.0,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-15T06:22:14.300",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cbb0d30a1ad6fc9439b1dc9b4f5a7a9140d3b11f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e2087447f562692ff0cd08a0554d8d4ad083aa5c"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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