FKIE_CVE-2026-72333
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-15 06:22 - Updated: 2026-08-17 06:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: L2CAP: fix tx ident leak for commands without a response
Commit 6c3ea155e5ee ("Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix not tracking outstanding
TX ident") changed ident allocation to use an IDA, releasing idents in
l2cap_put_ident() when the matching response command is received.
But identifiers allocated for commands that have no response defined
are never released. In particular L2CAP_LE_CREDITS is sent repeatedly for
the lifetime of an LE CoC channel, so a peer streaming data to the
host exhausts the 1-255 ident range after 254 credit packets. From
then on l2cap_get_ident() fails:
kernel: Bluetooth: Unable to allocate ident: -28
and every subsequent L2CAP_LE_CREDITS packet is sent with ident 0,
which is invalid (Core Spec, Vol 3, Part A, Section 4: "Signaling
identifier 0x00 is an invalid identifier and shall never be used in
any command"). Remote stacks that validate the ident drop these
commands, never receive new credits, and the channel stalls
permanently. With default socket buffers this happens after roughly 0.5 MB
of received data (the exact amount depends on the socket receive buffer):
< ACL Data TX: Handle 2048 flags 0x00 dlen 12
LE L2CAP: LE Flow Control Credit (0x16) ident 0 len 4
Source CID: 64
Credits: 1
Release the ident immediately after sending L2CAP_LE_CREDITS since no
response will ever release it. Use a local variable instead of
chan->ident so that an ident that an EXT_FLOWCTL channel may be waiting on
(e.g. a pending reconfigure) is not overwritten by a credit packet.
Also add the missing L2CAP_LE_CONN_RSP case to l2cap_put_ident() so
idents allocated for outgoing L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ commands are released
when the response arrives.
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "b8a32a5fc915b024c60f18d51b6cffd2bd64d4a6",
"status": "affected",
"version": "e86554c37d3d2b4b24608e0313f882cae28b8adb",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "bd1e01170341291292fd4c46b5f6949da282ca6c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "9b24ad4787cad46a3917620799f8455c6533b8df",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "0c602cb8f148a36bfb39c25ade400bdadc023c4f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "ea6cf86167b3972caa68972d2a1ad43ecbbb8331",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "d0a2b0c81f112540a337cde1c20251bf05ddf1da",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6c3ea155e5ee3e56606233acde8309afda66d483",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6e1930ece855a4c256f1c7e6632d634cfb9888b5",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6c3ea155e5ee3e56606233acde8309afda66d483",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "ed97bb2cf96684ee646be6f37e4c4835f9d30caa",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "84bc3197f7d87c5b89c156e853d0561a9154eceb",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "8c1cdbc1bacc0cf9c27c3ebda11a81c3dcd01630",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.18.40",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.18.21",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.11",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.10.261",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "5.16",
"status": "affected",
"version": "5.15.212",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThan": "6.20",
"status": "affected",
"version": "6.19.11",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "7.0"
},
{
"lessThan": "7.0",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.40",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: L2CAP: fix tx ident leak for commands without a response\n\nCommit 6c3ea155e5ee (\"Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix not tracking outstanding\nTX ident\") changed ident allocation to use an IDA, releasing idents in\nl2cap_put_ident() when the matching response command is received.\n\nBut identifiers allocated for commands that have no response defined\nare never released. In particular L2CAP_LE_CREDITS is sent repeatedly for\nthe lifetime of an LE CoC channel, so a peer streaming data to the\nhost exhausts the 1-255 ident range after 254 credit packets. From\nthen on l2cap_get_ident() fails:\n\n kernel: Bluetooth: Unable to allocate ident: -28\n\nand every subsequent L2CAP_LE_CREDITS packet is sent with ident 0,\nwhich is invalid (Core Spec, Vol 3, Part A, Section 4: \"Signaling\nidentifier 0x00 is an invalid identifier and shall never be used in\nany command\"). Remote stacks that validate the ident drop these\ncommands, never receive new credits, and the channel stalls\npermanently. With default socket buffers this happens after roughly 0.5 MB\nof received data (the exact amount depends on the socket receive buffer):\n\n \u003c ACL Data TX: Handle 2048 flags 0x00 dlen 12\n LE L2CAP: LE Flow Control Credit (0x16) ident 0 len 4\n Source CID: 64\n Credits: 1\n\nRelease the ident immediately after sending L2CAP_LE_CREDITS since no\nresponse will ever release it. Use a local variable instead of\nchan-\u003eident so that an ident that an EXT_FLOWCTL channel may be waiting on\n(e.g. a pending reconfigure) is not overwritten by a credit packet.\n\nAlso add the missing L2CAP_LE_CONN_RSP case to l2cap_put_ident() so\nidents allocated for outgoing L2CAP_LE_CONN_REQ commands are released\nwhen the response arrives."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-72333",
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:18:36.910",
"metrics": {},
"published": "2026-08-15T06:22:06.433",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c602cb8f148a36bfb39c25ade400bdadc023c4f"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6e1930ece855a4c256f1c7e6632d634cfb9888b5"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8a32a5fc915b024c60f18d51b6cffd2bd64d4a6"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bd1e01170341291292fd4c46b5f6949da282ca6c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0a2b0c81f112540a337cde1c20251bf05ddf1da"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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