FKIE_CVE-2026-72160
Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-08-15 06:21 - Updated: 2026-08-17 06:18
Severity
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: reject dinodes with non-canonical i_mode type
Patch series "ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata", v2.
This series adds three structural checks to OCFS2 dinode validation so
malformed on-disk fields are rejected before ocfs2_populate_inode() copies
them into the in-core inode.
The checks cover:
- i_mode values whose type bits do not name a canonical POSIX file
type;
- non-device dinodes whose id1.dev1.i_rdev field is non-zero; and
- non-inline dinodes that claim non-zero i_size while i_clusters is
zero, covering directories unconditionally and regular files on
non-sparse volumes.
The normal read path reports these through ocfs2_error(), matching the
existing suballoc-slot, inline-data, chain-list, and refcount checks. The
online filecheck path uses the same structural predicates but keeps its
own reporting contract, returning OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead
of calling ocfs2_error().
This patch (of 3):
ocfs2_validate_inode_block() currently accepts any non-zero i_mode value.
ocfs2_populate_inode() then copies that mode verbatim into inode->i_mode
and dispatches on i_mode & S_IFMT to the file/dir/symlink/special_file
iops; an unrecognised type falls through to ocfs2_special_file_iops and
init_special_inode().
Reject dinodes whose type bits do not name one of the seven canonical
POSIX file types. Use fs_umode_to_ftype(), the same generic file-type
conversion helper OCFS2 already uses for directory entries, so the
accepted inode type set matches the kernel file-type vocabulary instead of
open-coding a local switch.
Apply the same structural check to the online filecheck read path.
filecheck keeps its own error namespace, so it reports malformed i_mode
through the filecheck logger and OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of
calling ocfs2_error(), but it must not allow a malformed dinode to proceed
into ocfs2_populate_inode().
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"defaultStatus": "unaffected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ocfs2/inode.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "2e3aac33988ef4e4170141db8e995693ea38357c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "fb024ea29f6cb1f01745e5f2e31646f3acb9aa6f",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "157d31ef45038d89cd19620105e082d43c8e41e0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "a5b555bcabbb0aff8745ad181768eaf9d964c1ee",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "82afe13558354390d8a592a5334d5f4fd72c0e5c",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "4db3b6a2a8ecf2a89d26a4090ace4072c6fad050",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "b858f2d57cfc9d57ce61b86051d603dc0ebccd40",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12",
"versionType": "git"
},
{
"lessThan": "5366a017099c6a3c443be908a05f26fd72af12a1",
"status": "affected",
"version": "b657c95c11088d77fc1bfc9c84d940f778bf9d12",
"versionType": "git"
}
]
},
{
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"product": "Linux",
"programFiles": [
"fs/ocfs2/inode.c"
],
"repo": "https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git",
"vendor": "Linux",
"versions": [
{
"status": "affected",
"version": "2.6.29"
},
{
"lessThan": "2.6.29",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.10.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.10.261",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "5.15.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "5.15.212",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.1.178",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.6.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.6.145",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.12.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.12.97",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "6.18.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "6.18.40",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "7.1.*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.1.5",
"versionType": "semver"
},
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "*",
"status": "unaffected",
"version": "7.2",
"versionType": "original_commit_for_fix"
}
]
}
],
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nocfs2: reject dinodes with non-canonical i_mode type\n\nPatch series \"ocfs2: harden inode validators against forged metadata\", v2.\n\nThis series adds three structural checks to OCFS2 dinode validation so\nmalformed on-disk fields are rejected before ocfs2_populate_inode() copies\nthem into the in-core inode.\n\nThe checks cover:\n\n - i_mode values whose type bits do not name a canonical POSIX file\n type;\n - non-device dinodes whose id1.dev1.i_rdev field is non-zero; and\n - non-inline dinodes that claim non-zero i_size while i_clusters is\n zero, covering directories unconditionally and regular files on\n non-sparse volumes.\n\nThe normal read path reports these through ocfs2_error(), matching the\nexisting suballoc-slot, inline-data, chain-list, and refcount checks. The\nonline filecheck path uses the same structural predicates but keeps its\nown reporting contract, returning OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead\nof calling ocfs2_error().\n\n\nThis patch (of 3):\n\nocfs2_validate_inode_block() currently accepts any non-zero i_mode value. \nocfs2_populate_inode() then copies that mode verbatim into inode-\u003ei_mode\nand dispatches on i_mode \u0026 S_IFMT to the file/dir/symlink/special_file\niops; an unrecognised type falls through to ocfs2_special_file_iops and\ninit_special_inode().\n\nReject dinodes whose type bits do not name one of the seven canonical\nPOSIX file types. Use fs_umode_to_ftype(), the same generic file-type\nconversion helper OCFS2 already uses for directory entries, so the\naccepted inode type set matches the kernel file-type vocabulary instead of\nopen-coding a local switch.\n\nApply the same structural check to the online filecheck read path. \nfilecheck keeps its own error namespace, so it reports malformed i_mode\nthrough the filecheck logger and OCFS2_FILECHECK_ERR_INVALIDINO instead of\ncalling ocfs2_error(), but it must not allow a malformed dinode to proceed\ninto ocfs2_populate_inode()."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-72160",
"lastModified": "2026-08-17T06:18:16.247",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV31": [
{
"cvssData": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
"impactScore": 5.9,
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
},
"published": "2026-08-15T06:21:33.850",
"references": [
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/157d31ef45038d89cd19620105e082d43c8e41e0"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2e3aac33988ef4e4170141db8e995693ea38357c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4db3b6a2a8ecf2a89d26a4090ace4072c6fad050"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5366a017099c6a3c443be908a05f26fd72af12a1"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/82afe13558354390d8a592a5334d5f4fd72c0e5c"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a5b555bcabbb0aff8745ad181768eaf9d964c1ee"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b858f2d57cfc9d57ce61b86051d603dc0ebccd40"
},
{
"source": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb024ea29f6cb1f01745e5f2e31646f3acb9aa6f"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"vulnStatus": "Received"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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